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Ever since the 1997 Asian financial crisis which originated in Thailand, corporate 
governance has captured the world’s attention, particularly in Thailand and other 
emerging economies. This thesis contributes to the empirical evidence of ownership 
structure and concentration from a governance perspective. Specifically, the thesis 
explores the manner by which family control and institutional environment influence 
corporate decision-making and other stakeholders. Focusing on Thailand’s financial 
market, the thesis identifies different key dimensions of family control and undertakes 
three studies regarding: (i) the relationship between family control and dividend 
payment; (ii) the effect of family control on the cost of debt; and (iii) the association 
between family ownership and firm value during times of political uncertainty. 
Prior studies mainly focus on the family control-financial performance relationship 
yet little is known about the channels through which controlling families affect firm 
performance, particularly in emerging markets, which are characterized by weak legal 
systems and poor corporate governance regulations. To better understand this 
relationship, the first study examines the impact of family control on dividend payment. 
Agency theory suggests that controlling families’ tendency to expropriate minority 
shareholders can lead to inefficient use of free cash flow by reducing dividend payment. 
The results show that family firms significantly pay lower dividends than non-family 
firms. The effects are more pronounced when controlling families exert greater 
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ownership and have family members on the company boards. The effect of family 
control on dividend payment also varies according to corporate governance mechanisms; 
lower wedge and less free cash flow lead to higher dividend payment in family firms. 
Based on an exogenous political event in Thailand, we address the endogeneity 
concerns that exist between family control and dividend payment, and find that the 
negative relationship between family control and dividend payment increases in times 
of political uncertainty. This is due to the rent-seeking behavior related to establishing 
connections with new politicians and/or their parties. Those findings support the view 
that families are more likely to expropriate resources from their companies in emerging 
markets due to the weak institutional and regulatory environments, and poor investor 
protection systems in place.   
The second study investigates the influence of family control on cost of debt in 
Thailand. We analyse the incentives behind controlling families’ financing decisions 
which help sustain their long-run survivability. Family firms in Thailand have lower 
debt financing costs compared to non-family firms. The lower cost of external debt 
financing predominates in highly profitable family firms insofar that these firms are 
reputable and concerned with their long-term survival. Added to this, family firms 
benefit from the strong and trustworthy relationships they established with creditors, 
which help to alleviate information asymmetry in Thailand’s weak institutional 
environment. Those results are robust to possible confounding effect of bank-connected 
lending, possible endogeneity issues, different proxies for family control and control 
variables, and the use of matched samples. 
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Finally, as a number of studies investigate the impact of family ownership on firm 
performance during normal periods, the third study examines the relationship between 
family control and firm value during political uncertainty. Thailand’s constitutional 
change arising from the 2014 coup d’état is used as an exogenous shock. What is 
revealed here is the role of political uncertainty which can remove firms’ sense of 
equilibrium and amplifies the implications of family control influencing a business’s 
market value and use of resources. The results show that Thai family firms perform 
poorly when compared to non-family firms, during the period of political uncertainty. 
The effect is more pronounced when firms have high expected agency costs from 
minority shareholders. Family firms delay their investments, hold less cash, pay smaller 
dividends and have poorer access to debt financing sources when compared to non-
family firms. The reductions in investment and financing activities may at least partially 
account for their underperformance. This evidence is consistent with the view that 
family control enhances firms’ survivorship by establishing political connections in 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
A key financial variable in the business sector is ownership structure and 
concentration. Controlling shareholders influence firms’ policies and values. Ownership 
structure and concentration are also used as an internal governance mechanism which is 
pertinent to firms’ corporate governance, especially in family firms. These types of 
businesses share a common trait in many nations around the world (Claessens et al. 
2000; Anderson & Reeb 2003; Kotlar et al. 2018; Williams Jr et al. 2018). In addition, 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth and market capitalization are significantly 
attributed to family firms (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Dyer 
2018). Hence, the implications for family control play an important role in any economy.  
For decades, both theoretical and empirical literature on family ownership structure 
and its control have documented that as a controlling shareholder, families have control 
over corporate decision-making which influences firm value. Controlling families are 
different from other types of controlling shareholders since they are a homogeneous 
group of individuals. Therefore, controlling families’ interests might be different from 
those of other investors, for instance minority shareholders and creditors (Villalonga & 
Amit 2006), which might lead controlling families to make corporate decisions based on 
their vested interests. This phenomenon is typical of emerging countries where investor 
protection is weak and corporate governance is underdeveloped (Claessens et al. 2000).  
Theoretically, the relationship between controlling families and other investors 
originates from the agency theory framework. Family control is expected to have two 
opposite views on agency costs (Claessens et al. 2002). On the one hand, controlling 
families might be concerned with firms’ survival. Family control is beneficial and 
serves to monitor and control firms’ decisions are being taken in the best interests of all 
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investors. This effect can be referred to as “the survivorship view”, mitigating agency 
costs. On the other hand, controlling families might apply their dominant position to 
extract private benefits of control and expropriate other investors. Family control can be 
detrimental and lead to an increase in agency costs. This effect can be referred to as “the 
expropriation view”. The impact of family control on firms’ performance and decisions 
depends on which effect dominates.  
Typically, most prior studies on family firms have highlighted the implications of 
family ownership structure for firm performance in developed markets such as the U.S. 
economy where ownership is dispersed and investor protection laws are strong 
(Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; King & Santor 2008). Unlike family 
firms in developed markets, controlling families in other international context, 
particularly emerging markets, where ownership is concentrated, and investor protection 
is weaker, usually involve family management, and they also enhance their power via 
family business groups and affiliations in order to preserve the family empire. However, 
there are weak findings on the role of family control in emerging markets. While prior 
studies mainly focus on the effects of family ownership structure on firm performance 
(Anderson & Reeb 2003; Dyer 2018; Fattoum-Guedri et al. 2018), investigations into 
the channels affecting firm performance are sparse. For this reason, the empirical results 
on the effect of family control on firm value and policies particularly in emerging 
markets are inconclusive. 
Recently there has been a dramatic increase in investment in developing countries, 
while concurrently a number of economic crises have occurred in these markets. These 
trends reflect the rising importance of emerging markets as an alternative investment 
allocation, which is in part driven by global financial integration. Compared to 
developed markets, emerging markets have different institutional environments in terms 
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of legal system, quality of governance, level of corruption as well as ownership 
structure and concentration. Hence, these unique institutional environments in which 
emerging markets operate have drawn significant interests amongst researchers to 
examine their influence on firms’ behavior. 
Thailand was the origin of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and its capital market as 
one of the essential emerging markets in East Asia, is characterized by weak 
institutional environment and poor governance. Thai family firms have existed for many 
decades and they play a key role in the country’s economic development. Controlling 
families preserve their family empire via direct and disproportional ownership structures 
as well as family involvement in day-to-day management. They have worked to 
establish their social connections and implemented control decisions and managerial 
behavior. Equally, the government plays an active role in promoting economic 
development. Unfortunately, Thai politics have been marked by a great deal of 
corruption and intense political uncertainty between an unstable democracy and coups 
d’état. With the lack of investor protection, Thai firms have operated in a weak 
corporate governance environment with a high level of information asymmetry. These 
institutional environments experienced by Thai businesses differentiate them from 
family firms in other economies. 
Consequently, by focusing on Thailand’s economy, this thesis seeks to fill this gap 
in our knowledge by empirically investigating the agency conflicts between controlling 
families and other investors such as minority shareholders and creditors. To 
comprehend the behavior of family firms and their control of business decision-making, 
three studies concerning the effect of family control on dividend payment and the cost 
of debt as well as its impact on firm value influenced by the times of political 
uncertainty, are provided. To generate greater insights on family control in firms’ 
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decision-making, this thesis also examines three major dimensions of family control, 
namely family ownership structure 1 , control-ownership wedge 2  and family 
management3. This thesis chooses Thailand as a case study to understand how family 
control works generally in emerging markets.  
The empirical findings presented in this thesis demonstrate the impact of the unique 
institutional environments on firms’ behavior and outcomes, and by evaluating the 
quality of corporate governance and its implications these findings inform the 
development of regulations and policies to resolve agency conflicts in emerging 
countries such as Thailand. The next section provides a brief description of Thailand’s 
institutional background.  
1.2 Institutional background 
1.2.1 Family businesses in Thailand 
In Thailand, family firms have traditionally been the dominant type of business 
corporations. They became more pronounced after the 1997 Asian financial crisis or the 
Tom Yum Goong crisis, which started in Thailand and hugely undermined the 
economies throughout the Asian region. Since then, most Thai family firms have 
experienced financial difficulties, and they have restructured to be publicly traded on 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) as a result of needing additional capital from 
outsiders (Connelly et al. 2012). The SET thus became an important market for capital 
financing by the corporate sector. This also assists family firms in contributing more 
 
 
1 Family ownership structure is measured by two proxies. The first proxy is a family firm dummy defined 
as the blockholders who are founder and/or family members by either blood or marriage 
(Wiwattanakantang 2001; Villalonga & Amit 2006). Another proxy is family ownership which is defined 
as the control rights held by controlling families (La Porta et al. 1999). 
2 Control-ownership wedge is defined as the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of 
controlling families (Claessens et al. 2002; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Lin et al. 2011). 




than 25% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 33% of market 
capitalization in the stock market in 2015. Additionally, in the sample employed in this 
thesis, the number of family firms on the SET had increased substantially to 63% of 
total listed firms by the end of 2015.  
Compared to other types of shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders or a 
collective of independent investors, Thai family firms possess unique characteristics. In 
Thailand, blood ties and marriage are considered to be the most trustworthy form of 
family connections. Hence, family members are heavily involved in management and 
policy-making through being on boards as directors or CEOs, rather than employing 
external professional managers (Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). In the sample employed in 
this thesis, 96% of family firms have members who work on the board of directors or 
management team in 2015. Also, controlling families have both economic goals for the 
business and non-economic family goals (such as family harmony and social status). 
This makes family firms different from other firms.  
Additionally, in this nation most families have extended their business empires in 
various industry sectors such as agriculture, food and beverage, automotive manufacture, 
industrial materials, steel, construction materials, and commerce (Bertrand et al. 2008). 
Controlling families maintain their influence of their firms directly by holding the bulk 
of shares and/or indirectly through disproportional ownership structures. Interestingly, 
the disproportional ownership structures via business groups leading to divergence 
between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling families, can force controlling 
families to pursue their own incentives. Due to the low level of investor protection and 
corporate governance and high ownership concentration in Thailand, the property rights 
of firms’ owners are weakly protected. Taken together, family control has the potential 
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to encourage expropriation activities. Thus, in family firms the agency conflict between 
controlling shareholders and other investors is more severe (Villalonga & Amit 2006). 
It should be noted that Thai family firms have operated since the end of the absolute 
monarchy in 1932.  In the sample employed in this thesis, family firms listed on the 
SET are 30 years old, on average. Since institutional environment is weak and 
corruption is prevalent, controlling families have sought to establish connections and 
long-term relationship with banks (Charumilind et al. 2006) and powerful politicians 
including traditional, bureaucratic and military elites (Polsiri & Jiraporn 2012) to obtain 
better access to external financial resources and business opportunities which 
consequently improve firm value. Therefore, Thai family firms are more likely to be 
concerned about long-term survivorship and reputation. Based on the unique 
characteristics of family firms in Thailand, it is worth examining the implications of 
family control in Thailand. 
1.2.2 Financial sector reform and ownership structure 
Following  the late 1990s Asian financial crisis, Thailand began a process of 
economic policy reform to support economic growth and political stability. Since one of 
the main causes of the crisis was the rapid expansion of companies through high levels 
of debt, Thailand’s financial sector, which mainly consists of domestic commercial 
banks and financial companies, became the main target of these reforms to reduce 
businesses’ non-performing loans (NPLs). Before the crisis most domestic commercial 
banks and financial companies were established by family groups. Therefore, lending 
by financial institutions depends on family connections rather than how well a company 
performed. This imprudent lending is mainly in the form of credit loans granted at low 
interest rates or no collateral.  
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After the crisis, to increase corporate governance and the country’s stability, the 
Bank of Thailand (BOT, the central bank in Thailand) implemented a series of reforms, 
particularly in 1997 and 2004. According to the reforms in 1997, individual 
shareholders were limited to owning shares for banks and financial companies at 5% 
and 10%, respectively. Also, following the reforms in 2004, banks were required to 
reduce their outstanding loans to connected companies otherwise they would be 
required to have their senior executives surrender their company directorships if they 
held more than 1% of the company’s equity. Taken together, those reforms increased 
corporate governance and transferred the ownership of some Thai financial institutions 
from families to other types of controlling shareholders such as foreigners or the 
government. However, Thailand’s financial sector remains concentrated since the five 
largest banks still account for about 69% of total assets in the banking system in 2015 
(Bank of Thailand 2015). Thus, post-crisis, it is interesting to understand how the 
changes of family control affect other investors, corporate policies and firms’ market 
value. 
1.2.3 Political uncertainty in Thailand 
The importance of political uncertainty has been widely investigated in various 
contexts around the world. In Thailand, politics have long been marked by intense 
political uncertainty between an unstable democracy and coup d’état, in which the 
military seizes control and replaces elected governments. Between 1932 and 2015, there 
were 20 constitutions and 20 coups. Thailand has faced a series of prolonged political 
crises and upheaval leading to a change in the political system, from constitution to 
coup d’état, which affects economic growth and firms’ behaviors. These events have 
proved to be very severe when it comes to the change in the constitution experienced by 
the 2014 coup d’état. At least 28 people died and more than 700 were injured during 
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this period of political uncertainty.4 As a result, Thai economy declined and the gross 
domestic product (GDP) fell by 2.1% in 2014.5 
In Thailand, the government plays an active role in promoting economic 
development. Since Thailand has weak economic fundamentals and legal system, firms’ 
decisions are influenced by events involving the government (Bunkanwanicha & 
Wiwattanakantang 2009), not helped by the high degree of corruption in this nation. 
According to Transparency International, in 2015 Thailand scored only 38 out of 100 
(where 100 is ideal) on corruption, making it 76th out of 167 countries. As such, to 
survive during times of political uncertainty, controlling families are more likely to 
extracts firms’ resources at the expense of minority shareholders in order to establish or 
reinforce existing political connections through their friendships and board nominations. 
Thus, from this perspective, this thesis contends that political uncertainty provides an 
exogenous shock which can attenuate endogeneity issues. 
1.3 Aims and contributions 
Ownership structure and concentration have received extensive attention in recent 
research on corporate finance and governance since it is crucial to reform and develop 
economies in emerging markets. Family control is the key factor to developing reliable 
corporate governance. Regarding the importance of family control and its influence on 
firms’ policies and market value, three studies are offered in this thesis and make 
several key contributions to the literature on this topic. 
The first study aims to investigate the effect of family control on dividend payment, 
one of the significant policies that signal firm value and is used as an internal 
governance mechanism to mitigate the agency costs associated with free cash flow 
 
 
4 Time, http://time.com/108719/thai-army-declares-military-coup/ (May 22, 2014). 
5 Time, http://time.com/4448655/thailand-constitutional-referendum/ (August 11, 2016). 
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(Jensen & Meckling 1976; Isakov & Weisskopf 2015). There is a large body of 
evidence on dividend policy in the presence of an agency problem between managers 
and shareholders in ownership literature, especially in developed countries. However, 
how dividend policy can be affected by agency conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders has not been fully explored, particularly in 
family firms operating in emerging markets where investor protection is weak and 
family control via family ownership structure and family management, is prevalent. 
This study therefore extends the previous literature by examining the effect of family 
control on dividend payment in emerging markets, and it seeks to answer the question: 
does family control affect dividend policy? More generally, how are corporate decisions 
made under conditions of family control affected by the unique environment in which 
Thai listed firms operate? An investigation into the impact of family control on dividend 
payment is deemed essential because this can reveal the importance of institutional 
environment that can significantly affect the use of free cash flow, and conflicts of 
interest between controlling families and minority shareholders in family firms. 
Thus, it expands on the previous literature by examining the effect of family control 
on dividend payment in emerging markets. It indicates that the weak institutional 
environment in emerging markets has serious implications for family control, the 
inefficient use of excess cash flow and lower dividend payment. An investigation into 
the impact of family control on dividend payment is deemed essential because this can 
reveal the importance of institutional environment increasing the conflicts of interest 
between controlling families and minority shareholders in family firms. 
To advance our comprehension of family control, the second study extends the 
research to firms’ ability to access external debt financing. It relates to the agency 
conflict between controlling shareholders and creditors. Due to the lack of an arm’s 
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length market-driven system, lending relationship and long-term affinities between 
controlling families and creditors, this can bring benefits to family firms such as more 
capital (Schwert 2018), longer investment horizons (Faccio 2010), more access to long-
term debt (Charumilind et al. 2006) and better monitoring of managerial activities 
(Fama & Jensen 1983). It is highly likely that established family firms which have 
developed and expanded their businesses for many decades have also maintained long-
lasting and trustworthy relationships with banks to access debt funding as part of their 
survival measures in the long run (Behr & Güttler 2007; Croci et al. 2011). While there 
is a large literature focusing on leverage, loan collateral and debt maturity in emerging 
markets (Shyu & Lee 2009; Liu et al. 2011; Díaz-Díaz et al. 2016; Pan & Tian 2016), 
empirical evidence on the cost of debt from a governance perspective is sparse, 
particularly in emerging markets like Thailand. Accordingly, this study adds to the 
extant literature by examining the behavior of family firms and their decision-making 
on the cost of debt and it addresses an important question on how do family control 
influence the cost of debt? This study can provide greater insights into the influence of 
family control on financing decisions in the corporate finance literature. The lending 
relationship between controlling families and creditors affects access to external debt 
financing. 
Therefore, this thesis adds to the extant literature by examining the behavior of 
family firms and their decision-making on the access of external debt financing. firms’ 
cost of debt financing. It documents the empirical evidence of lower cost of debt 
resulting from family control. This reflects the fact that under the lack of an arm’s 
length market-driven system family control is advantageous in securing external finance 
at lower cost, stemming from their long-lasting relationships with creditors. These 
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findings help us to understand the link between family ownership and firm performance 
observed by previous studies. 
The third study concerns the influence of political uncertainty on the relationship 
between family control and firm value. Unexpected political uncertainty poses a threat 
to the survivorship of family firms. In the face of political uncertainty family firms have 
a propensity to enhance their firms’ survivorship by using internal firms’ resources to 
establish or sustain political connections in times of political uncertainty at the expense 
of minority shareholders. It is widely acknowledged that political connections can 
provide firms with regulatory protection and financial assistance from the government 
(Faccio 2010; Liu et al. 2013). Prior literature generally investigates the relationship 
between family ownership structure and firm performance in normal periods but does 
not account for dynamic periods of political uncertainty. This study fills this void in our 
knowledge by investigating the value of family control on firm performance as well as 
investment and financial activities based on Thailand’s constitutional change in the 
wake of the 2014 coup d’état. Provided here are insights into the role of family control 
by examining the net effect of family control on firm value during turbulent periods of 
heightened political uncertainty. It also provides evidence on the incentive of 
controlling families, and it enriches the literature regarding the important implications 
for family ownership structure and agency theory with reference to the agency conflict 
between controlling families and other investors. 
Hence, this thesis confirms the importance of political uncertainty which can 
influence the relationship between family firms and their market value. It considers the 
effect of the constitutional change as an experiment in addressing the endogeneity 
concerns and potential simultaneity bias between family control and firm value (Lins et 
al. 2013; Beuselinck et al. 2017). This thesis suggests that during political uncertainty 
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family firms perform poorly in contrast to non-family firms, and they delay their 
investment and financial activities or decisions which are associated with greater 
underperformance. It means that during the political uncertainty controlling families 
enhance their businesses’ survival by establishing political connections at the expense 
of other investors.  
Overall, given the unique institutional environment of Thailand, this thesis provides 
new evidence about the effects of family control on firms’ dividend payment and cost of 
debt financing, and the influence of political uncertainty on the relationship between 
family control and firm value. We will understand better the importance of corporate 
governance regarding family control, and its implications for: firstly, investors who are 
actively involved in the economy; and secondly, policy-makers who are responsible for 
devising and enforcing regulations and mitigating agency problems in the context of 
emerging markets like Thailand. 
1.4 Structure of this thesis  
This thesis consists of five chapters. The current chapter is a prelude to the research 
topics covered in later chapters. It discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on 
family control. Important key empirical features are emphasized and unique institutional 
environment in emerging markets are discussed. Using a sample of hand-collected 
ownership of Thai listed companies and considering the unique institutional setting of 
countries like Thailand, three studies are developed in this thesis to provide empirical 
evidence to support the argument that family control and institutional environment 
significantly influence firms’ policies and performance.  
Chapter 2 investigates the effect of family control on dividend payment. Family 
control is common in many countries around the world, although with different 
incentives and motivations. Existing research illustrates two opposite views that family 
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control is expected to be either beneficial or detrimental (Claessens et al. 2002). The 
influence of institutional environment also affects the incentives of controlling families 
and has implications for family control (La Porta et al. 2000a). It is argued that 
controlling families as the largest shareholder tend to expropriate minority shareholders 
and engage in reducing the dividend payment. The assumptions of both univariate 
analysis and Tobit regression models are investigated in this study. The results are also 
robust to alternative estimation methods (using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) and 
random-effects methods), alternative sampling methods and alternative proxies of 
family control, dividends and different control variables. As well, this study examines 
whether the relationship between family control and dividend payment varies according 
to financing constraints and/or political uncertainty. The resulting evidence is consistent 
with the view that families are more likely to expropriate resources from their 
companies in emerging markets due to the weak institutional/regulatory environment 
and poor investor protection.   
Chapter 3 examines the impact of family control on the cost of debt which reflects 
another potential agency issue between controlling families and creditors. Prior studies 
indicate the problems of firms’ ability to access external debt financing which is 
required for their growth in emerging markets where an arm’s length market-driven 
system is lacking. To evaluate the access of external debt financing, this study focuses 
on the interest rate of all debt outstanding as an indicator of cost of debt. It conjectures 
that the strong and trusting relationships between controlling families and their creditors 
can help alleviate information asymmetry. Consequently, family control leads to the 
lower cost of external debt financing which help sustain family firms’ long-term 
survivorship. The assumptions of both univariate and multivariate analysis are applied 
to draw the conclusions.  The results are also robust to possible confounding effect of 
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bank-connected lending, possible endogeneity issues, different proxies for family 
control and control variables, and the use of matched samples. This study emphasizes 
that family control is vital and can determine sustainable finance-related decisions. 
Chapter 4 looks at the influence of political uncertainty on the role of controlling 
families affecting firms’ market value (Pástor & Veronesi 2012; Baker & Bloom 2013). 
Previous literature notes that this uncertainty might amplify the benefits or costs of 
family control and also threaten the survival of family firms. This study thus 
investigates the influence of family ownership structure on firm value during the 
periods of heightened political uncertainty, particularly in the context of the change in 
the constitution. It argues that in order to survive and flourish, family firms establish 
political connections at the expense of other investors. As a result, family firms 
underperform than non-family firms. This study also considers the influence of 
controlling families on firm value when investors face different levels of expected 
agency costs during political uncertainty since the inefficient use of firms’ resources by 
controlling families can increase the agency cost of minority shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976; Zhang & Cao 2016). It proposes that higher expected agency costs give 
controlling families more incentives to extract firms’ resources so that their businesses 
can continue trading.  
This study further shows the reductions in investment and financing activities of 
family firms during the political uncertainty in order to enhance the likelihood of firms’ 
survivorship. To draw a causal relationship between family control and firm value, this 
study applies a number of empirical approaches. It considers the influence of the 
constitutional change arising from the 2014 coup d’état as a natural experiment which 
addresses the endogeneity concerns and potential simultaneity bias between family 
control and firm value (Lins et al. 2013; Beuselinck et al. 2017). This study uses a 
15 
 
difference-in-difference framework and control for firm fixed effects. It also applies a 
matched sample approach by using the propensity score matching (PSM) method as 
well as alternative measurements of family control, and control variables. Overall, this 
study suggests that controlling families are more conservative during times of political 
uncertainty, and focus their concerns on the survival of their family network.  
Chapter 5 concludes and summarizes the thesis and the important implications. 




Chapter 2: Family control and dividend policy in Thailand 
2.1 Introduction 
Dividends can be used as an internal governance mechanism to mitigate the agency 
cost associated with excessive free cash flows (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Pindado et al. 
2012; Isakov & Weisskopf 2015). The dividend decision-making of firms with 
controlling shareholders can be different from that of widely held firms since 
controlling shareholders have the power to impose their views on the board, 
management and minority shareholders. The decisions therefore may be directed at 
satisfying preferences of controlling shareholders but not maximizing firm value 
(Johnson et al. 2000). Existing literature has focused on dividend policy in the presence 
of the agency problem between managers and shareholders in widely held firms. In this 
paper, we extend this literature by examining the dividend policy in the presence of an 
equally important agency problem which is between the controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders in family firms where ownership concentration is prevalent (La 
Porta et al. 2000b; Faccio & Lang 2002). Specifically, we focus on the influence of 
family control on dividend policy of Thai listed companies which operate in a weak 
institutional/regulatory environment with poor investor protection. 
Family firms are expected to have different agency problems from those of non-
family firms. Villalonga and Amit (2006) show that compared to other types of 
shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders or co-founders, controlling families 
have stronger incentives to monitor managers and thus mitigate the conflict of interests 
between shareholders and managers. This raises another potential agency issue that can 
beset relationships concerning controlling families and minority shareholders, since 
controlling families may safeguard their personal incentives and use their power to 
expropriate minority investors. As a result, the dividend policy made by controlling 
17 
 
families may not maximize a firm’s market value, but instead encourage them to pursue 
personal gains. Nevertheless, it has also been documented that controlling families are 
concerned about reputation and the firms’ long-term survival (Anderson & Reeb 2003). 
Accordingly, they pay higher dividends which lead to efficient use of free cash flows 
and eliminate the expropriation concerns raised by other investors (Faccio et al. 2001). 
Given the trade-off between the incentives for families to pursue their private benefits 
and concerns about reputation and long-term survival, it remains an empirical question 
on how family control exerts influence on dividend payment.  
Given that family firms and their control have dominated many countries’ 
economic systems (La Porta et al. 1999; Pindado et al. 2012; De Massis et al. 2018), 
studies have investigated the effects of family control on firm value and corporate 
decisions from different perspectives (Anderson et al. 2009; Dawson et al. 2018; Kotlar 
et al. 2018; Hearn & Filatotchev 2019). While most research focus on ownership 
structure in developed markets (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Hu & Kumar 2004), research 
on different dimensions of family control affecting dividend decision is rarely found in 
the literature, especially in emerging markets where ownership concentration is 
prevalent which further enhances family’s control (La Porta et al. 2000b). Compared to 
developed economies, emerging economies are characterized by having underdeveloped 
institutional environments, poor protections for minority investors and weak corporate 
governance (La Porta et al. 2000a). These conditions suggest that family firms in these 
countries may behave differently from their counterparts in developed markets, and 
understanding why this is so can advance our knowledge about how institutional 
environments shape companies’ behaviors, particularly that of family firms.  
Taken together, the presence of controlling families motivates us to investigate the 
importance of family control and expand on earlier works by examining two different 
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dimensions of family control, namely family ownership structure 6 and family 
management 7 , and their respective effects on dividend policy. In particular, we 
investigate how family control impacts companies’ dividend decisions in Thailand and 
identify which theoretical prediction best describes it. We also highlight the weak 
institutional environment in Thailand and the dominant role of family firms in Thai 
economy.  
Thailand provides an ideal setting for our investigation. First, family firms are 
prevalent and have played a historical and important role in its economic growth. This 
role became more pronounced after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Since then, most 
Thai family firms have experienced financial difficulties, and they have restructured so 
that they can survive and continue to be publicly traded as a result of additional capital 
supplied by outsiders (Connelly et al. 2012). The number of family firms on the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) has increased substantially. In particular, as reported in 
Wiwattanakantang (2001), by the end of 1996 there were 155/270 (57.41%) listed firms 
controlled by families, while at the end of 2015, there were 256/395 (64.81%) listed 
family firms reported in our study. About (245/256) 95.70% of these family firms also 
have family members as the board of directors. As reported in Forbes Thailand8, more 
than 25% of Thailand’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth and 33% of market 
capitalization of its listed companies are attributed to family firms. On average, these 
family firms have been established and listed on the SET for more than 30 years. For 
 
 
6  Family ownership structure is measured by two proxies. Following Wiwattanakantang (2001) and 
Villalonga and Amit (2006), we define the first proxy by a dummy variable which equals one for family 
firms and zero for non-family firms. According to Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009), another proxy is family 
ownership, which is calculated as the control rights held by the controlling families. 
7 Family management is defined by a dummy variable which equals one when a family member acts as a 
chairman, CEO or director and zero otherwise, according to Villalonga and Amit (2006).  
8 Forbes Thailand, 2015, https://www.marketingoops.com/news/forbes-thailand-50-richest-2015/ 
(February 10, 2019) 
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this reason, family firms in Thailand are very much concerned about their long-term 
survival and market reputations.  
Second, family firms may be involved in short-term private benefit and 
expropriation of minority shareholders as Thailand is an emerging market economy 
characterized by weak legal protection of investors and a high level of information 
asymmetry. Connelly et al. (2012) point out that under Thailand’s weak legal and 
regulatory enforcement environment, while family firms pay lip service to corporate 
governance rules, they usually use their power to pursue private benefits through their 
controlling positions via pyramidal structures or cross-holding. Nevertheless, how 
family control influences corporate decision-making and performance in Thailand 
remains unclear due to conflicting theoretical predictions.  
In addition, over the decades, Thai family firms obtained government favors via 
their political connections and/or business owners themselves seeking elections to top 
offices (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang 2009; Polsiri & Jiraporn 2012). Both 
Thai central and local governments play an active role in promoting economic 
development. As a result, political connections are crucial in many economic activities. 
The benefits of being politically connected have been documented by existing literature 
via finance access and public policies favorable to political connected businesses 
(Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang 2009; Faccio 2010). In contrast, it has been 
argued that political connections are associated with the role of a ‘grabbing hand’ to 
firms via favorable taxes, lax regulations or bribery (Frye & Shleifer 1997; Xu et al. 
2016), which is more pronounced when a country’s corruption level is high (Caprio et 
al. 2011). Thailand’s political system for many decades has suffered from instability 
due to the vulnerability of its democratic system to military coup d’états, thereby 
generating a great deal of political uncertainty. When external shocks emerge, the 
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behavior of family firms can change dramatically (Lins et al. 2013). In this study, we 
also explore the effects of family control on dividend payment during the periods of 
political uncertainty brought about by the 2014 coup d’état. The institutional setting in 
Thailand shares some common features with other emerging markets, and presents an 
opportunity to study issues about family control in emerging markets, which will 
contribute to the literature on business ownership structure. 
Using a sample of 2,490 firm-year observations in Thailand from 2009 to 2015, we 
find that family firms have lower dividend payment compared to non-family firms, and 
this distinction is more pronounced when family firms have greater family ownership 
and family members on company boards. These results indicate that controlling families 
have incentives to expropriate minority shareholders, and use excess cash for their 
private benefits, thus confirming the severity of agency problems in family firms in 
Thailand. Our findings remain largely unchanged when we consider the use of stock 
repurchase activity which can affect the distribution of cash dividend payment. The 
results are also robust to using alternative estimation methods, alternative samples and 
alternative measurements of family control, dividends and other control variables. 
Moreover, the extraction of private benefits for the purpose of family control becomes 
more costly when firms have higher market value. The thrust of our findings is further 
supported by the observation that the negative relationship between family control and 
dividend payment becomes stronger when firms have higher wedge, have more free 
cash flows or face political uncertainty. An important implication of these results is that 
maintaining higher wedge and less free cash flows can help to mitigate the agency 
problems caused by family firms expropriating minority shareholders and leads to 
higher dividend payments. Taken together, these results suggest that family firms are 
likely to actively yet covertly expropriate minority shareholders, especially in less 
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developed markets where protection for investors is weak and external monitoring is 
ineffective.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, while the 
impact of family ownership on corporate governance has been examined extensively for 
decades (La Porta et al. 1999; Faccio & Lang 2002), these studies tend to focus on the 
relationship between family firms and performance, but do not examine the channels 
through which firm performance is affected (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga & 
Amit 2006; Connelly et al. 2012). To present a complementary perspective, this study 
identifies dividend policy as such a channel. We document the empirical evidence of 
lower dividend payment by Thai family firms, which is consistent with Mulyani et al. 
(2016) and Attig et al. (2016) who examine dividend policy of family firms in Indonesia 
and East Asia, respectively. In addition, we study the behavior of family firms during 
the periods of unexpected political uncertainty experienced by the 2014 coup d’état. We 
find that the negative relationship between family control and dividend payment 
becomes stronger. This is possibly due to firms’ controlling families wanting to 
establish political connections with government and other business elites. Thus, this 
paper enriches the literature on the impact of controlling shareholders on corporate 
dividend policy in family firms. 
Secondly, this study provides further insights into the literature about family control. 
Extending the study of Anderson and Reeb (2003), we highlight the effects of three 
different dimensions of family control, namely family ownership structure and family 
management. We find that the negative effects of family control on dividend payment 
are more pronounced when controlling families exert larger ownership and have family 
members on company boards. These can help us to better understand the association 
between family control and dividend payout. Research on dividend policy in family 
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firms is essential as it reflects the agency conflict between controlling families and 
minority shareholders which is more severe in emerging markets. By examining the 
relationship between family control and dividend payment, our study indicates that 
family control matters and it is a significant cause for concern influencing the source of 
returns for investors.  
Lastly, prior studies investigating family ownership mainly focus on the U.S. and 
other developed markets (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Adjaoud & Ben‐Amar 2010; Isakov 
& Weisskopf 2015), while such an issue in emerging markets like Thailand has been 
comparatively neglected. In particular, after the 1997 Asian financial crisis starting in 
Thailand, listed companies on the Thai stock markets were required to comply with a 
base standard of corporate governance and to disclose all necessary information leading 
to higher levels of corporate responsibility such as the rights of shareholders, disclosure 
and transparency, and the role of stakeholders. However, the Thai corporate governance 
code is designed to adhere to a “comply or explain” basis thereby compelling firms to 
explain in the annual report when they cannot meet the code’s requirements. Thus, 
compared to developed markets, the level of investor protection and corporate 
governance still remain low in the Thai stock market. Given the significant increase in 
investment in developing countries recently and the emergence of a number of 
economic crises concurrently, greater attention is devoted to examining the influence of 
institutional setting in emerging markets on family firms’ behavior. The role played by 
family firms in Thailand that have survived for an extended period of time and achieved 
a dominant position in the Thai economy, deserves investigation. In doing so, this study 
advances our understanding about how institutional environments shape the behavior of 
family-run business owners, thus contributing to the literature on ownership structure, 
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and benefitting market practitioners in resolving agency problems in emerging 
economies.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly describes 
the institutional background and ownership structure of family firms in Thailand. 
Section 2.3 reviews the current and relevant literature on which the hypotheses are 
established. Section 2.4 describes the data and methodology used in this study. Section 
2.5 presents the empirical results and additional analyses, and section 2.6 concludes this 
study. 
2.2 Institutional background 
2.2.1 Thai institutional background 
Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which is known as the South East Asian 
currency crisis or the Tom Yum Goong crisis, one that started in Thailand and hugely 
undermined the economies throughout the Asian region, it was clear that the SET 
became an important market for capital financing by the corporate sector. One of the 
main causes of the crisis was the rapid expansion of companies through high levels of 
debt and imprudent investment, which led to a large number of bankruptcies in Thailand. 
The outcome is closely linked to poor corporate governance practices and a weak legal 
environment. After the crisis, listed companies on the Thai stock markets were ordered 
to comply with a base standard of corporate governance, for example the “Code of Best 
Practices for Directors of Listed Companies” in 1999, the “Compass for Good 
Corporate Governance” in 2002 and “The Principle of Good Corporate Governance” in 
2006. The emergence of the basic standard of corporate governance led to higher levels 
of corporate responsibility being established in a number of dimensions. These included, 
but were not limited to, the rights of shareholders, disclosure and transparency, and the 
role of stakeholders. Although companies are now required to comply with these 
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obligations and disclose all necessary information, the Thai corporate governance code 
is designed to adhere to a “comply or explain” basis thereby compelling firms to explain 
in the annual report when they cannot meet the code’s requirements. Despite the 
reforms, the level of investor protection and corporate governance still remains low and 
there is a high degree of information asymmetry observed in the Thai stock market.  
2.2.2 Emergence of family firms in Thailand 
Family firms9 have been established for a long time in Thailand and expanded their 
business interests dramatically since 1932. In our sample, the average period family 
firms have been listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) is 30 years. Although 
family firms are prevalent in Thailand for reasons of survival, the characteristics of such 
firms particularly in terms of family control have changed significantly particularly in 
the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis. Based on ownership structure in Thailand, 
before the 1997 crisis, founding families usually exerted complete control of their 
companies and how they were managed (Claessens et al. 2000). However, after 1997, 
family firms went public because they urgently needed additional external capital and 
restructured themselves (Connelly et al. 2012). Approximately 64.81% of Thai non-
financial listed companies were family firms by the end of 2015.  
From a cultural perspective, the relationship within family members through blood 
ties and marriage is regarded as the most trustworthy in Thailand, particularly when 
compared to external professional managers. In a weak legal environment and for the 
highly concentrated ownership of publicly-traded family firms, Thai family firms are 
characterized by family members being heavily involved in management and policy-
 
 
9 Family firms are important and contribute to the overall economy in Thailand. As reported in Forbes 
Thailand, more than 25% of Thailand’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth come from family firms 
and 33% of market capitalization of listed companies in Thailand.  
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making through being on the board or CEOs (Wiwattanakantang 2001; Bunkanwanicha 
et al. 2013). For example, about 95.70% of family firms have members who work as the 
board of directors in 2015. These arrangements imply that families are more likely to 
have enormous controlling power over listed companies and the board of directors is not 
likely to be independent.  
Based on the discussion of the institutional setting and family firm characteristics in 
Thailand, it can be seen that the structure of family control is considered to be one of the 
key factors for firms’ survival, particularly after the crisis. 
2.3 Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.3.1 Literature review 
Family firms are pervasive and important for economic growth around the world 
(La Porta et al. 1999; Setia‐Atmaja et al. 2009; Pindado et al. 2012; De Massis et al. 
2018; Hearn & Filatotchev 2019). Theoretically, firms with controlling shareholders 
reveal conflict of interests with other investors which is especially the case when 
controlling shareholders are families (Villalonga & Amit 2006). However, how 
controlling families affect firm policy remains controversial due to controlling families’ 
characteristics (Bertrand & Schoar 2006). On the one hand, controlling families may 
use their power to expropriate other investors and extract for their private benefits 
(Boubakri et al. 2010; Lin et al. 2011). On the other hand, controlling families are 
concerned about their reputation and long-term survival, and thus place more emphasis 
on the relationship with other investors and stakeholders (Anderson & Reeb 2003).   
The extant literature shows that family control is beneficial due to family firms’ 
concern about their reputation for impartial treatment of minority shareholders and the 
firms’ long-term survival (Anderson & Reeb 2003). Therefore, controlling families 
have the incentive to monitor managerial activities which are associated with efficient 
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use of free cash flows and maximizing firm value (Villalonga & Amit 2006). This 
aspect of the family firm has led to greater insights into how dividends are utilized. This 
evidence has been investigated and found in developed countries which are 
characterised by strong legal protection and corporate governance regulations (Setia-
Atmaja et al. 2009; Schmid et al. 2010; Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2010; Isakov & 
Weisskopf 2015). La Porta et al. (2000b) propose an alternative model of dividend 
payments and argue that, in the context of poor institutional regulation and weak 
investor protection, firms use dividend payment as a trust-generation tool to establish 
their reputation and allay expropriation. Guaranteed dividend payment can also force 
managers to raise external sources of funds that are better monitored by owners who are 
outsiders (Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2010). In addition, families who intend to maintain 
their control over the firm in the long run are not interested in selling their shares, but 
they tend to use dividends as a source of family income (Isakov & Weisskopf 2015).  
However, there are costs associated with family control because of expropriation 
and tunneling (Johnson et al. 2000). Due to the institutional environment of emerging 
economies, these agency problems become more severe (Faccio et al. 2001; Connelly et 
al. 2012; Vieira 2013; Attig et al. 2016; Mulyani et al. 2016). Controlling families have 
strong incentives to expropriate minority shareholders, and use excess cash for their 
private benefits, thus paying lower dividends (Vieira 2013; Attig et al. 2016; Mulyani et 
al. 2016). Little previous literature has examined the impact of family control on 
dividend payment in emerging markets. Faccio et al. (2001) document that compared to 
Western Europe, dividend payment is lower in Asia. Mulyani et al. (2016) analyze a 
sample of Indonesia firms and note that family firms pay smaller dividends and have 
higher leverage than non-family firms. This finding is further confirmed by Attig et al. 
(2016) who investigate a sample of companies from East Asian countries.  
27 
 
It can be seen from the foregoing literature that whether family firms influence 
dividend payout remains an important and relevant topic worthy of investigation, 
particularly in emerging markets. 
2.3.2 Hypotheses development 
The effect of family firms on dividend payment in Thailand is more likely to rely 
on the quality of institutional environment and the power of controlling families in the 
firms. Compared to other types of controlling shareholders such as institutional 
investors or investors who are independent and who curtail private benefits, controlling 
families have strong incentives to expropriate outside investors (Villalonga & Amit 
2006). The empirical evidence, particularly in emerging markets, further shows that the 
incentives for controlling families to pursue their private benefits and expropriate 
minority shareholders outweigh the concerns of reputation and long-term survival, 
probably due to the weak institutional environment (Attig et al. 2016; Mulyani et al. 
2016). Like other developing countries, Thailand has weak legal protection for minority 
shareholders and a high level of ownership concentration. In addition, family firms are 
prevalent and play an important role in Thailand since they have been established for a 
very long time and expanded their businesses rapidly (Wiwattanakantang 2001). Taken 
together, family firms are more likely to use free cash flow inefficiently and expropriate 
minority shareholders by paying lower dividends. We therefore formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Dividend payout is lower in family firms than in non-family firms. 
In Thailand, it is important to note that relationship between family members 
through blood ties and marriage is considered to be the most trustworthy 
(Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). Controlling families also participate in the management 
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of companies and exert a strong influence on the board, managers and minority 
shareholders to control financial decisions, policymaking, and performance of the firms 
(Claessens et al. 2002). Accordingly, this type of family management makes it unlikely 
for the board of directors to be independent (Wiwattanakantang 2001). It has been 
documented that due to the increase in the expected cost of monitoring managerial 
activities by outsiders associated with the inefficient use of free cash flow and the 
failure to maximize firm value, these expropriation activities via the high level of the 
family management are more likely to cause more agency problems (Pindado et al. 
2012; Vieira 2013). Overall, we contend that the agency problem between controlling 
families and minority shareholders is predicted to be severe in Thai family firms. We 
formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2. Dividend payout is lower in family firms when family members act as 
chairman, CEO or directors. 
2.4 Sample and methodology 
2.4.1 Data and sample selection 
We examine the impact of family control on dividend policy by using a sample of 
listed firms in Thailand. In order to distribute dividends in Thailand, public listed firms 
are governed by the Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535 (A.D. 1992) and the 
Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535. There is, however, no regulation governing 
dividends payout for privately owned firms. For this reason, only publicly listed 
companies on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) are considered in this study. In 
terms of paying dividends, the listed companies can distribute dividends by cash and/or 
stock dividends; however, if the companies have accumulated losses, they are not 
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permitted to pay out dividends.10 In addition, to avoid possible bias arising from the 
GFC’s impact on our results, we study the sample period from 2009 to 2015. The data 
are obtained from Bloomberg database for all companies listed on the SET. Our sample 
excludes: firstly, companies with irregular financial reporting; and secondly, firms in 
the finance industry since they have different accounting standards and leverage 
arrangements.  
After removing all missing observations, our final sample comprises 395 listed 
firms and 2,490 firm-year observations. As this research focuses on family control, it is 
important to obtain accurate information on family ownership structure and family 
management. Thus, we consider both control rights and cash flow rights in our study. 
The control rights and cash flow rights of the controlling families are hand-collected 
from companies’ annual reports, which are obtained from SET Market Analysis and 
Reporting Tool (SETSMARTS) provided by the SET. For a given company in its 
annual report, the ownership data include shareholders with stakes of at least 0.5%. 
Information on family control which lacks clarity is further verified and ascertained by 
retrieving information from corporate homepages, newspaper articles and the 
commercial register. Finally, we match the ownership data with firm accounting and 
financial data. 
2.4.2 Measurement of variables 
2.4.2.1 Dividend policy 
To measure dividend payment, we use the dividend per share (DPS) as a proxy 
which is defined as the ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares 
 
 
10 Thailand is a debt-dominated capital market. On the one hand, companies are more likely to smooth 
dividend stream expected by shareholders. This requires companies to report earnings high enough to pay 
dividends. On the other hand, managing earning upwards is costly because of tax consequences. Dividend 
policy also depends on free cash flow and life-cycle of Thai companies (Fairchild et al. 2014). 
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outstanding. This measure is consistent with Fairchild et al. (2014), Floyd et al. (2015) 
and Firth et al. (2016). We apply dividend per share because it can show the proportion 
of income paid out to shareholders. For robustness checks on our results, we employ 
two alternative measures of dividend payment. The first measure is dividend yield 
(Dividend), which is defined as the common dividends paid divided by the market value 
of equity, following Cao et al. (2017). We apply dividend yield to avoid the problems of 
managerial manipulation and this measure reflects direct financial market information 
given to investors. The second measure is the dividend payout ratio (Payout), which is 
defined as the sum of cash dividends and repurchases divided by the market value of 
equity, following Hu and Kumar (2004). We consider stock repurchases as another 
option which can affect paying excess cash to shareholders because stock repurchases 
are similar to dividends which are significantly sensitive to earnings (Von Eije & 
Megginson 2008; Jiang et al. 2013), and can be used to adjust the level of ownership 
structure within firms (Schulze et al. 2002).  
2.4.2.2 Family control 
According to Wiwattanakantang (2001) who pioneered the study of family 
ownership in Thailand, we define a firm as a family-operated firm if a founder and/or 
family member by either blood or marriage is the blockholder. This definition is also 
consistent with that of Villalonga and Amit (2006). Together with, the legal system in 
Thailand defines that shareholders need to hold at least a 75% stake to have absolute 
voting power for important corporate decisions, thus, a shareholder who holds more 
than 25% shares can have enough voting rights to control what the firm intends to do. 
To ensure controlling families can exert effective control, we set 25% of the control 
rights as the cut-off point of ownership, which is consistent with Wiwattanakantang 
(2001). In the empirical analysis, we consider two types of family control, namely 
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family ownership and family management, in order to directly assess how family 
control affects dividend policy.  
First, we measure family ownership by two proxies. The first proxy is Family, 
which is a dummy variable equal to 1 for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. 
Another proxy for family ownership is the control rights held by controlling families 
(ControlR), following Setia‐Atmaja et al. (2009).  
Another type of family control is family management, which is defined when a 
family member acts as a chairman, CEO or board director (Villalonga & Amit 2006). 
We use a dummy variable for family management (Family_CEO), which equals 1 for 
family firms with a family member who is the chairman, CEO or board director and 0 
otherwise.11   
2.4.2.3 Control variables 
Following the literature, we include a set of firm characteristics as control variables 
that can potentially influence dividend policy. First, we control for a firm’s size. 
Previous analyses have shown that when firms expand, they are more likely to pay 
dividends (Adjaoud & Ben‐Amar 2010). Similar to Adjaoud and Ben‐Amar (2010), we 
include Size which is defined as firm size and measured as the natural logarithm of firm 
total assets. In the robustness check, we measure firm size by including Sale, which is 
calculated as the natural log of firm total sales, following Isakov and Weisskopf (2015).  
Second, firms which are more profitable tend to pay higher dividends (Fama & 
French 1998; Adjaoud & Ben‐Amar 2010). We include two variables to measure a 
firm’s profitability. ROA is defined as return on assets and measured as net income 
divided by total assets, following Fama and French (1998). Another variable to measure 
 
 
11 We focus on the presence of family members as chairman, CEO, or board directors, rather than other 
senior executives due to the power and influence of corporate decision-making they have. 
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profitability is Cycle which is measured as retained earnings divided by total equity, 
following Adjaoud and Ben‐Amar (2010), and Cao et al. (2017).  
Firms which grow rapidly may need more funds to invest in positive net present 
value projects, and hence they tend to pay lower dividends (Adjaoud & Ben‐Amar 2010; 
Cao et al. 2017). For this reason, we control for the growth opportunity of the firm 
defined by the variable, Growth, which is measured as percentage change of total sales, 
following Cao et al. (2017). In the robustness check, we replace Growth with Asset 
which is another proxy for measure firms’ growth opportunities. Asset is defined as 
percentage change of total assets, following Isakov and Weisskopf (2015). 
Finally, we control for firm risk level, as riskier firms tend to pay lower dividends 
(Firth et al. 2016). Here, we use Beta to measure the risk level, which is given by the 
firm’s beta value that reflects systematic risk. The year dummy and industry dummy are 
also included.12  In addition, to mitigate potential problems of outliers and extreme 
values, the control variables such as Cycle and Growth are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. The definitions for these variables, as well as all other variables used in this 










12 The industry dummy is based on the industry classification of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). 
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Table 2. 1 Definitions of Variables 
Variable name Variable definition 
Panel A: Dividend and ownership structure 
Dividend per share (DPS) Total cash dividend/ total number of common shares 
outstanding  
Dividend yield (Dividend) Common dividends/ the market value of equity 
Dividend payout ratio (Payout) The sum of cash dividend and repurchases/ the market value of 
equity 
Family Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms and 0 for non-family 
firms 
ControlR The control rights held by the controlling families 
Family_CEO Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms that have a family 
member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors, and 
0 for family firms that do not have a family member as the 
chairman, CEO or on the board of directors 
Family 25-50% Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms in which a member 
holds between 25% and 50% of control rights, and 0 for family 
firms in which a member holds between 25% and 50% 
Family 50% or more Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms in which a member 
holds more than 50% of control rights, and 0 for family firms in 
which a member holds more than 50% 
  
Panel B: Firm characteristics  
Firm size (Size) Natural logarithm of firm total assets 
Return on assets (ROA) Net income/total assets 
Cycle Retained earnings/total equity 
Growth opportunity (Growth) Percentage change of total sales 
Beta Firm’s beta value reflecting systematic risk 
LnMB Natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio 
Free cash flow (FCF) Free cash flow/total assets  
Wedge Divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of 
controlling shareholders 
Asset growth (Asset) Percentage change of total assets 
Sale size (Sale) Natural logarithm of firm total sales 
Industry dummy 
 
Panel C: Political uncertainty events 
Political turnover (Turnover) 
Dummy variable equals 1 for firms in a given industry and 0 
otherwise 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 when the local politician in a 
province is newly appointed and 0 otherwise. If politicians took 
office from January 1 to June 30, then the current year 
represents the year they took office; if politicians took office 
from July 1 to December 31, then the following year represents 
the year they took office 
 
2.4.3 Model specification 
In order to test the relationship between family control and dividend policy, we first 




where i stands for the firm and t stands for the year. ε is the error term. The dependent 
variable, DIVP, stands for the dividend policy of firm i in year t, and is proxied by DPS 
which is dividend per share. For key explanatory variable Family_Control of firm i in 
year t, we use four proxies including family firm (Family), family ownership (ControlR) 
and family management (Family_CEO). Firm-specific control variables (Control) are 
also included in the regression. These variables include Size, ROA, Growth, Cycle and 
Beta which are discussed and defined in the previous section. Year dummy and industry 
dummy are added to control for year-specific effect and industry-specific effect in this 
model, respectively. The sample used in this study includes several firms that do not pay 
dividends, so the dividend payout of those companies is censored at zero. In order to 
examine the effects of family control on dividend policy when the dependent variable is 
censored, we estimate Tobit regression models with the maximum likelihood estimation 
method. 
2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2.2 reports the distribution of the firms in our sample. As can be observed in 
Table 2.2, the sample used in this study comprises 395 listed firms and 2,490 firm-year 
observations. 60.32% of observations are family firms. Among them, there are 1,520 
firm-year observations for family firms and 988 firm-year observations for non-family 
firms. In addition, 96.67% of the family firms have a family member working as the 
board of directors, CEO and/or chairman. Obviously, during the sample period, there 
are a few changes in the levels of family control through family ownership structure and 
family management in Thailand in each year. Also, among those firms that change their 
ownership type, family members often retain their involvement in management 
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decisions. These statistics indicate the prevalence of family firms in Thailand and the 
significance of our study using that country’s firms. 
Table 2. 2 Sample constituent and time-series analysis 
This table reports sample constituents. Panel A shows the number of Thai public listed companies which 
can be divided into family and non-family firms for each year. Panel B shows the percentage of Thai 
public listed companies which can be divided into family and non-family firms for each year. Panel C 
shows the percentage and the number of firms controlled by families who have members in management 
positions for each year. Definitions of all variables are as shown in Table 2.1. 
 
 Year         
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Panel A: Number of firm-year observations 
1. Family firms 185 205 199 199 216 242 256 1,502 
2. Non-family firms 126 141 153 146 143 140 139 988 
Total 311 346 352 345 359 382 395 2,490 
         
Panel B: Percentage of firm-year observations (%) 
1. Family firms 59.49 59.25 56.53 57.68 60.17 63.35 64.81 60.32 
2. Non-family firms 40.51 40.75 43.47 42.32 39.83 36.65 35.19 39.68 
         
Panel C: Family management within family firms (N=1,502) 
1. Percentage of family management 
(%) 
97.30 97.07 97.99 97.99 95.37 95.87 95.70 96.67 
2. number of family management 
(number of firm-year observation)  
180 199 195 195 206 232 245 1,452 
 
The summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 2.3. Panel A shows 
the mean (median) of the dividend per share is THB 0.92 (THB 0.16). This is slightly 
higher than the mean dividend per share in Indonesia which is about MYR 0.069 or 
THB 0.5913 as reported by Al-Twaijry (2007). The results in Panel A also demonstrate 
the ownership structure in this sample. There are 2,490 firm-year observations in this 
study. As can be seen, 60.32% of observations are family firms. The average control 
rights are 29.30%, with a median value of 34.32%. Furthermore, about 58.31% 
(1,452/2,490) of the sample and/or 96.67% of the family firms (which are 1,502 firm-
year observations) have a family member working on the board of directors, or as CEO 
and/or chairman. Panel B summarizes firm characteristics. The average firm size is 8.50, 
 
 
13 MYR 1 to THB 7.4 Exchange rate on 18 Aug 2019.  
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whereas the average ROA is 5.31%. Beta is about 0.77, on average, while on average 
both the cycle and growth are about 9%. Panel C reports the proportion of sample firms 
which are categorized as family and non-family firms. There are 1,502 family firm-year 
observations which make up 60.32% of the total sample. This figure is slightly higher 
than that reported by Wiwattanakantang (2001). For 988 non-family firm-year 
observations, they make up the remaining 39.68% of the total sample. Meanwhile, 
6.07% of firms are controlled by the government, 15.94% by foreign investors, and 
0.68% by a group of people. Finally, 16.99% of firms are classified as widely held non-



















Table 2. 3 Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics. DPS is the ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common 
shares outstanding. Dividend is the ratio of common dividends to the market value of equity. Payout is the 
ratio of the sum of cash dividends and repurchases to the market value of equity. Family is a dummy 
variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held 
by the controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have 
a family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural 
logarithm of firm total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Beta is the firm’s beta value 
reflecting systematic risk. Cycle is the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. Growth is the percentage 
change of total sales. LnMB is natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio. FCF is the ratio of free cash 
flow to total assets. Wedge is the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling 
shareholders. Asset is the percentage change of total assets. Sale is the natural logarithm of firm total sales. 
Turnover is a dummy variable which equals one when the local politician is newly appointed and 0 
otherwise. If politicians took office from January 1 to June 30, then the current year represents the year 
they took office; if politicians took office from July 1 to December 31, then the following year represents 
the year they took office. Definitions of all other variables are as shown in Table 2.1. For Family_CEO, 
summary statistics are reported for the sample of firm-year observations within family firms, whereas in 
the regressions, firm-year observations include total firms. 
 




Panel A: Dividend and ownership structure 















       
Family  2,490 0.603 0 1 1 0.489 
ControlR (%) 2,490 29.296 0 34.320 50.610 26.214 
Family_CEO  1,502 0.967 1 1 1 0.179 
       
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Size 2,490 8.496 7.410 8.263 9.393 1.493 
ROA (%) 2,490 5.312 1.205 5.248 9.753 9.564 
Beta 2,490 0.774 0.395 0.715 1.130 1.088 
Cycle (%) 2,490 8.832 2.349 10.237 18.278 20.524 
Growth (%) 2,490 9.391 -7.394 4.691 16.496 40.256 
LnMB 2,490 0.248 -0.0964 0.155 0.520 0.529 
FCF (%) 2,490 2.554 -3.393 2.835 9.098 10.133 
Wedge (%) 2,490 4.514 0 0 0.331 10.227 
Asset (%) 2,490 11.645 -1.696 5.971 16.016 29.103 
Sale 2,490 8.140 7.130 8.099 9.100 1.680 
Turnover 2,490 0.365 0 0 1 0.481 
 
Panel C: Number and percentage of firm-year observations in our sample 
 Number of firm-year 
observations 
Percentage of total firm-year 
observations 
1. Family firms 1,502 60.32% 
2. Non-family firms 988 39.68% 
2.1 Government 151 6.07% 
2.2 Foreign investor 397 15.94% 
2.3 Group 17 0.68% 
2.4 Widely held 423 16.99% 
Total 2,490 100% 
 
Table 2.4 reports the results of the univariate test of key variables between family 
and non-family firms. The results reveal that dividend per share (DPS), dividend yield 
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(Dividend) and dividend payout ratio (Payout) are significantly lower in family firms 
than those in non-family firms. Family firms also are significantly smaller in size (Size) 
and have lower systematic risk (Beta) than non-family firms. Additionally, non-family 
firms make significantly smaller profits (as measured by both ROA and Cycle) and have 
less growth potential (as measured by Growth) than family firms.  
Table 2. 4 Univariate analysis 
This table reports the univariate analysis. DPS is the ratio of total cash dividends to total number of 
common shares outstanding. Dividend is the ratio of common dividends to the market value of equity. 
Payout is the ratio of the sum of cash dividends and repurchases to the market value of equity. Size is the 
natural logarithm of firm total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Beta is the firm’s beta 
value reflecting systematic risk. Cycle is the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. Growth is the 
percentage change of total sales.  Definitions of all other variables are as shown in Table 2.1. Robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 




Difference test  
(t-value) 
 Mean  Mean   
DPS (Bt) 0.679  1.283  -0.604 Bt*** (-5.377) 
Dividend (%) 3.196  3.493  -0.297%* (-1.749) 
Payout (%) 3.178  3.464  -0.286%* (-1.679) 
      
Size 8.347  8.723  -0.376*** (-6.196) 
ROA (%) 5.865  4.471  1.394%*** (3.566) 
Beta  0.743  0.820  -0.077* (-1.719) 
Cycle (%) 9.794  7.368  2.426%*** (2.890) 
Growth (%) 10.536  7.650  2.886%* (1.751) 
 
2.5.2 Regression results 
In this section, we conduct multivariate analysis by estimating equation (1) and 
report the regression results in Table 2.5, in which the dependent variable is dividend 
per share.14 As can be seen in columns 1 and 2, Thai listed firms pay lower dividends 
when controlling families are present and when controlling families hold more shares. 
In column 1, the estimated coefficient of Family is -0.475 and significant at the 1% 
 
 
14 Correlations amongst the variables are not presented but are available from the authors upon request. 
As expected, a firm’s dividend policy which is proxied by dividend per share has a negative correlation 
with all two types of family control, these being family ownership structure (as proxied by Family and 
ControlR) and family management (as denoted by Family_CEO). 
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level (t-value is -3.44). In column 2, we also find that the estimated coefficient of 
ControlR is -1.028 and significant at the 1% level (t-value is -4.01). Economically, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in ControlR brings about 26.95 percentage points, or 
29.32% decrease in dividend per share (DPS). The results in columns 1 and 2 support 
our hypothesis H1 that family firms have lower dividends, indicating that controlling 
families tend to have stronger incentives to pursue their own agendas and personal 
advantages. 
Column 3 shows that Thai family firms are associated with lower dividend payment 
when family members act as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors. We 
observe a statistically significant and negative coefficient of Family_CEO, which is -
0.601 at the 1% level (t-value is -4.39). This finding supports our hypothesis H2, and 
indicates that controlling families as senior/executive managers tend to transfer firms’ 
resources for their own private ends. Also, when we consider the subsamples of firms 
with dividend payment separately in columns 4 to 6, the results are consistent with our 
prior findings for full sample.15 
Results for the control variables are generally consistent with the literature on 
dividend policy (Adjaoud & Ben‐Amar 2010; Isakov & Weisskopf 2015; Mulyani et al. 
2016). Especially, firms are prone to pay dividends when they are larger in size and 
firms are less likely to pay dividends when they have potential growth opportunities and 






15 OLS model is used as an alternative model because a truncation bias does not exist for the subsamples 
of firms with dividend payment. All results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 2. 5 Family control and DPS 
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression for full sample 
and OLS regression for subsample where dividend payment has non-zero values.. DPS is the ratio of total 
cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family is a dummy variable which equals 
one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling 
families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member 
as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of firm 
total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Beta is the firm’s beta value reflecting 
systematic risk. Cycle is the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. Growth is the percentage change of 
total sales. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in 
this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. Columns 4, 5 and 6 use the subsample 
where dividend payment has non-zero values. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 DPS      
 Full sample   Subsample   





















  -0.601*** 
(-4.39) 
























































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -5,059 -5,057 -5,055    
R2    0.0906 0.0948 0.0965 
Observations 2,490 2,490 2,490 1,874 1,874 1,874 
 
We also use alternative proxies of dividend policy based on market and accounting 
measures of corporate performance to re-estimate the main equation, and report the 
results in Table 2.6 for the full sample (in Panel A) and subsample of firms with 
dividend payment separately (in Panel B). In particular, the results in columns 1 to 3 use 
dividend yield as the dependent variable, and the results in columns 4 to 6 use the 
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dividend payout ratio as the dependent variable.16 The results are qualitatively similar 
for both the full samples and subsamples. Obviously, in Panel B of Table 2.6, we 
examine the relationship between family control and dividend payment for the 
subsamples of firms with dividend payment. In column 1 the estimated coefficient of 
Family is -0.007 and is significant at the 1% level (t-value is -2.70). This result indicates 
that family firms reduce their dividend yield probability by a 0.7 percentage point, or 
0.16%, more than those of non-family firms.17  In column 2, we also find that the 
estimated coefficient of ControlR is -0.0.16 and is significant at the 1% level (t-value is 
-3.55), which implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in ControlR decreases 
dividend yield by 0.42 percentage points.18 Finally, column 3 shows that Thai family 
firms are associated with lower dividend yield when family members work as the 
chairman, CEO or sit as the board of directors. In column 3, we observe a negative 
coefficient of Family_CEO (-0.006), which is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-
value is -2.52). This result suggests that family firms reduce their dividend yield 
probability by a 0.6 percentage point, or 0.14%, more than those of non-family firms. 
The estimated coefficients of the key variables in columns 4 to 6 are quite similar to 
those in the first four columns. These findings suggest that the stock repurchases 
component is very small. In this scenario, it is reasonable to infer that Thai companies 
are more likely to disburse their free cash flows to their shareholders in the form of cash 
dividends, rather than stock repurchases. Based on corporate governance, these findings 
also reflect that family firms need not use stock repurchases to adjust the ideal level of 
ownership structure.  
 
 
16 OLS model is used as an alternative model because a truncation bias does not exist for the subsamples 
of firms with dividend payment. All results are available from the authors upon request. 
17 The standard deviation of Dividend for the subsamples is 4.247 and its mean is 4.403. 
18 The standard deviation of ControlR for the subsamples is 26.086% and its mean is 30.176%. 
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It can be seen in Table 2.2 that the levels of family control through family 
ownership structure and family management remain nearly constant in most of the 
family firms in Thailand. These findings are similar to the work of Chen (2013) who 
examines the association between family ownership and share repurchase activities in 
Taiwan. Their results indicate that family firms are less likely to repurchase stocks than 
non-family firms. One explanation is that, in family firms, the older generations can 
retain their ownership concentration and wealth for their descendants by transferring 
their stocks and resources to their children (Schulze et al. 2002). Overall, the estimation 
results are consistent for dividend payout. Taken together, our key variables of interests 
are all negatively and significantly related to dividend yield and dividend payout ratio, 
which are consistent with the results reported in Table 2.5. That is, family firms pay 
















Table 2. 6 Family control and alternative proxies of dividend policy 
This table reports the estimation results of the Dividend and Payout equations using a panel Tobit 
regression for full sample and OLS regression for subsample where dividend payment has non-zero 
values. Dividend is the ratio of common dividends to the market value of equity. Payout is the ratio of the 
sum of cash dividends and repurchases to the market value of equity. Family is a dummy variable which 
equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the 
controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a 
family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Control variables are 
included as follows: Size, ROA, Beta, Cycle and Growth. Definitions of all other variables are as shown in 
Table 2.1. Panel A uses the full sample and Panel B uses the subsample where dividend payment has non-
zero values. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dividend    Payout   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





















  -0.004** 
(-2.29) 
















Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood 4,604 4,606 4,604 4,595 4,596 4,594 
Observations 2,490 2,490 2,490 2,490 2,490 2,490 
      





















  -0.006** 
(-2.52) 
















Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.111 0.114 0.110 0.112 0.115 0.111 
Observations 1,874 1,874 1,874 1,852 1,852 1,852 
 
To understand the way in which family ownership exerts an influence on dividend 
policy, we provide insights into the distribution of controlling families’ control rights in 
Table 2.7. Family ownership concentration or the presence of controlling families may 
influence dividend policy in different ways. We analyze whether the agency problems 
operate uniformly across the different range of ownership levels by generating a dummy 
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variable for Family 25-50% (Family 50% or more) which equals 1 for family firms that 
a family member holds between 25-50% (50% or more) of control rights and 0 
otherwise. Looking at column 1, we find that Thai family firms pay less dividends 
across the different ranges of family ownership concentrations. The estimated 
coefficients are -0.351 and -0.639 when families hold 25-50% and 50% or more of 
control rights, respectively. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% 
level (t-value is -2.25) for family control rights of 25-50% at the 1% level (t-value is -
3.82) for control rights of 50% or higher, respectively.  
These results show that when families own more shares as proxied by the 
percentage of control rights, family firms pay lower dividends. These results further 
support hypothesis H1. These results imply that controlling families can use their power 
via their ownership structure to increase the risk of minority shareholders being 
expropriated. Column 3 shows that the coefficient of the ControlR2 is not statistically 
significant implying that dividends decrease linearly with the family ownership 
structure. Taken together, these results are particularly important in the context of 
Thailand, indicating that controlling families are found to pursue their private benefits 
and expropriate minority shareholders by paying lower dividends. In the absence of an 
internal corporate governance mechanism to curtail such behavior, the extent of 
expropriation manifested through lower dividend payment is more pronounced in 








Table 2. 7 Family control and DPS with alternative measures of family ownership 
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression. DPS is the 
ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family 25-50% is a dummy 
variable which equals one for family firms in which a member holds between 25% and 50% of control 
rights and 0 otherwise. Family 50% or more is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms in 
which a member holds more than 50% of control rights and 0 otherwise. ControlR is the control rights 
held by the controlling families. Size is the natural logarithm of firm total assets. ROA is the ratio of net 
income to total assets. Beta is the firm’s beta value reflecting systematic risk. Cycle is the ratio of retained 
earnings to total equity. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. Year dummy and industry dummy 
are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2 and 3 
use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 DPS   











ControlR  -1.028*** -1.377* 
  (-4.01) (-1.70) 
ControlR2   0.562 

















































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -5,058 -5,057 -5,057 
Observations 2,490 2,490 2,490 
 
2.5.3 Additional evidence 
2.5.3.1 Market-to-book ratio, family control, and dividend payment 
In this section, we analyze the impact of family control on dividend payment which 
may stem from market-to-book ratio and performance (Chen et al. 2005). Under the 
weak institutional environment and high ownership concentration in emerging markets 
like Thailand, we focus in particular on our hypothesis that the extraction of private 
benefits of family control becomes more costly when firms over-perform. In this regard, 
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we conduct further analysis by testing whether the negative relationship between family 
control and dividend payment becomes stronger when firms have higher market-to-
book ratio. To test this conjecture and validate our main argument, we provide empirical 
results by including an interaction term between firm value (such as the natural 
logarithm of market-to-book ratio (LnMB)19 and each proxy of family control, namely 
Family, ControlR and Family_CEO in the panel Tobit regression.  
Table 2.8 reports the results. In column 1, the estimated coefficient of 
LnMB*Family is -0.599 and statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.23). 
This result implies that market-to-book ratio has a negative effect on the relationship 
between family ownership structure and dividend payment. The estimated coefficient of 
LnMB*Family also indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in LnMB is 
associated with a 31.69 percentage point reduction of dividend payment in family firms. 
The estimated coefficient of Family is also -0.312 which is statistically significant at the 
5% level (t-value is -2.04). Hence, the net coefficient of Family on dividend payment 
with firm value is -0.312-0.599 = -0.911, holding all else constant. The results in 
column 2 also confirm this outcome by showing the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction between LnMB and ControlR which is -1.327 and significant at the 1% level 
(t-value is -2.74). This implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in LnMB creates a 
70.20 percentage point decrease in dividend payment for family firms. The estimated 
coefficient of ControlR is also -0.662 which is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-
value is -2.34). Thus, the net coefficient of ControlR on dividend payment with firm 
value is -0.662-1.327= -1.989 and also reflects that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
ControlR induces a 52.14 percentage point fall in dividend payment for family firms. 
 
 
19 To mitigate the impact of outliers, we use the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio (LnMB) 
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According to the results documented in columns 1 and 2, the negative association 
between family ownership structure and dividend payment become stronger when firms 
have higher market-to-book ratio. These results support our hypothesis H1 and it can be 
inferred that a firm’s market-to-book ratio will encourage controlling families to extract 
private benefits by reducing dividends.  
Column 3 shows that market-to-book ratio also magnifies the negative relationship 
between family management and dividend payment. In column 3, we find that the 
estimated coefficient LnMB*Family_CEO is -0.938 and statistically significant at the 
1% level (t-value is -3.56). The estimated coefficient of LnMB*Family_CEO also 
indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in LnMB is associated with a 49.62 
percentage point decrease in dividend payment for family firms with family 
management systems in place. The estimated coefficient of Family_CEO is also -0.355 
which is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.35). Thus, the net 
coefficient of Family_CEO on dividend payment with firm value is -0.355-0.938= -













Table 2. 8 Effect of market-to-book ratio on the association between family control 
and DPS 
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression estimation. 
DPS is the ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family is a 
dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control 
rights held by the controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family 
firms that have a family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. 
LnMB is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio. Control variables are included as follows: Size, 
ROA, Beta, Cycle and Growth. Definitions of all other variables are as shown in Table 2.1. Year dummy 
and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 DPS   

















LnMB  0.160 
(0.69) 
 





  -0.355** 
(-2.35) 
LnMB   0.327 
(1.37) 










Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -5,055 -5,052 -5,047 
Observations 2,490 2,490 2,490 
 
2.5.3.2 Free cash flow, family control, and dividend payment 
It has been argued that in emerging market economies, controlling families are 
more likely to extract cash for their private benefits rather than pay dividends to 
shareholders (Attig et al. 2016; Mulyani et al. 2016). Accordingly, one could test 
whether the documented negative relationship between family control and dividend 
payment is stronger when firms have a higher level of free cash flows. We run the 
regression in Table 2.8 by replacing firm performance with firms’ free cash flow (FCF), 
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and report the results in Table 2.9. In column 1, the estimated coefficients of Family and 
FCF*Family are -0.319 and -4.024. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 
5% and 1% levels each (t-values are -2.19 and -2.90, respectively). This finding implies 
that free cash flow has a negative effect on the relationship between family ownership 
structure and dividend payment. The coefficient of Family on dividend payment with 
free cash flow is -0.319-4.024 = -4.343, holding all else constant. The estimated 
coefficient of FCF*Family also indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in FCF 
is associated with a 40.78 percentage points, or 44.37%, reduction of dividend payment 
in family firms. The results in column 2 also confirm this amplifying effect by showing 
the estimated coefficient of the interaction between FCF and ControlR which is -9.538 
and significant at 1% level (t-value is -3.73). This implies that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in FCF creates a 96.65 percentage point, or 105.17%, decrease in dividend 
payment for family firms. The estimated coefficient of ControlR is -0.695 and it is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value -2.59). Thus, the coefficient of ControlR 
for family firms is -0.695-9.538 = -10.233, which implies that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in ControlR creates a 268.25 percentage point, or 291.89%, decrease in 
dividend payment for family firms.  
According to the results in columns 1 and 2, the negative association between 
family ownership structure and dividend payment become stronger when firms have 
more free cash flow. The results also support our hypothesis H1 and are consistent with 
the view that free cash flow is able to increase controlling shareholders’ power, and 
exacerbate the risk of minority expropriation by lowering dividends (Attig et al. 2016). 
Column 4 shows that free cash flow amplifies the negative relationship between family 
management and dividend payment. In column 3, we find that the estimated coefficients 
of Family_CEO and FCF*Family_CEO are -0.413 and -4.969, and both are statistically 
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significant at the 1% level (t-values are -2.87 and -3.62, respectively). The estimated 
coefficient of FCF*Family_CEO also indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase 
in FCF is associated with a 50.35 percentage point, or 54.79%, decrease in dividend 
payment for family firms with family management systems. This finding is consistent 
with our hypothesis H2. The net coefficient of Family_CEO for family firms is -0.413-
4.969 = -5.382. Our results suggest that when firms’ cash balances are large, the risk of 
expropriation by family members who work as CEOs or the board of directors, are more 




















Table 2. 9 Effect of free cash flows on the association between family control and 
DPS 
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression. DPS is the 
ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family is a dummy variable 
which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the 
controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a 
family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. FCF is the ratio of 
free cash flow to total assets. Control variables are included as follows: Size, ROA, Beta, Cycle and 
Growth. Definitions of all other variables are as shown in Table 2.1. Year dummy and industry dummy 
are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2 and 3 
use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 DPS   

















FCF  6.175*** 
(5.67) 
 





  -0.413*** 
(-2.87) 
FCF   6.342*** 
(5.60) 










Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -5,045 -5,041 -5,039 
Observations 2,490 2,490 2,490 
 
2.5.3.3 Wedge, family control, and dividend payment 
So far we have presented the results concerning the effects of family control on 
dividend payment in Thailand in the context of a weak institutional environment with 
no consideration for disproportional ownership structures via business groups leading to 
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling families (wedge) 
external financing. In emerging markets, family business groups and the pyramidal 
ownership structure are prevalent under a high level of ownership concentration 
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(Claessens et al. 2000; Wiwattanakantang 2001). It is evident that controlling families 
implement disproportional ownership structures to maintain their control and power 
such as the pyramidal structure and cross-holding (Claessens et al. 2002). The poor 
legal environment and the use of families’ power via the control-ownership wedge can 
exacerbate the agency conflict between controlling families and minority shareholders 
(Connelly et al. 2012).Thus, we conjecture that family control may exert a stronger 
influence on paying lower dividends when firms have higher wedge. In this regard, we 
conduct further analysis by testing whether the negative relationship between family 
control and dividend payment becomes stronger in the presence of wedge. We run the 
regression in Table 2.9, by replacing firms’ free cash flow with their level of wedge, and 
report the results in Table 2.10. In column 1, the estimated coefficient of Family is 
negative (-0. 388) and it is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value is -2.57). The 
estimated coefficient of Wedge*Family is negative (-2.897) and is statistically 
significant at the 10% level (t-value is -1.85), implying that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in Wedge brings about a 29.63 percentage point, or 32.24%, decrease in 
dividend payment for family firms. These results support the view that wedge can 
effectively rise the negative relationship between family ownership structure and 
dividend payment (Mulyani et al. 2016). The net effect for a family firm on dividend 
payment with external debt financing is -0.388-2.897 = -3.285, holding all else constant.  
The estimated coefficient of Wedge*ControlR in column 2 is also negative (-6.155) 
and is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.29). This finding indicates 
that a one-standard-deviation increase in Wedge is associated with a 62.95 percentage 
point, or 68.50% decrease in dividend payment for family firms. Additionally, as the 
estimated coefficient of ControlR is negative (-0.845), statistically significant at the 1% 
level (t-value is -3.06), the net effect for a family firm on dividend payment with wedge 
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is negative (-0.845-6.155 = -7.00). It means that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
ControlR creates a 70.59 percentage point, or 77.90%, increase in dividend payment for 
family firms with wedge. Again, the results in columns 1 and 2 support our hypothesis 
H1 and it can be inferred that the level of wedge can exacerbate the negative association 
between family ownership structure and dividend payment. In column 3, we find the 
coefficient of the interactive variables between wedge and family family management is 
negative thus suggesting that wedge rises the negative relationship between family 
management and dividend payment. The estimated coefficients of Family_CEO and 
Wedge*Family_CEO are -0.465 and -3.941, both statistically significant at the 1% level 
(t-values are -3.11 and -2.70, respectively). The coefficient of the interaction term 
indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in Wedge is associated with a 40.30 
percentage point, or 43.86%, decrease in dividend payment for family firms. The net 
coefficient of Family_CEO for family firms is -0.465-3.941 = -4.406 and this result is 
consistent with our hypothesis H2.  
In summary, the findings listed in Table 2.10 reflect the importance of 
disproportional ownership structures or wedge as a mechanism to exacerbate minority 
expropriation in family firms. Considering the wedge, the negative relationship between 
family control and dividend payment becomes stronger and significantly negative when 
firms have more wedge. This reflects that a family firm’s disproportional ownership 
structure seems to matter in terms of how family control influences the payment of 
dividends. Lower wedge can help to mitigate the agency problems of expropriating 
minority shareholders by family firms and the payment of higher dividends. As our 
results suggest, lower wedge in family firms tends to increase dividend payment and 




Table 2. 10 Effect of wedge on the association between family control and DPS 
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression estimation. 
DPS is the ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family is a 
dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control 
rights held by the controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family 
firms that have a family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. 
Wedge is the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Control 
variables are included as follows: Size, ROA, Beta, Cycle and Growth. Definitions of all other variables 
are as shown in Table 2.1. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry 
fixed effects in this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Wedge  2.757** 
(2.23) 
 





  -0.465*** 
(-3.11) 
Wedge   3.185*** 
(2.60) 










Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood 574.01 580.05 585.31 
Observations 2,490 2,490 2,490 
 
2.5.3.4 Political uncertainty, family control, and dividend payment 
To better understand the behavior of family firms, we consider not only family 
firms’ behavior during normal periods, but also in the presence of external shocks that 
emerge from political uncertainty. Thailand’s political system for many decades has 
suffered from instability due to the vulnerability of its democratic system to military 
coup d’états which leads to political turnover. The political uncertainty may change the 
ways that family firms make decision on dividends from normal periods (Lins et al. 
2013). Political uncertainty is proxied by the change in leadership in the provinces of 
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Thailand where the headquarters of the businesses are located. In Thailand, changes in 
provincial political leaders can be triggered by instability in the central government, 
stemming from elected governments and coup d’états. Both new appointments from a 
newly elected central government and a change in provincial leadership due to a 
military coup d’etat20 can significantly increase political uncertainty in the provinces. 
Table 2.11 reports the changes in provincial political leadership across the seven-year 
period in our sample. Following Bo (1996), political turnover is defined as a dummy 
variable: 1 is when the local politician in a province is newly appointed and 0 otherwise. 
During the sample period 2009 to 2015, there are changes in leadership or political 















20 For example, the generals can refer to Article 44 to implement their absolute power and swiftly enforce 
their legislative, administrative and jurisdictional powers. Therefore, provincial leaders can be appointed, 
suspended or reshuffled swiftly by the generals if they want to intervene in events in the provinces. 
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Table 2. 11 Government political turnover in Thailand by province and year over 
the sample period 2009-2015 
This table reports government political turnover in Thailand by province and year for the sample period 
2009-2015. 
 
Number Province 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 Ayutthya 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2 Bangkok 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
3 Buriram 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
4 Chacherngsao 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
5 Chainart 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
6 Chiang Mai 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
7 Chiang Rai 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
8 Chonburi 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
9 Chumphon 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
10 Khon Kaen 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
11 Krabi 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
12 Lampang 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
13 Lamphun 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
14 Nakhon 
Ratchasima 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
15 Naknorn Sawan 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
16 Nakorn Phathum 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
17 Nonthaburi 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
18 Pathum Thani 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
19 Prachinburi 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
20 Rayong 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
21 Roi Et 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
22 Samut Prakarn 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
23 Samut Sakhon 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
24 Saraburi 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
25 Songkhla 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
26 Surat Thani 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
27 Udon Thani 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
 
In the first year when a new politician is appointed, controlling families have a 
greater tendency to use their cash to establish political connections with newly 
appointed political leaders with a view of benefitting the firm through advantageous 
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financing strategies (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang 2009). Under weak legal 
environment and high corruption level, politicians are more likely to extract resources 
from firms for their own personal benefits (Fry & Shleifer 1997). Taken together, this 
could result in less cash available for dividend payment. Therefore, during political 
uncertainty, the behavior of family firms is prone to change (Lins et al. 2013). It is 
possible that the negative relationship between family control and dividend payment 
will be stronger during political uncertainty period. Here, we conduct further analysis 
by considering political uncertainty in this study to test whether the negative 
relationship between family control and dividend payment becomes stronger. In the 
regression, we replace firms’ level of wedge with political turnover (i.e. Turnover), the 
definition of which is provided in Table 2.1. Table 2.12 reports the effect of political 
uncertainty in provincial level on the association between family control and dividend 
payment. In column 1, the estimated coefficient of Turnover*Family is -0.623 and it is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.25). This result means that political 
turnover has a negative effect on the relationship between family ownership structure 
and dividend payment. However, it is interesting to note that the estimated coefficient of 
Turnover is 0.866 and significantly positive at the 1% level (t-value is 3.41), reflecting 
that when political changes do occur at the provincial level, firms are more likely to pay 
higher dividends. Thus, it is possible that family and non-family firms have a larger 
cash balance to pay dividends, stemming from political uncertainty negatively affecting 
the economy and firms’ investment.  
The results in column 2 also confirm this effect; the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction between Turnover and ControlR is -1.108 and it is significant at the 5% level 
(t-value is -2.16). Moreover, the estimated coefficient of ControlR which is -0.612 is 
statistically significant at the 10% level (t-value is -1.90). Taken together, the 
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coefficient of ControlR for family firms is -0.612-1.108 = -1.72, which suggests that a 
one-standard-deviation increase in ControlR creates a 45.09 percentage point, or 
49.06%, decrease in dividend payment for family firms. Also, the estimated coefficient 
of Turnover is 0.830 and statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.38). Taken 
together, these results imply that although political turnover can increase firms’ 
dividend payment, family firms extract cash and pay lower dividends, possibly to seek 
the rents of establishing political connections.  
According to the results in columns 1 and 2, the negative association between 
family ownership structure and dividend payment become stronger when political 
turnover is present. The results also support hypothesis H1 and are consistent with the 
‘grabbing hand’ hypothesis of politicians, i.e. politicians who extract resources from 
firms for their own personal gain (Frye & Shleifer 1997). Column 3 shows that political 
turnover also amplifies the negative relationship between family management and 
dividend payment. We find that the estimated coefficients of Family_CEO and 
Turnover*Family_CEO are -0.376 and -0.611, respectively. Both coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 5% level (t-values are -2.21 and -2.22, respectively). The 
net coefficient of Family_CEO for family firms is -0.376-0.611 = -0.987. This finding is 
consistent with hypothesis H2 and support the view of Bunkanwanicha and 
Wiwattanakantang (2009) that Thai family control is more likely to establish new 
political connection than non-family firms. Considering the provincial level, these 
findings imply that under the weak legal environment and high corruption levels in 
Thailand, political uncertainty is associated with political extraction. Controlling 
families in their attempt to establish political connections with newly appointed political 
leaders in the form of bribes and gifts, will expropriate more from minority shareholders 
by paying lower dividends. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of Turnover is 0.863 
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and this is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.41). It leads to the view 
that provincial level political changes can lead to economic downturn and risks to 
investment. As a result, firms hold more cash and pay more dividends to their 
shareholders. 
Table 2. 12 Effect of political uncertainty at the provincial level on the association 
between family control and DPS 
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression. DPS is the 
ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family is a dummy variable 
which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the 
controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a 
family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Turnover is a dummy 
variable which equals one when the local politician is newly appointed and 0 otherwise. If politicians took 
office from January 1 to June 30, then the current year represents the year they took office; if politicians 
took office from July 1 to December 31, then the following year represents the year they took office. 
Control variables are included as follows: Size, ROA, Beta, Cycle and Growth. Definitions of all other 
variables are as shown in Table 2.1. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year 
and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. Robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Turnover  0.830*** 
(3.38) 
 





  -0.376** 
(-2.21) 














Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -5,053 -5,051 -5,050 






2.5.4.1 Addressing potential endogeneity issues 
In this section, we apply alternative estimation methods to ascertain that our 
findings are robust when considering the endogeneity issue. Family control and 
dividend policy are both internal governance mechanisms and they could be related to 
each other by substitution or complement (Agrawal & Knoeber 1996). In particular, not 
only a specific ownership structure may affect different dividend payment, but also the 
level of dividend payment may influence the decision of an owner to hold shares of 
firms ( Setia-Atmaja et al. 2009; Pindado et al. 2012; Isakov & Weisskopf 2015). These 
make possible a potential reverse causality between family control and dividend policy. 
Furthermore, there could be some unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity at the firm 
level that affects both family control and dividend policy simultaneously. In order to 
address these possible endogeneity issues, first, we apply the random-effects models, 
following the results derived from conducting a Hausman test. We assume that residual 
is random, and we consider the variations in residual terms between different firms. 
Then, we apply the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method for estimation in this section. 
We use the values of the family control variables at the beginning of our sample as 
instruments21, which is consistent with the method employed by Laeven and Levine 
(2009) and Lin et al. (2011).22  The results estimated using these four methods are 
reported in Table 2.13. Columns 1 to 3 and columns 4 to 6 report coefficients of family 
control variables which are used in the previous analysis for the full samples and 
 
 
21 In the first stage, the F-statistics (unreported but available on request) show that the coefficients of the 
instrument variables are significant at the 1% level and further suggest the validity of our instrument 
variables. Then, the first-stage regression values are used as key independent variables in the second stage.  
22 There are many instrument variables that can be used for instrument variables, but in this study, the 
beginning-of-period values are applied as instrument variables to identify the impact of ownership on 
dividend payment (Coles et al. 2012). 
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subsamples, respectively. Three panels present the results for the different dependent 
variables which are represented by DPS, Dividend and Payout. 
The overall results using 2SLS and random-effects methods remain qualitatively 
similar to those using the Tobit model, indicating that family control is associated with 
lower dividend payment which is consistent with our main hypothesis. The empirical 
evidence shows that in Thailand’s weak legal/regulatory enforcement environment and 
a high level of ownership concentration, family firms are associated with lower 
dividend payment via different forms of family control, namely family ownership 
structure and family management.  
However, the results using firm fixed-effects models are statistically insignificant in 
most cases. The insignificance is expected because the coefficients of fixed-effects 
models are estimated by exploiting the within-firm variations of family control. It can 
be seen in Table 2.2 that the levels of family control through family ownership structure 
and family management remain nearly constant in most family firms in Thailand. In 
addition, during the sample period, the number of firms which change their ownership 
structure from family to non-family firms and vice versa is very small relative to the 
total sample size at about (124/2,490) or 4.98% of firms. Among those firms that alter 
their ownership type, family members remain influential on management matters, 
therefore implying that the causal effect running from dividend policy to family control 
is an unlikely channel. It is also difficult to argue that the level of dividend payment 
determines family control, thus, reflecting that endogeneity problems, such as reverse 






Table 2. 13 Effect of alternative estimation methods on the association between 
family control and dividend payment 
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS, Dividend and Payout equations using fixed-effects 
models, random-effects models and two-stage least squares (2SLS) models. DPS is the ratio of total cash 
dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Dividend is the ratio of common dividends to 
the market value of equity. Payout is the ratio of the sum of cash dividends and repurchases to the market 
value of equity. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. 
ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which 
equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors 
and 0 otherwise. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed 
effects in this model, respectively. Definitions of all other variables are as shown in Table 2.1. Columns 1, 
2 and 3 use the full sample, and columns 4, 5 and 6 use the subsample where dividend payment has non-
zero values. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
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2.5.4.2 Matching sample 
We are also concerned that family control might be correlated with other firm 
characteristics. In this regard, we apply a matched sample approach by using propensity 
score matching (PSM) method as a robustness check. In Panel A of Table 2.14, we 
control for industry and year that can affect the relationship between family control and 
dividend payment, and we estimate propensity scores in logit models to match each 
treated firm (a family firm) to a control firm (a non-family firm) with the same control 
variables used in Table 2.5, and control firms are selected by one-to-one matching 
strategy. Hence, in Panel A of Table 2.14, we have two groups of firms with exact 
matching of fundamentals, but the treated firms are firms with family ownership while 
the control firms are firms with non-family ownership. In Panel B of Table 2.14, 
Columns 1 to 3 report coefficients of family control variables which are used in the 
previous analysis but use a match sample. The results remain qualitatively similar to 
those using a full sample in Table 2.5, indicating that there is no difference between 
using a full sample or a matched sample, the family control including family ownership 
structure and family management. They continue to significantly reduce firms’ dividend 
payment when compared to a control firm, and this is consistent with our main 










Table 2. 14 Using the propensity score matching approach (PSM) to examine the 
relationship between family control and DPS 
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression by using the 
propensity score matching approach. In Panel A, the control sample is for firms in the same industry and 
year, and the propensity scores are estimated by using logit regressions of treatment status on Size, ROA, 
Beta, Cycle and Growth, and control firms are selected by one-to-one matching strategy. In Panel B, 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the matching sample. Definitions of all variables are as shown in Table 2.1. DPS 
is the ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family is a dummy 
variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held 
by the controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have 
a family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural 
logarithm of firm total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Beta is the firm’s beta value 
reflecting systematic risk. Cycle is the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. Growth is the percentage 
change of total sales. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry 
fixed effects in this model, respectively. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 




Control sample Difference (t-value) 
 
 Mean Mean 
Panel A: Matching sample difference tests  


















Growth (%) 7.337 7.650 
Observations 988 988  
 
Panel B: Matching sample analysis  
 DPS   

























Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -3,877 -3,876 -3,874 
Observations 1,976 1,976 1,976 
 
2.5.4.3 Alternative proxies and alternative sample 
We further consider alternative definitions of controlling families for robustness 
check. Consistent with La Porta et al. (1999), and Faccio and Lang (2002), we re-
estimate regression (1) by changing the threshold from 25% of control rights to 20% of 
control rights. In addition, we use alternative control variables such as different 
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definitions of firm size and growth. Instead of using the natural logarithm of firm total 
assets to measure firm size, following Mulyani et al. (2016), we apply the natural 
logarithm of firm total sales (Sale). Referring to the growth of a firm, we replace 
percentage change of total sales by percentage change of total assets (Asset), which is 
consistent with Huang et al. (2012). The findings are mostly consistent with those 
documented in Table 2.5. 
Finally, following Isakov and Weisskopf (2015), we use a balanced panel sample 
by excluding companies that have missing data in some years of the sample period. 
These missing data can occur as a result of companies being unable to pay dividends 
due to an accumulated loss or having a retain earning that is less than 10 percent of the 
registered capital, which is governed by the Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535 
(A.D. 1992) and the Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535. In some cases, the missing 
data are due to bankruptcies or takeovers. Failing to remove these companies from the 
dataset would imply that the behavior of these companies which fail to pay dividends in 
some years might bias our results. We estimate the Tobit regression for a balanced panel 
sample comprising 261 listed firms and 1,827 firm-year observations. The results are 
not presented here for brevity but they are available from the authors upon request, and 
they show that the exclusion of such firms does not affect our findings.  
2.6 Conclusion 
We examine the association between the three key dimensions of family control 
and dividend policy, and provide insights into corporate decision-making of family 
firms. Using panel data of non-financial companies listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) between 2009 and 2015, we find that family control is associated with 
lower dividend payment compared to non-family firms. These results become more 
pronounced when family firms have a larger level of ownership and are influenced on 
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family management decisions. The results suggest that controlling families have 
incentives to expropriate minority shareholders by using excess cash for their private 
benefits, which point to potentially more severe agency problems in family firms than 
non-family firms. Our results are robust when we take into consideration stock 
repurchase in addition to cash dividends. Further, our results are robust to alternative 
estimation methods, alternative sampling methods and alternative proxies of family 
control, dividends and different control variables. We also indicated that the extraction 
of private benefits of family control becomes more costly when firms have higher 
market-to-book ratio. Finally, we find that the effect of family control on dividend 
payment weakens when firms have smaller wedge, when firms have less free cash flows 
or political uncertainty is absent. Overall, there is evidence to suggest that family firms 
are prone to engage in expropriation of minority shareholders through curtailing of 
dividend payment, particularly for a country like Thailand which has weak protection 
systems in place for investors and high disproportional ownership structures such as the 
pyramidal structure and cross-holding via business groups.  
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Chapter 3: Family control and cost of debt: Evidence from Thailand 
 
3.1 Introduction 
To the extent that financial policy is crucial for firm survivorship and growth in 
both the short- and long-term, it is meaningful to understand controlling shareholders’ 
financial decisions particularly for family firms, who assert dominance in most 
countries especially in emerging markets (Claessens et al. 2000; Fan & Wong 2002; 
Williams et al. 2018; Hearn & Filatotchev 2019). Many studies have investigated the 
performance of firms controlled by families relative to other types of controlling 
shareholders by focusing on the agency conflicts between controlling families and other 
investors (Anderson & Reeb 2003; King & Santor 2008; Lins et al. 2013; De Massis et 
al. 2018; Kotlar et al. 2018; Hearn & Filatotchev 2019). While extant literature has 
examined the financial implications of family control from the perspective of equity 
holders (Villalonga & Amit 2006; Isakov & Weisskopf 2015; Dawson et al. 2018), the 
literature on the consequences of controlling families on creditors is sparse, which 
motivates this study. These issues are pertinent in emerging markets where the 
institutional environment is underdeveloped, and the arm’s length market-driven system 
is deficient. In such an environment, lending relationships and long-term affinities 
between controlling families and creditors are important for firms’ ability to access 
external debt financing. In this paper, we identify an important channel through which 
family control wields influence on the cost of debt in emerging markets.  
Theoretical predictions on the relationship between family control and firms’ cost 
of debt is ambiguous with inconclusive empirical evidence. On the one hand, 
controlling families pursue their personal benefits and use their power to expropriate 
other investors (Johnson et al. 2000). These expropriation incentives can reduce the 
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ability of family firms to pay off debt, and raise the expected costs associated with 
financial distress and bankruptcy (Purnanandam 2008). As a result, creditors 
incorporate these cost expectations into their lending decisions, and thus require higher 
financing costs of debt (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Lin et al. 2011). On the other hand, 
controlling families might be concerned about long-term survivorship, maintaining the 
family’s reputation, and passing on wealth to descendants (Anderson et al. 2003), since 
they have a large and highly undiversified investment in the firms (Shleifer & Vishny 
1986). Accordingly, family firms often maintain long-lasting and mutually beneficial 
relationships with creditors. In so doing, family firms can access lower cost of debt 
financing (Anderson et al. 2003; Behr & Güttler 2007; Ellul et al. 2007; Croci et al. 
2011).  Between family firms’ propensity to expropriate incentives which leads to 
higher costs of debt and their concerns for reputation and long-term survivorship which 
leads family ownership to adopt policies that improve firm value leading to favorable 
credit terms, the net impact of family control on cost of debt is difficult to predict 
theoretically, and instead becomes a matter of empirical investigation.  
In the case of Thailand, its institutional environment presents a number of 
interesting dimensions which motivates our investigation of this important issue. First, 
family firms play an important role in Thailand’s economy. Our sample shows that by 
the end of 2015, there are 212 family firms which accounts for 63.28% of total sample 
firms, and 202 of these family firms have family members involved in managing the 
business. Thai family firms have been listed on the stock exchanges for more than 30 
years and have made significant contribution to the Thai economy. Specifically by the 
end of 2015, Thailand’s 50 richest people who own large family business groups 
contribute more than 25% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), and 
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constitute 33% of market capitalization of listed companies. 23  Taken together, the 
significant presence of family control in the Thai economy warrants an investigation of 
the financial conditions of these family firms which are linked to their long-term 
survivorship and reputation. 
Second, Thailand is a typical emerging market featured with less developed 
regulatory and legal system, opaque information environment and weak investor 
protection (Wiwattanakantang 2001; Anuchitworawong et al. 2003). Consequently, 
controlling families may also have strong incentives to pursue their private benefits at 
the expense of debtholders (La Porta et al. 2000a; Connelly et al. 2012). As such, the 
disparity in the behavior of family firms in emerging markets like Thailand from those 
in developed markets deserves further investigation. 
In addition, the Thai equity markets are underdeveloped to the extent that Thai 
firms rely heavily on external debt financing (Anuchitworawong et al. 2003; 
Charumilind et al. 2006; Mahathanaseth & Tauer 2012). By the end of 2015, bank loans 
are considered to be the most important source of new capital and it constitutes 54% of 
new external financing and bond financing constitutes 15%24, while equity financing 
constitutes 30%25 . To access external debt financing in Thailand, the arm’s length 
market-driven system implies that relationship with debtholders plays an important role 
in providing external finance for firms, which presents as an informal governance 
mechanism (Charumilind et al. 2006; Schwert 2018). However, after 2004, the Thai 
government launched reforms in the banking sector to increase the number of banks and 
financial institutions controlled by non-family entities (such as the government and 
 
 
23 See more details at Forbes Thailand, https://www.forbes.com/thailand-billionaires/list/. 
24 Thai Bond Market Association, http://www.thaibma.or.th/Doc/annual/SummaryMarket2016.pdf. 




foreigners) to dilute the concentrated family control of financial institutions (Lu & 
Mieno 2018). Such a policy change presents an interesting setting to evaluate how these 
non-family banks provide financial support to family firms, where the basic objective is 
to ensure their sustained growth and contribution to the economy. On these issues, an 
examination of the relationship between controlling families and creditors can provide 
new insights into the literature on agency conflicts and inform regulators on the design 
of sustainable financial policies in emerging markets.   
Expanding on earlier analyses, we focus on three dimensions of family control, 
namely family ownership structure, control-ownership wedge and family management, 
and their respective effects on the cost of debt. The first type of family control is the 
family ownership structure which is measured by two proxies. Following 
Wiwattanakantang (2001) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), we define the first proxy by 
a family firm dummy which equals one if the founder and/or family members by either 
blood or marriage is the blockholder. Another proxy is family ownership, which is 
defined as the control rights held by the controlling families. The second type of family 
control is control-ownership wedge, which is defined as the divergence between control 
rights and cash flow rights of controlling families (Claessens et al. 2002; Villalonga & 
Amit 2006; Lin et al. 2011). The third type of family control is family management, 
which is defined by a dummy that equals one when a family member acts as a chairman, 
CEO or director (Villalonga & Amit 2006).   
When measuring the cost of debt, we consider the interest rate of all debt 
outstanding as an indicator of cost of debt. Due to data paucity on the different types of 
debt instruments employed by Thai firms, data on costs relating to each class of debt 
contract are not available. Nevertheless, bank loans make up for more than half of new 
capital and thus dominate the external debt financing of Thai firms. As such the total 
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cost of debt is expected to be dominated by the costs of bank loans. Using a sample of 
2,167 firm-year observations in Thailand from 2009 to 2015, we discover that cost of 
debt is significantly lower for family firms relative to non-family firms. Further analysis 
shows that agency cost of debt is lower in family firms when they have a greater degree 
of family ownership, have larger control-ownership wedge, and have family members 
on the board and/or management team. These results continue to hold true even when 
we control for possible confounding effect of lenders who are related to family business 
groups. Using firms’ profitability as a proxy for firm’s reputation and long-term 
survivorship (Anderson & Reeb 2003), we find that highly profitable family firms tend 
to enjoy lower cost of debt.  These results suggest that Thai controlling families are 
concerned about long-term survivorship and reputation to the extent that they seek to 
establish long-term relationships with creditors as they stand to benefit, and are less 
likely to expropriate other investors. Our main findings are robust to using alternative 
estimation methods, alternative sampling methods, the use of exogenous events such as 
political uncertainty caused by turnover of political leaders and coup d’état, alternative 
measurements of family control, and alternative control variable by using different 
definitions of firm size. Our findings emphasize that family control is vital and can 
determine sustainable financing decisions which is consistent with Anderson et al. 
(2003).  
Our study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, we 
contribute to studies on the financial implications of family ownership structure and its 
influence on external financing costs. In general, existing research presents two views 
whereby family ownership is deemed to be either beneficial or detrimental. In the US 
where ownership is dispersed and investor protection is stronger, family ownership can 
enhance firm value by reducing financing costs (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Anderson et 
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al. 2003; Anderson & Reeb 2003; Ellul et al. 2007). In other international context, 
especially emerging markets where ownership is concentrated and controlling families 
have incentives to expropriate other investors, family ownership could lead to higher 
financing costs (Purnanandam 2008; Lin et al. 2011; Pan & Tian 2016). Our study 
chooses an emerging market – Thailand – where family ownership is prevalent, the 
institutional environment is underdeveloped and investor protection is weak 
(Charumilind et al. 2006), and we provide interesting evidence that family control is an 
efficient institution that mitigates such conflict of interest resulting in lower financing 
cost. This is also in direct contrast to the evidence in other emerging markets arguing 
that family firms are likely to engage in expropriation of other investors (Pan & Tian 
2016). Taken together, our study shows evidence that, under these conditions, a very 
strong interest of Thai controlling families to survive in the long-run may motivate them 
to manage the firms by safeguarding their long-term survivorship and reputation to the 
extent that these could lead to lower cost of debt. Our study enriches the literature on 
agency theory with reference to the agency conflict between controlling families and 
creditors. This work has important implications for practitioners and policy-makers in 
emerging markets to develop sustainable economic policies. 
Second, we provide greater insight into literature about the behavior of family firms 
and firm decision-making. Previous studies have considered the effects of general 
corporate governance and the impact of family ownership structure on business 
performance (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Connelly et al. 2012). 
However, they do not examine the channels through which firm performance is affected. 
In our study, we identify an important channel affecting such performance by 
empirically examining the impact of family control on firms’ cost of debt financing. 
Unlike Connelly et al. (2012) who study the relationship between ownership structure 
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and corporate governance practices on firm performance in Thailand, we focus on the 
role of family control directly in more detail. To provide more insights into family 
control, we focus on three dimensions: family ownership structure, control-ownership 
wedge and family management. Unlike Pan and Tian (2016) who examine the impact of 
family control on loan collateral in China where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are 
more likely to access debt financing than private firms, which stems from the 
intervention of state-owned banks to the allocation of loans, we study the institutional 
setting of Thailand where SOEs are not dominant like China. Furthermore, we 
document the empirical evidence of lower cost of debt resulting from family control by 
considering the channels in which Thai controlling families take a long-term 
survivorship and reputation approach. Specifically, we use firms’ profitability as a 
proxy for firms’ reputation and long-term survivorship and we show the negative 
association between family control and cost of debt predominates in highly profitable 
firms. In this way our study provides a complementary perspective to the literature 
about the behavior of family firms and the influence of family control on their financing 
decision-making. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly describes 
the ownership structure of family firms in Thailand and institutional background. 
Section 3.3 reviews the current and relevant literature on which the hypotheses are 
established. Section 3.4 describes the data and methodology. Section 3.5 presents the 
empirical results and section 3.6 concludes this paper. 
3.2 Institutional background 
3.2.1 Family control in Thailand  
Family control is prevalent in Thailand and important for the country’s economic 
development, particularly in capital markets. Based on ownership structure, family 
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firms are dominant players in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), and they comprise 
about 60.27% of Thai non-financial listed companies by the end of 2015. Family firms 
which are typically controlled and managed entirely by founding families (Claessens et 
al. 2000) tend to rely on external equity financing for additional capital and growth 
opportunities (Connelly et al. 2012). The relationships between people in family firms 
can still be tracked by surnames of controlling families, which are unique and protected 
by Thai law (Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). These types of firms contribute to the 
country’s GDP growth and total market capitalization of listed companies in Thailand, 
by more than 25% and 33%, respectively (Forbes Thailand 2015).  
Thai firms are characterized by dominant ownership concentration (Claessens et al. 
2000). Under the country’s weak law enforcement environment and high ownership 
concentration, controlling families maintain their influence and control firms directly by 
holding firms’ shares and/or indirectly via disproportional ownership structures. These 
can include a pyramidal structure and cross-holding via business groups (Connelly et al. 
2012). A point in case is Southern Concrete Pile Public Company Limited (see Figure 
3.1). The company is a part of Thai business groups referred to as the Chinteik Brothers 
Group, which was founded by the Nganthavi family. Based on ownership information 
for 2015, the Nganthavi family owns 11.15% of Southern Concrete Pile Public 
Company Limited directly and controls 31.16% of Southern Concrete Pile Public 
Company Limited indirectly through the group’s privately held holding companies. The 
family also enjoys more votes concerning the management of Southern Concrete Pile 
Public Company Limited indirectly through this pyramidal structure. It holds 12.79% of 
shares in Thai Wire Products Public Company Limited, which is the publicly traded 
company that owns 1.19% of Southern Concrete Pile Public Company Limited. In total 
the Nganthavi family controls 43.50% of Southern Concrete Pile Public Company 
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Limited. At the same time, there are cross-holdings because Southern Concrete Pile 
Public Company Limited also holds 9.99% of Thai Wire Products Public Company 
Limited. 
Figure 3. 1 Southern Concrete Pile Public Company Limited  
Nganthavi family 
Thai Wire Products (PLC) 
Southern Concrete Pile (PLC) 
Holding companies of  











  It is a common practice in Thailand for businesses to be closely tied to extensive 
families and this link is established through marriages, which are considered to be the 
most trustworthy form of family connections. Thus, family members, typically, are 
involved in firm management by serving on the board of directors or as CEOs in Thai 
family firms rather than hiring external professional managers (Wiwattanakantang 2001; 
Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). For instance, about 96.40% of family firms listed on the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) have members working on the board of directors or 
management team in 2015. These imply that families can exert power over listed 
companies, and it is difficult for the board of directors to be independent. 
3.2.2 Financial system in Thailand  
In Thailand, the financial sector mainly consists of domestic commercial banks and 
financial companies. Originally, most domestic commercial banks and financial 
companies were established by family groups. Based on family connections via blood 
ties, imprudent lending by financial institutions is evident, mainly in the form of credit 
loans granted at low interest rates and without any collateral or guarantees. This has led 
to a high ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) which, amongst other factors, gave rise 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Charumilind et al. 2006). Since then, the Bank of 
Thailand (BOT, the central bank in Thailand) actively strengthened the regulation of 
financial institutions via implementing a series of reforms, such as the imposition of 
upper limits of shareholding for banks and financial companies (at 5% and 10 % for 
individual shareholders respectively), abolition of the interest rate ceiling, the 
requirement to have bank reserves and the abrogation of restrictions on foreign 
ownership of commercial banks. Furthermore, after 2004, the BOT launched the 
financial sector Master Plans to reforms in the finance industry to improve its efficiency 
and corporate governance practices. For instance, the ownership of some Thai financial 
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institutions was transferred from Thai families to foreigners or the government. Banks 
are required to reduce outstanding loans to connected companies otherwise they are 
required to have their senior executives surrender their company directorships if they 
held more than 1% of the company equity. The members of the board in both financial 
and non-financial listed companies are also required to have at least one-third ratio of 
independent directors who are unrelated to firms’ major shareholders or who are not 
employed by the companies. The reforms also cover granting new banking licenses for 
both domestic and foreign commercial banks and broadening the scope of commercial 
bank business. Consequently, the number of commercial banks increased from 13 in 
2003 to 19 in 2015, and 6 out of 19 banks have foreigners as the largest shareholders by 
the end of 2015. 
However, Thailand’s financial sector remains concentrated and far from competing 
fairly. Based on the financial stability report issued by the BOT, the five largest banks 
still account for about 69% of total assets in the banking system in 2015.   
3.3 Literature review and hypotheses development  
3.3.1 Literature review  
The separation of ownership and control, which can lead to conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders, has long been viewed as the key to analyzing 
modern corporations (Jensen & Meckling 1976). However, in other economies where 
controlling families assert dominance, especially in emerging markets (La Porta et al. 
1999; Faccio & Lang 2002; Anderson & Reeb 2003; De Massis et al. 2018; Hearn & 
Filatotchev 2019), the primary agency conflict is between large shareholders and other 
investors (Villalonga & Amit 2006). Interestingly, due to economic firm goals and non-
economic family goals (such as family harmony and social status), family firms have 
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unique characteristics and agency problems compared to non-family firms (Villalonga 
& Amit 2006).  
Empirical evidence on the relationship between family control and cost of debt 
remains inconclusive. On the one hand, family control can increase the expropriation of 
other investors by pursuing personal benefits and engaging in tunneling and moral 
hazard, for instance transferring a firm’s resources out or committing funds to 
unprofitable projects that provide private benefits which bear financial risk (Johnson et 
al. 2000). As a result, these can exacerbate the risk of agency conflicts between 
controlling families and creditors and raise the cost of debt associated with the expected 
costs of financial distress and bankruptcy (Purnanandam 2008). Additionally, bank loan 
spread is higher for firms experiencing a wider divergence between control rights and 
cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders, which is due to: the entrenchment incentive of 
shareholders able to reduce efficiency; and the ability of firms to pay debt, and increase 
financial distress and bankruptcy (Lin et al. 2011). Also, compared to non-family firms, 
family firms are required to offer more collateral since creditors incorporate the credit 
risk of expropriation of family control via control-ownership wedge and family 
management (Pan & Tian 2016).   
Conversely, family control can mitigate agency conflicts and reduce cost of debt 
because controlling families are concerned with the firms’ reputation, long-term 
commitment, and ensuring the descendants inherit their wealth (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; 
Anderson et al. 2003; Ellul et al. 2007). These can lead to lower monitoring costs for 
banks and less asymmetric information (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Furthermore, 
lending relationship and long-term affinities between controlling families and creditors 
can bring benefits to family firms such as more capital (Schwert 2018), longer 
investment horizons (Faccio 2010), more access to long-term debt (Charumilind et al. 
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2006), efficient investment (James Jr 1999) and better monitoring of managerial 
activities (Fama & Jensen 1983). It is possible that family firms often maintain long-
lasting and trustworthy relationships with their banks to access debt funding and survive 
for many years to come (Behr & Güttler 2007; Croci et al. 2011). As a result, creditors 
view the incentive structure of family firms as being less prone to expropriation of 
creditors, thereby leading to reduced agency cost of debt (Charumilind et al. 2006). 
As can be seen from the tension of the arguments above, to understand the impact 
of family firms on financial policy, specifically how family control affects cost of debt 
remains an important topic worthy of investigation. 
3.3.2 Hypotheses development  
Thailand is an emerging market characterized by an underdeveloped institutional 
and regulatory environment, poor control of corporate practices, and weak protection of 
investors. Yet it is dominated by family firms who make substantial contribution to the 
country’s economy (Wiwattanakantang 2001). This is different from other typical 
emerging markets such as China where government-owned firms dominate, and family 
firms usually face discrimination against accessing external finance (Pan & Tian 2016). 
Thus, we contend that family firms in Thailand could access external finance potentially 
at a lower cost.  
Moreover, Thai family firms have been established for a very long time and 
expanded their businesses rapidly. For many decades now, family firms have been and 
will continue to be very concerned about their long-term survivorship and long-lasting 
relationships with other stakeholders, such as creditors, to maintain continuous access to 
external finance (Anuchitworawong et al. 2003; Charumilind et al. 2006). Such a 
lending relationship plays a vital role as an informal mechanism of governance via a 
network of social relationships (Faccio 2010; Schwert 2018), so that family firms have 
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lower default risks and lower costs associated with financial distress or bankruptcy 
(Wiwattanakantang 2001; Connelly et al. 2012; Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). This can 
mitigate credit concerns raised by creditors when lending to family firms, which is 
likely to result in lower cost of debt. As such, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Cost of debt is lower in family firms than in non-family firms. 
In Thailand, controlling families can reinforce their control via holding more 
control rights and are likely to implement control-ownership wedge via pyramidal and 
cross-holding structures in their firms (Wiwattanakantang 2001). Connelly et al. (2012) 
opine that in a weak legal environment, controlling families can exert their influence on 
firms through a control-ownership wedge in order to reduce any dilution of family 
control. Family members’ authority is preserved through blood ties and marriages, 
which are considered to be a highly trusted form of family connection (Bunkanwanicha 
et al. 2013). In addition, controlling family involvement in management can further 
exert a strong influence on the board of directors (Claessens et al. 2002). Overall, we 
argue that families are more concerned about their survivorship and thus have even 
lower credit risks when controlling families have a larger control-ownership wedge or 
have family members on the boards. Thus, we form the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 2: Cost of debt is lower in family firms with a larger control-ownership 
wedge. 
Hypothesis 3: Cost of debt is lower in family firms when family members are the 
chairperson, CEO or directors. 
3.4 Sample and methodology 
3.4.1 Data and sample selection  
Our sample comprises non-financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET) from 2009 to 2015. The firm financial data are collected from Bloomberg. Firm 
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ownership data are hand-collected by searching the information from SET Market 
Analysis and Reporting Tool (SETSMART) which is produced by the SET. This 
database provides information on the stakes of shareholders with at least 0.5%. For each 
firm in each year, we manually collect the ownership of controlling shareholders 
including both control rights and cash flow rights. We also collect information on the 
identity of the controlling shareholders to identify family firms, and for family firms, we 
manually collect information of whether their members work in the management team. 
To verify that the information on family control is reliable and accurate, we compare the 
information we collected with firms’ homepages on their websites, the commercial 
register and newspapers. We are able to identify all recorded shareholders for each year 
throughout the sample period. Then we merge the ownership data with each company’s 
financial data. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% to 
reduce the impact of outliers. We exclude firms with irregular financial reporting habits 
and missing data for the variables employed in our baseline empirical specification. Our 
final sample comprises 2,167 firm-year observations for 335 listed firms. 
3.4.2 Measurement of variables  
Cost of debt  
Previous studies measure the cost of debt using proxies like the yield spread, the 
difference between the weighted-average debt yield and U.S. treasury yield (Anderson 
et al. 2003) or the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) (Lin et al. 2011) as a 
benchmark. However, in emerging markets, the debt market is not as developed. 
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Following Zou and Adams (2008), we measure the cost of debt as the ratio of interest 
expense to total debt.26  
 
Family ownership structure  
Following the work of Villalonga and Amit (2006), we define a firm as a family 
firm if a founder and/or family member by either blood or marriage is the blockholder. 
Despite an extensive literature on family firms, there is no consistent cut-off point of 
family ownership structure due to different degrees of ownership concentration in 
developed and developing countries (Wiwattanakantang 2001; Fan & Wong 2002). In 
accordance with the Thai legal system and implemented in the SET, a shareholder with 
25% of the voting rights has substantial control over the firm, thus we use 25% cut-off 
point of control rights, which is consistent with Wiwattanakantang (2001) who 
examines family ownership in Thailand.  In this study, we use two different measures of 
family ownership structure. The first is a dummy variable, Family, capturing the 
presence of controlling families and takes the value of one if a family owns more than 
25% of the control rights, and zero otherwise. The second is a continuous variable, 
ControlR, measuring the control rights held by the controlling families, following 
Anderson et al. (2009). 
 
Control-ownership wedge  
To measure the presence of controlling and powerful families, we use Wedge to 
measure disproportional ownership structure or control-ownership wedge. This variable 
is calculated as the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling 
 
 
26 Thai company accounting disclosures do not give a breakdown of interest charges relating to each class 
of debt contract (e.g. bank loans, bonds, notes payable, and borrowing from non-bank institutions). 
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shareholders (Claessens et al. 2002; Villalonga & Amit 2006). Accordingly, control 
rights are defined as the weakest link of the ownership chain while cash flow rights are 
defined as the products of all ownership levels along the ownership chain. For example, 
if firm A owns 35% of firm B directly, and firm B owns 50% of firm C directly, then 
the control rights held by firm A on firm C is 35% (the weakest ownership level) and 
the cash flow rights is 10.5% (= 35% * 50%, the products of all the ownership levels).   
 
Family management 
In this study, following Villalonga and Amit (2006), we create a dummy variable 
Family_CEO which proxies for family management. It is equal to one if the firm has a 
family member who acts as a chairperson, CEO or director, and zero otherwise.  
 
Control variables 
Firm characteristics, beside family control, can wield a potential impact on the cost 
of debt (Anderson et al. 2003; Pittman & Fortin 2004; Lin et al. 2011). Following the 
literature, we include a set of firm characteristics as control variables in our regression. 
We include Size which is calculated as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets, 
following Petersen and Rajan (1994). Larger firms tend to be more established, are 
stronger financially and with lower default risk, and, thus enjoy lower interest rates than 
smaller businesses (Petersen & Rajan 1994). For the robustness check, we replace Size 
with Size_growth which is another proxy to measure firm size. Size_growth is defined as 
the natural logarithm of firms’ debt and equity, following Anderson et al. (2003). 
We include tangible assets intensity (Tangible), measured as tangible assets divided 
by total assets. Firms with more tangible assets may provide more collateral which 
decreases the cost of debt (Zou & Adams 2008; Kim et al. 2011) 
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Leverage (Lev), calculated as total debt/total assets, is included in the model to 
control for the risk of bankruptcy (Chava et al. 2008). Firms that have lower debt 
intensity present lower risk to debt providers, and, thus, are more likely to have lower 
cost of debt (Chava et al. 2008; Graham et al. 2008).  
Current ratio (Current), measured by current assets over current liabilities, is 
controlled as a proxy of liquidity because firms with more liquidity tend to enjoy lower 
cost of debt (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca 2011).  
We also control for profitability (EBITDA) which is calculated as earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets, following Graham et al. 
(2008). Debt providers are more likely to charge a lower interest rate to firms with 
higher profits (Graham et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2011).  
In addition, firms with better growth opportunities can have lower borrowing cost 
(Graham et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2011). Such firms may be vulnerable to financial 
distress or be associated with information asymmetry (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca 
2011). For this reason, we include two variables to measure the growth opportunities of 
firms. MB is measured as the market value of equity plus book value of debt, divided by 
the book value of total assets, following Graham et al. (2008). Another variable to 
measure growth opportunities is Growth which is defined as percentage change of total 
sales, following Kim et al. (2011). The year dummy and industry dummy are also 
included.27 The definitions for these variables, as well as all other variables used in this 





27 The industry dummy is based on the industry classification of the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
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Table 3. 1 Variable Definitions  
Variable name Variable definition 
Panel A: cost of debt and ownership structure 
Cost of debt Interest expense/ total debt. 
Family Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms and 0 for non-family 
firms 
ControlR The control rights held by the controlling families 
Wedge Divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of 
controlling shareholders 
Family_CEO Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms that have a family 
member as the chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors 
and 0 for family firms that do not have a family member as the 
chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors 
Family 25-50% Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms that have a member 
of the family who holds between 25% and 50% of control rights 
and 0 for family firms that do not have a member of the family 
who holds between 25% and 50% 
Family 50% or more Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms that have a member 
of the family who holds more than 50% of control rights and 0 
for family firms that do not have a member of the family who 
holds more than 50% 
  
Panel B: firm characteristics  
Firm size (Size) Natural log of firm total assets 
Tangible assets intensity (Tangible) Tangible assets/ total assets 
Leverage (Lev) Total debt/ total assets 
Current ratio (Current) Current assets/ current liabilities 
EBITDA Earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization/ 
total assets 
MB Market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value 
of debt) divided by the book value of total assets 
Growth Percentage change of total sales 
Size_growth Natural log of firms’ debt and equity 
Return of assets (ROA) Net income/total assets 
Beta Firm’s beta value reflecting systematic risk 
Free cash flow (FCF) Free cash flow/ total assets  
Operating cash flow (OCF) Operating cash flow/ total assets 
Return on equity (ROE) Retained earnings/total equity 
Industry dummy 
 
Panel C: Political uncertainty events 
Political turnover (Turnover) 
Dummy variable equals 1 for firms in a given industry and 0 
otherwise 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 when the local politician is newly 
appointed and 0 when the local politician is not newly 
appointed. If politicians took office from January 1 to June 30, 
then the current year represents the year they took office: if 
politicians took office from July 1 to December 31, then the 
following year represents the year they took office 
Coup Dummy variable equals 1 when Thailand in 2014 is governed 
by the 2014 coup leaders and 0 otherwise 
 
3.4.3 Descriptive statistics  
Table 3.2 reports the distributions of family control including family ownership 
structure, control-ownership wedge and family management. Panel A shows the 
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distribution of our sample firms between family firms and non-family firms; there are 
1,306 firm-year observations for family firms and 861 firm-year observations for non-
family firms. The percentage of family firms increases slightly from 59.11% (170/286) 
in 2009 to 63.28% (212/335) in 2015. Panel B shows the average percentage of control-
ownership wedge within family firms is 5.77% and the percentage of family firms with 
family management is 96.40% (1,259/1,306), respectively. In the sample period, there 
are a few changes in the levels of control-ownership wedge and family management in 
Thailand each year. Additionally, amongst those firms that change their ownership type, 
family members often maintain their involvement in management as the board of 
directors, CEO and/or chairperson.  
Panel C of Table 3.2 reports the distribution of family firms and non-family firms 
by industry. The number and percentage of family firms vary significantly from 
industry to industry. The consumer products industry group has by far the largest 
number of family firms at about 78%. Compared to non-family firms, family firms 
dominate in most of the industry groups in Thailand, particularly in property & 
construction, which represents the largest industry according to the total number of 
listed firms. 
Panel D of Table 3.2 reports the number and percentage of firm-year observations 
by bank-connected lending within family firms in our sample. Consistent with the post-
2004 banking sector reform which increases the number of banks and financial 
institutions controlled by non-family entities and the dilution of concentrated family 
control of financial institutions, our sample contains only a small proportion of 
connected lending via family business groups (i.e. 5.2% of the total sample which 




Table 3. 2 Sample Distribution  
This table reports sample constituents Panel A shows the number and percentage of Thai listed companies 
which can be divided into family and non-family firms for each year. Panel B shows the percentage of 
control-ownership wedge and the number of family firms with family management within family firms 
for each year. Panel C shows the number and percentage of firm-year observations by industry for family 
and non-family firms for the sample period. Panel D shows the number and percentage of firm-year 
observations by bank-connected lending via family business groups. Definitions of all variables are based 
on those listed in Table 3.1. 
 Year         
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Panel A: Number of firm-year observations 
1. Family firms 170 172 167 174 199 212 212 1,306 
2. Non-family firms 116 121 130 125 123 123 123 861 
Total 286 293 297 299 322 335 335 2,167 
         
Panel B: Within family firms 
(N=1,306) 
        
1. Control-ownership wedge 
(mean in %) 
5.81 5.39 5.41 5.84 6.08 6.03 5.69 5.77 
2. Family management 
(number of firms)  
165 167 164 170 189 202 202 1,259 
Panel C: Number and percentage of firm-year observations by industry 










Agro & Food 
Industry 
Agribusiness, food & beverage 222 161 61 72.53 
Consumer 
Products 
Fashion, home & office products, 
personal products & pharmaceuticals 
164 128 36 78.05 
Industrials Automotive, 
industrial materials & machinery, 
packaging, 
paper & printing materials, 
petrochemicals & chemicals, 
steel 






520 321 199 61.73 
Resources Energy & utilities, 
mining 
193 80 113 41.45 
Services Commerce, 
health care services, 
media & publishing, 
professional services, 
tourism & leisure, 
transportation & logistics 
442 259 183 58.60 
Technology Electronic components, 
information & communication 
207 97 110 46.86 
 Total 2,167 1,306 861 60.27 
 
Panel D: Number and percentage of firm-year observations by bank-connected lending within 
family firms (N=1,306) 
 Number of firm-year 
observations 
Percentage of total 
firm-year observations 
1. Connected lending via family business groups 68 5.2% 





Table 3.3 provides the summary statistics for our sample. Panel A indicates that the 
mean (median) of the cost of debt is 6.04% (4.50%). This is higher than the mean 
(median) cost of debt in China which is 3.40% (3.3%) as reported by Zou and Adams 
(2008). In addition, most firms in our sample are family firms which make up 59.9% of 
the sample. The average percentage of control rights held by family firms is 28.84% 
while the median is 33%; these statistics indicate the high concentration of business 
ownership in Thailand. The average percentage of control-ownership wedge held by 
families is 5.77%, which reflects a high disproportional ownership in Thailand. 
Interestingly, the number of firms with family management is 96.6% of the sample. 
Panel B shows that the average firm size is 8.54. The average tangible assets intensity is 
37.72%. Leverage for the median firm in our sample is 47.15%, while the average 
current ratio is about 2%. On average, profitability (EBITDA) and growth opportunity 
are nearly 9% and around 7%, respectively. The average market-to-book ratio is 1.43.  
Panel C summarizes the distribution of our sample firms by owners. There are 1,306 
family firm-year observations, which make up 60.27% of the total sample. These 
statistics are slightly higher than Wiwattanakantang (2001) which reflects the growing 
presence of family firms in the Thai economy. The remaining 39.73% of our total 
sample are non-family firms comprising 861 non-family firm-year observations. For 
those non-family firms, there are 125 government firms, 321 foreign investor firms, and 
15 co-founder firms. In addition to this, 400 firms are classified as widely held non-







Table 3. 3 Summary Statistics  
This table reports summary statistics. Cost of debt is the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a 
dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control 
rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the divergence between control rights and cash flow 
rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms 
that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or is on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is 
the natural log of firm total assets. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Lev is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets. Current is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of 
earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets. Growth is the percentage 
change of total sales. MB is the market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) 
divided by the book value of total assets. Definitions of all other variables are based on those listed in 
Table 3.1. For Wedge and Family_CEO, summary statistics are reported for the sample of firm-year 
observations within family firms, whereas in the regressions, firm-year observations include total firms. 






Panel A: Cost of debt, ownership structure factors   
Cost of debt (%) 2,167 6.044 3.073 4.503 6.617 5.389 
       
Family  2,167 0.599 0 1 1 0.490 
ControR (%) 2,167 28.845 0 33.000 50.229 26.032 
Wedge (%) 1,306 5.774 0 0 7.982 10.945 
Family_CEO 1,306 0.966 1 1 1 0.181 
       
Panel B: Firm characteristics   
Size 2,167 8.542 7.515 8.349 9.409 1.463 
Tangible (%) 2,167 37.717 18.148 35.931 54.830 22.776 
Lev (%) 2,167 47.150 32.721 47.353 61.615 20.170 
Current 2,167 1.991 0.962 1.392 2.355 1.774 
EBITDA (%) 2,167 8.740 3.695 8.350 13.648 9.050 
Growth (%) 2,167 7.106 -7.541 5.523 18.316 25.115 
MB  2,167 1.430 0.917 1.156 1.629 0.864 
 
Panel C: Number and percentage of firm-year observations in our sample 
 Number of firm-year 
observations 
Percentage of total firm-
year observations 
1. Family firms 1,306 60.27% 
2. Non-family firms 861 39.73% 
2.1 Government 125 5.77% 
2.2 Foreign investor 321 14.81% 
2.3 Group 15 0.69% 
2.4 Widely held 400 18.46% 
Total 2,167 100% 
 
Table 3.4 reports the results of the univariate analysis of key variables between 
family and non-family firms in order to provide some preliminary evidence for our 
hypotheses. The results show that family firms on average pay lower cost of debt (i.e. 
0.731% lower) than non-family firms. The difference is statistically significant at the 
1% level (t-value is 2.99). Also, family firms are, on average, significantly smaller in 
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size than non-family firms by 0.32 points. Furthermore, family firms have significantly 
higher current ratio and profit than non-family firms by 0.29 points and 1.52%, 
respectively, implying that family firms may prefer a low-risk capital structure. Again, 
these differences are statistically significant. Compared to non-family firms, family 
firms also have significantly higher growth potential as measured by Growth and MB by 
2.52% and 0.14 points, respectively. There is no statistically significant difference in 
tangible assets intensity and leverage ratio between family and non-family firms.  
Table 3. 4 Univariate Analysis  
This table reports the univariate analysis. Cost of debt is the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Size is 
the natural log of firm total assets. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Lev is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets. Current is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of 
earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets. Growth is the percentage 
change of total sales. MB is the market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) 
divided by the book value of total assets. Definitions of all other variables are based on those listed in 
Table 3.1. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Family firms  
(N=1,306) 
Non-family firms  
(N=861) 
Difference tests  
(t-Stat) 
 Mean  Mean   
Cost of debt (%) 5.750  6.481  -0.73%***  
(2.992) 
Size 8.412  8.736  -0.32***  
(4.890) 
Tangible (%) 37.589  37.909  -0.32%  
(0.3092) 
Lev (%) 46.568  48.020  -1.45%  
(1.586) 
Current 2.107  1.818  0.29***  
(-3.602) 
EBITDA (%) 9.351  7.829  1.52%***  
(-3.714) 
Growth (%) 8.115  5.599  2.52%**  
(-2.208) 
MB  1.480  1.354  0.14**  
(-3.218) 
 
3.5 Empirical results 
3.5.1 Family control and cost of debt  
In Section 3.3.2, we hypothesize that, in Thailand, the three types of family control 
are more likely to have a negative relationship with the cost of debt. To test this 
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conjecture, we estimate the below linear model, following Anderson et al. (2003), 
Charumilind et al. (2006) and Lin et al. (2011), which makes our results directly 
comparable with prior empirical evidence: 
                 
The definitions for these variables, as well as all the other variables employed in 
this study, are presented in Table 3.1.28 To determine how controlling families exert their 
influence on the cost of debt and establish causality, we use one-year lagged values of 
family control as well as other control variables in our empirical estimation. Thus, the 
number of observations used in the regression analysis reduced to 1,806.  
The multivariate analysis of this regression is reported in Table 3.5. The 
relationship between family ownership and cost of debt are reported in columns 1 and 2. 
Looking at column 1, the estimated coefficient of Family is -0.07 and significant at the 
1% level (t-value is -2.65). In column 2, we also find that the estimated coefficient of 
ControlR is -0.17 and is significant at the 1% level (t-value is -3.23), which implies that 
a one-standard-deviation increase in ControlR is associated with a 4.4 percentage point 
decrease in the cost of debt. The results in columns 1 and 2 indicate that Thai listed 
firms have a lower cost of debt when controlling families are present and when 
controlling families hold more shares. These results support our hypothesis H1. Our 
results are qualitatively similar to those of Anderson et al. (2003) who attribute the 
lower cost of debt of family firms relative to non-family firms to reputational concerns. 
The difference in institutional environment can shape the behavior of family firms 
 
 
28 Correlations amongst the variables are not presented but are available upon request. The results report 
that firm’s cost of debt has a negative correlation with all three types of family control: family ownership 
structure (as denoted by Family and ControlR); control-ownership wedge (as denoted by Wedge); and 
family management (as proxied by Family_CEO). 
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differently (Lin et al. 2011). Anderson et al. (2003) focuses on the U.S., which has a 
much stronger law enforcement environment, so the property rights of family firms can 
be better protected and controlling families are thus more concerned about long-term 
survivorship and reputation. This can be confirmed by Anderson and Reeb (2003) who 























Table 3. 5 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt  
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is 
the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms 
and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the 
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a 
dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or 
on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of firm total assets. MB is the market 
value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by the book value of total assets. 
Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Current is the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total 
assets. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Year 
dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, 
respectively. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Cost of debt   
 OLS   





   
ControlR  -0.17*** 
(-3.23) 
  
Wedge   -0.16* 
(-1.88) 
 




































































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.059 0.061 0.055 0.058 
Observations 1,806 1,806 1,806 1,806 
 
 
However, under a weak institutional environment, and deficient arm’s length 
market-driven system in Thailand, controlling families are inclined to establish 
trustworthy relationships with their creditors because they stand to benefit from this 
relationship.  As such Thai controlling families are prone to taking a long-term 
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survivorship and low-risk approach in their business activities. Our results are different 
from the findings of Ellul et al. (2007), who document that family firms in countries 
with weak institutional environment experience higher cost of debt than non-family 
firms. However, Ellul et al. (2007) focus on financial markets in both developed and 
developing economies. Our results pertain to Thailand, a single economy, and control 
for the unique institutional environment and financial market characteristics that may 
not be representative of the sample of emerging economies in the study by Ellul et al. 
(2007). As such the results from this study demonstrate the unique relationship that 
exists between Thai family firms and their lenders. Our results corroborate the findings 
documented by Petersen and Rajan (1994), who indicate that ties between firms and 
their lenders can affect the availability and cost of funds to the firms. 
Column 3 focuses on firms with control-ownership wedge. The estimated 
coefficient of Wedge is -0.16 and is statistically significant at the 10% level (t-value is -
1.88). This implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in Wedge induces a 1.7 
percentage point decrease in cost of debt. It is a result suggesting that Thai family firms 
have lower cost of debt with larger control-ownership wedge. This supports our 
hypothesis H2. Our results are different from the findings of Lin et al. (2011), who 
show that firms with a larger control-ownerhsip wedge experience higher cost of debt. 
The results demonstrated in Lin et al. (2011) could stem from the cross-country analysis 
to the extent that their results could be driven by cross-country variation in institutional 
environments including legal systems, political economies and security laws. In contrast, 
our results are based on a single country, Thailand. Further, our results contrast the 
views of Peyer (2002) who finds that firms may use internal financing via their business 
group affiliations that lead to weaker incentive to access external finance and lower cost 
of external financing. We show in the next sub-section that lenders who are connected 
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to family business groups do not exert a statistically significant influence on the cost of 
debt. 
Column 4 shows the results of firms with family involvement in management. We 
observe a statistically significant and negative coefficient of Family_CEO (-0.07) at the 
5% level (t-value is -2.50). This finding supports our hypothesis H3 and complements 
the findings of Claessens et al. (2002), who find that controlling families can exert a 
strong influence on the board to manage financial decisions via family management. 
However, our results are different from those of Pan and Tian (2016); family 
management requires higher loan collateral in China while family management in 
Thailand enjoys a lower cost of debt. A notable difference is that the credit market in 
China is dominated by state-owned banks which tend to discriminate against private 
loans so that more loans are allocated to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than to 
privately owned firms. As such, the latter firms are required to provide higher loan 
collateral than state-owned enterprises (SOEs) when debt financing is granted. This 
scenario is not present in Thailand and consequently our results are different to those of 
Pan and Tian (2016).  
Regarding the effects of firm characteristics on the cost of debt, the results are 
generally consistent with the literature on cost of debt (Petersen & Rajan 1994; Chava et 
al. 2008; Zou & Adams 2008; Kim et al. 2011). However, somewhat surprisingly, the 
coefficient estimates associated with three firm characteristics, namely size, tangible 
assets intensity and leverage are significant. We find that firms are more likely to have 
lower cost of debt when they are larger in size; this is consistent with the findings of 
Petersen and Rajan (1994). Similarly, Kim et al. (2011) and Zou and Adams (2008) find 
a negative association between cost of debt and tangible assets. Following Chava et al. 
(2008), cost of debt is also positively related to leverage. As well as size, tangible assets 
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and leverage, other firm characteristics are often found to be empirically important 
determinants of cost of debt in developed economies, like the U.S. and the U.K., which 
may not have any statistically significant effect on the cost of debt of Thai firms. The 
lack of significance of other variables in explaining the cost of debt in our regression 
could in part be due to differences in institutional environment and ownership structure.  
To provide more insights into the behavior of family ownership on cost of debt, we 
further examine the distribution of control rights of controlling families and those in 
firms with family management. Here, we consider the ownership of families between 
25% and 50% of control rights, families which hold more than 50% of control rights, 
and family management. We generate a dummy variable for Family 25-50% (Family 
50% or more) which equals 1 for family firms and have a member who holds between 
25% and 50% (50% or more) of control rights and 0 otherwise. We also generate the 
dummy variable for Family_CEO which equals 1 for family firms which have a 
member who serves as chairperson, CEO or the board of directors and 0 otherwise. To 
differentiate the effect of the different degrees of control ownership on the cost of debt, 
family management on the cost of debt and the interaction between family management 
and control ownership, we incorporate interactive dummies and include them in the 
regression as follows:  
 
                
The definitions of the other variables are presented in Table 3.1. To determine how 
family ownership and management exert their influence on the cost of debt and 
establish causality, we use one-year lagged values of family ownership and management 
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as well as other control variables in our empirical estimation.   
The results for regression (2) are reported in Table 3.6. Column 1 shows that the 
ownership concentration of families may influence cost of debt in different ways. We 
find a negative relationship between family ownership concentration and cost of debt. 
The estimated coefficient is -0.01 when families hold 25-50% of control rights and this 
is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.32). The estimated coefficient is -
0.06 for family control rights of 50% or more of control rights and it is statistically 
significant at the 1% level (t-value is -8.05). These results indicate that family firms 
have lower cost of debt as controlling families hold more shares. They also further 
support hypothesis H1. We also consider the distribution of control rights of controlling 
families in firms with family management by interacting the dummy variable of 
Family_CEO with the control rights dummy variable of 25-50%, and 50% or more. The 
results are reported in column 2. We find that Thai family firms have a negative impact 
on the cost of debt when family members are involved in firm management. The 
estimated coefficients of Family 25-50% of control rights and Family_CEO are -0.10 
and -0.38, respectively. They are, respectively, statistically significant at the 5% and 1% 
levels (t-value are -2.32 and -4.98 each). The estimated coefficients of the interactive 
variables between Family 25-50%*Family_CEO, and Family 50% or 
more*Family_CEO are -0.40 and -0.32, respectively. They are statistically significant at 
the 1% levels where the t-values are -4.77 and -3.40. These findings suggest that the 
negative relationship between family ownership and cost of debt becomes stronger 
when controlling families hold more shares and are involved in their firm’s 
management. The net coefficient of Family_CEO on cost of debt with family ownership 
is -0.38-0.40-0.32 = -1.10. The net coefficient of Family 25-50% of control rights on 
cost of debt with family management is -0.10-0.40 = -0.50 holding all else constant. 
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These results support our hypotheses H1 and H3. They show that, in Thailand, 
controlling families through their involvement in firms’ management and control rights 
can reduce the cost of debt. 
Table 3. 6 Family Ownership Structure, Family Management and Cost of Debt  
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is 
the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family 25-50% is a dummy variable which equals one for 
family firms that have a member of the family who holds between 25% and 50% of control rights and 0 
otherwise. Family 50% or more is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a 
member of the family who holds more than 50% of control rights and 0 otherwise. Family_CEO is a 
dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or 
on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for 
year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Definitions of all other variables are based on 
those listed in Table 3.1. Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Cost of debt  
 OLS  













Family_CEO  -0.38*** 
  (-4.98) 
Family 25-50%*Family_CEO  -0.40*** 
  (-4.77) 
Family 50% or more*Family_CEO  -0.32*** 







Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
R2 0.057 0.069 
Observations 1,806 1,806 
 
3.5.2 Reputational effect and long-term survivorship  
To establish that controlling families are concerned with their long-term 
survivorship and will manage their firms through their control and by establishing their 
creditors’ trustworthiness thereby allowing them to borrow at a lower interest rate, we 
draw on the existing literature which documents that family control has a significant 
effect on firm performance and profitability (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga & 
Amit 2006). Firms which are concerned with their long-term survivorship tend to be 
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profitable and are also more likely to be reputable. These attributes may reduce credit 
concerns and the cost of debt. To further assess the channel governing the results, we 
test whether the lower cost of debt is more pronounced in family firms with higher 
profitability, which suggests that reputational effect and long-term survivorship 
characteristics of family firms are important governing factors. We classify firms into 
two categories of firm profitability based on three criteria: operating cash flow, return 
on assets and return on equity. The first category is for firms with high profitability, 
which is defined as firms with above-median operating cash flow (OCF), above-median 
return on assets (ROA), or above-median return on equity (ROE). The second category 
is for firms with low profitability, and these are firms with below-median operating cash 
flow (OCF), below-median return on assets (ROA), or below-median return on equity 
(ROE). We then perform the regression Eq. (1) on the subsamples for these two 















Table 3. 7 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt and Firm Profitability 
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is 
the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms 
and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the 
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a 
dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or 
on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. OCF is the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets. ROA is 
the ratio of net income to total assets. ROE is the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. Year dummy 
and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. 
Definitions of all other variables are based on those listed in Table 3.1. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 use the 
sub-sample with low profitability firms. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 use the sub-sample with high profitability 
firms. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 Profitability sub-sample 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
 OLS        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 







      




    









Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.090 0.084 0.089 0.087 0.089 0.085 0.089 0.085 
Observations 906 900 906 900 906 900 906 900 







      




    









Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.109 0.077 0.109 0.080 0.110 0.081 0.108 0.078 
Observations 912 894 912 894 912 894 912 894 







      




    










Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.077 0.085 0.077 0.088 0.077 0.078 0.077 0.086 
Observations 884 922 884 922 884 922 884 922 
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Table 3.7 reports the results for low and high profitability firms in accordance to the 
three criteria: operating cash flow (Panel A), return on assets (Panel B) and return on 
equity (Panel C). In columns 1, 2, 3 and 4, we find that the lower cost of debt for family 
ownership structure is concentrated in firms with high profitability. In column 2, the 
estimated coefficients of Family range from -0.08 to -0.11, and they are statistically 
significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels (t-value are between -1.93 and -2.79, 
respectively). The results in column 4 confirm these effects; the estimated coefficients 
of ControlR range from -0.19 to -0.26, and they are statistically significant at the 1% 
levels (t-value are between -2.62 and -3.42, respectively). The estimated coefficients of 
ControlR in column 4 indicate that when firm profitability is above the median, a one-
standard-deviation increase in ControlR brings about a reduction in the cost of debt in 
the 4.9-6.8 percentage points range. It can be seen in columns 2 and 4 that these results 
are similar to those reported in Table 3.6. However, the coefficients of Family and 
ControlR in columns 1 and 3, which represent the sample of firms with low profitability, 
are not only insignificant, but they are also smaller than those in columns 2 and 4. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the negative association between family 
ownership structure and cost of debt is more pronounced in firms with high profitability. 
These results provide strong support for our hypothesis H1 and are consistent with the 
view that firms’ profitability is akin to enhancing firms’ reputation and families’ long-
term survivorship which make lower cost of debt possible (Anderson et al. 2003; 
Anderson & Reeb 2003).  
In columns 5 and 6 we find that the lower cost of debt associated with greater 
control-ownership wedge is also concentrated in firms with high profitability. In column 
6, the estimated coefficients of Wedge range from -0.33 to -0.61, and they are 
statistically significant at the 5% or 1% levels (t-value are between -2.17 and -4.50, 
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respectively), thus implying that when firm profitability is above the median, a one-
standard-deviation increase in Wedge creates between 3.6 and 6.7 percentage points 
reduces the cost of debt. These results again are similar to those reported in Table 3.6. 
However, the coefficients of Wedge in column 5, which represent low-profitability 
firms, are insignificant and smaller in magnitude. Taken together, these results are 
consistent with our hypothesis H2 and extend the work of Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
who find that control-ownership wedge is associated with U.S. firm performance.  
In columns 7 and 8, the estimated coefficients of Family_CEO range between -0.09 
and -0.12, and they are statistically significant at the 5% or 1% levels (t-value are from -
2.17 to -2.97, respectively). Again, these results are similar to those reported in Table 
3.5. In contrast, in column 7, the coefficients of Family_CEO are not statistically 
significant, and they are smaller in magnitude for firms with low profitability. These 
results reflect the fact that when firms are highly profitable, creditors view family firms 
to be less likely to expropriate them, which translates into a reduction in agency cost of 
debt. 
3.5.3 Bank-connected lending of family firms  
The established results on the reduced cost of debt effect of family firms could be 
also driven by an alternative explanation that firms borrow from a lender that is 
controlled by or connected to the same family business groups. Should the borrower and 
the lender belong to the same family business group, it is probable that the borrower 
could obtain lower cost of debt. To ameliorate this concern, we estimate regression (1) 
by incorporating an extra control variable, Fambank which is a dummy variable equal to 
one for family firms that have connected lending with banks via family business groups 
and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in Table 3.8. Family firms that have connected 
lending with banks is broadly defined as family firms whose surname appears in the 
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board of directors and who owns 5% or more of the banks’ shares. This definition is 
broad enough to capture the possibility that family-related connections with lenders 

























Table 3. 8 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt (Controlling for Bank-
Connected Lending of Family Firms) 
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is 
the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms 
and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the 
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a 
dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or 
on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of firm total assets. MB is the market 
value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by the book value of total assets. 
Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Current is the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total 
assets. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Fambank is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have connected lending with banks 
via family business groups and 0 otherwise. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for 
year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 use the full sample. 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Cost of debt   
 OLS   





   
ControlR  -0.16*** 
(-3.29) 
  
Wedge   -0.17** 
(-1.97) 
 












































































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.061 0.062 0.057 0.060 
Observations 1,806 1,806 1,806 1,806 
 
It can be seen in Table 3.8 that across columns 1 to 4 for the different measures of 
controlling families, the coefficients of interest for Family, ControlR, Wedge and 
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Family_CEO continue to be statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively, with little changes in the magnitude of these coefficients. These results are 
by and large confirming the robustness of our results to the confounding effect of 
business lending arising from family related lenders. We do not find any evidence to 
support the view that bank-connected lending of family firms is associated with lower 
cost of debt. To further validate that controlling families long-term survivorship and 
reputation are the factors that lead to lower cost of debt conditional on possible family 
related business lending, we perform regression (2) by incorporating the dummy 
variable Fambank.  The results remain qualitatively unchanged from those shown in 
Table 3.7, justifying that reputational concerns and long-term survivorship are the 
possible channels through which family firms could benefit from lower cost of debt. 
These results are not presented here for brevity but are available from the authors upon 
request. 
3.5.4 Robustness analyses 
3.5.4.1 Alternative estimation methods concerning endogeneity issue  
Endogeneity might be a problem when examining family control. There could be 
one endogeneity concern that borrowers with certain ownership structures might have 
other firm-specific characteristics which have been unobserved in our previous 
regression models and may influence the relationship between family control and the 
cost of debt (Lin et al. 2011). Another endogeneity concern is that the association 
between family control and the cost of debts could be simultaneously determined. It is 
possible that while family control affects the level of cost of debt, the levels of cost of 
debt influence the decision of controlling families to retain their control of the firm (Ma 
et al. 2017). Therefore, the reverse causality between family control and cost of debt, 
and/or the joint determination of family control and other unobserved factors could 
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potentially bias our previous study. To mitigate these endogeneity issues and ascertain 
our results from the previous models, we exploit an exogenous shock, the political 
uncertainty occurring in Thailand that influences the relationship between family 
control and cost of debt. In addition, we apply the random effect model and two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) method with instrument variables, to check the results’ robustness.  
First, following the results derived from a Hausman (1978) test, we use the random 
effect model to address the potential endogeneity issue of unobserved, time-invariant 
heterogeneity29. We rerun regression (1) by using the random effect model, and report 
the results of our key variables in columns 1 to 4 of Table 3.9. We find that the 
coefficients of Family and ControlR in columns 1 and 2, respectively, are significantly 
negative which indicate that Thai listed firms enjoy a lower cost of debt when 
controlling families are present and when controlling families hold more shares. 
Column 3 focuses on firms with control-ownership wedge; we find that the estimated 
coefficient of Wedge is significantly negative, suggesting that the cost of debt is lower 
in Thai family firms with higher control-ownership wedge. Column 4 highlights firms 
with family members’ involvement in management matters; we observe a statistically 
significant and negative coefficient of Family_CEO, implying that Thai family firms are 
associated with lower debt cost when members are involved in the firm’s management. 
The results of the family control variables based on the random effect model show that 
the signs of the coefficients and levels of significance are consistent with the results 
 
 
29 To test the robustness of the results, we estimate the results using fixed effects models and discover that 
the results are statistically insignificant in all cases for the relationship between family control and cost of 
debt. This was expected because the family control variables are time-invariant variables that do not 
change within firms. The results are available from the authors upon request. In addition, the levels of 
family control remain nearly constant in most of Thai family firms. From 2009 to 2015, there are small 
changes in ownership structure from family firms to non-family firms and vice versa (3.37% of firms in 
the total sample size). Furthermore, changes in the level of family management and control-ownership 
wedge are nearly the same during the sample period. Taken together, the results suggest that endogeneity 
concern may not be prevalent in our study.  
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reported in Table 3.5. Thus, the results of the random effect confirm the robustness of 
our main findings, and family control potentially influences the cost of debt when the 
endogeneity issue of unobserved characteristics is considered. 
 Further, we apply a 2SLS approach to address simultaneity and reverse causality 
between family control and the cost of debt. Following Laeven and Levine (2009), we 
use the values of the family control variables at the beginning of our sample as 
instruments. In the first stage, we regress each endogenous family control variable on 
the instrument variables and all the other control variables from equation (1). The F-
statistics30 illustrate that the coefficients of the instrument variables are significant, thus 
confirming our instrument variables are valid. In the second stage, we apply the 
predicted values from the first-stage regressions as key independent variables and we re-
estimate regression (1). Results of the second stage regression are reported in columns 5 
to 8 of Table 3.9. The key variables of interest are negatively and significantly related to 
cost of debt, which are consistent with the results documented in Table 3.5. Taken 











30 In the first stage, the F-statistics are unreported but they are available on request. 
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Table 3. 9 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt (Addressing Endogeneity 
Concerns) 
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using random effect and 2SLS models. 
Cost of debt is the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for 
family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. 
Wedge is the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. 
Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the 
chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of firm total assets. 
MB is the market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by the book 
value of total assets. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Current is the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization to total assets. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. Lev is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects 
in this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Cost of debt       
 Random effects   2SLS   





   -0.06** 
(-1.99) 
   
ControlR  -0.15** 
(-1.93) 
   -0.14** 
(-2.55) 
  
Wedge   -0.24* 
(-1.86) 
   -0.11 
(-0.65) 
 
Family_CEO    -0.04** 
(-2.10) 
   -0.06** 
(-2.15) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.034 0.058 0.031 0.033 0.058 0.060 0.055 0.058 
Observations 1,806 1,806 1,806 1,806 1,754 1,754 1,754 1,754 
 
3.5.4.2 Matching sample  
Another concern is that the association between family control and cost of debt 
could be determined by other firm characteristics used as control variables in our main 
equation. To address this issue, we construct a new sample using propensity score 
matching, following Dehejia and Wahba (2002). We control for industry and year that 
influence the impact of family control on cost of debt by matching across industry and 
year. Based on the literature, we also control for firm characteristics that affect family 
control, which are Size, ROA, Beta, Lev, FCF and MB. All variables are defined as per 
Table 3.1. A logit model is estimated to obtain propensity scores for each treated firm (a 
family firm) and its matched control firm (a non-family firm). We match each treated 
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firm to one control firm in the same industry and year with the nearest propensity score. 
The mean differences of the firm characteristics are reported in Panel A of Table 3.10. It 
can be seen that for all the firm characteristics, the treated firms and control firms show 
no statistically significant difference in their mean values.  
In Panel B of Table 3.10, we regress Eq. (1) based on the sample of treated and 
control firms. The coefficients of family control variables, namely family ownership 
structure, control-ownership wedge and family management are reported in columns 1 
to 4. It is apparent that the results remain qualitatively unchanged when compared to 





















Table 3. 10 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt (Propensity Score 
Matching Approach)  
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using the propensity score matching 
approach (PSM) and an OLS model. In Panel A, the control sample is for firms in the same industry and 
year, and is based on firm characteristics like Size, ROA, Beta, Lev, FCF and MB. In Panel B, Columns 1, 
2, 3 and 4 use the matching sample. Cost of debt is the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a 
dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control 
rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the divergence between control rights and cash flow 
rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms 
that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is 
the natural log of firm total assets. MB is the market value of assets (market value of equity plus book 
value of debt) divided by the book value of total assets. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total 
assets. Current is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before 
interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets. Growth is the percentage change of total 
sales. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Beta is 
firm’s beta value reflecting systematic risk. FCF is the ratio of free cash flow to total assets. Year dummy 
and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 
 Treated sample Control sample Difference (t-value) 
 Mean Mean  
Panel A: Matching sample difference tests  
Size 8.494 8.570 -0.076 (-1.01) 
ROA (%) 4.344 3.776 0.568% (1.11) 
Beta 0.825 0.879 -0.054 (-1.60) 
Lev (%) 48.600 48.542 0.058% (0.05) 
FCF (%) 1.179 1.565 -0.386% (-0.69) 
MB (%) 1.320 1.370 -0.05% (-1.23) 
Observations 742 742  
 
Panel B: Matching sample analysis  
 Cost of debt   
 OLS   





   
ControlR  -0.19*** 
(-3.12) 
  
Wedge   -0.03* 
(-1.71) 
 












Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.075 0.077 0.069 0.074 
Observations 1,272 1,272 1,272 1,272 
 
3.5.4.3 Exogenous shock of political uncertainty and the effect of family control  
We use the political uncertainty in Thailand as an exogenous shock to test whether 
our main results are not driven by endogeneity concerns. Specifically, we conjecture 
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that controlling families might use internal resources to establish connections with new 
political elites during political uncertainty to the extent that creditors may impose higher 
cost of debt. Empirically, we construct two dummy variables to capture political 
turnovers. The first is Turnover which equals 1 for turnovers of political leaders at the 
province level and 0 otherwise. The second is Coup, which equals 1 for the year 2014 
when the coup d’état occurred and 0 for other years. Data on Turnover are presented in 
Appendix A. We incorporate in regression (1) the interaction terms between these two 
dummy variables and different measures of family control. The estimation results are 
reported in Table 3.11. Across the four regression specifications, the interaction terms 
are our focus of interest. The results show that the coefficients of the interaction terms 
are positive and statistically significant, indicating that the lower cost of debt enjoyed 
by family firms is less pronounced during political uncertainty, which is consistent with 
















Table 3. 11 The Effects of Political Uncertainty at Provincial and National Levels 
on the Relationship between Family Control and Cost of Debt 
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is 
the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms 
and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the 
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a 
dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or 
on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Coup is a dummy variable which equals one when Thailand in 
2014 was governed by the coup leaders and 0 otherwise. Turnover is a dummy variable which equals one 
when the local politician is newly appointed and 0 otherwise. If politicians took office from January 1 to 
June 30, then the current year represents the year they took office: if politicians took office from July 1 to 
December 31, then the following year represents the year they took office. Year dummy and industry 
dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Definitions 
of all other variables are based on those listed in Table 3.1. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 use the full sample. 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 





























































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sum test (F-value) 5.89*** 6.07*** 6.50*** 5.82*** 
R2 0.071 0.072 0.068 0.070 
Observations 1,737 1,737 1,737 1,737 
 
3.5.4.4 Alternative proxies for controlling families, firm size and samples   
We conduct a number of additional analyses to test the robustness of the results.31 
To explore whether our definition of controlling families matters for our results, we 
consider different definitions of family ownership structure by changing the cut-off 
point from 25% of control rights to 20%, following La Porta et al. (1999), and Faccio 
and Lang (2002). We also apply alternative measure of firm size in our control variable. 
Referring to Anderson et al. (2003), firm size can be defined as the natural logarithm of 
 
 
31 All results are available from the authors upon request. 
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firms’ debt and equity (Size_growth). Furthermore, we explore the sensitivity of our 
results by excluding utilities companies; it is often argued these companies are 
government regulated and are not entirely able to set their own policies, such as capital 
structure. All results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Traditionally, Thai firms have relied heavily on bank debt for their external 
finances. Equally, family control has played a very crucial role in many Thai businesses 
which have traditionally formed the backbone of the country’s economy. In this paper 
we examine the link between family control and cost of debt when family firms obtain 
external debt finance. Using cost of debt to measure firms’ ability to secure debt 
finances externally, we find that family control benefits from lower cost of debt 
compared to non-family firms. The benefits of lower cost of debt are more pronounced 
when family firms have larger family ownership, larger control-ownership wedge, and 
are involved in day-to-day management. We fail to find any evidence that bank-
connected lending of family firms leads to lower cost of debt. We show that the 
reputation and long-term survivorship characteristics of family firms as proxied by their 
high profitability are the channels which give rise to lower cost of debt. The evidence is 
consistent with the view that Thai controlling families have incentives to take a long-
term and low risk approach in running firms, and they are less prone to expropriating 
other investors despite Thailand’s weak institutional environment.  
Our results are also robust to possible endogeneity issues and continue to hold for 
different proxies of family control and control variables, and for matched samples. We 
further document that the negative relationship between family control and cost of debt 
becomes weaker in the presence of political uncertainty engendered by the 2014 coup 
d’état and changes in the provincial level politicians over the sample period. By and 
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large, our findings may be generalized to other economies and markets with weak 
institutional environments and a lack of arm’s length market-driven system. The low 
cost of debt enjoyed by family firms is instrumental in their continued success and for 







Chapter 4: The value of family control during political uncertainty: Evidence 
from Thailand’s constitutional change in 2014 
4.1 Introduction 
Family firms dominate in many economies (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Williams Jr et 
al. 2018). Prior studies have investigated the effect of family control on firms’ policies 
and performance, and recognized the distinction between family firms and other types 
of firms, which is a crucial factor for firms’ survivorship (Anderson & Reeb 2003; 
Villalonga & Amit 2006; King & Santor 2008; Dyer 2018; Fattoum-Guedri et al. 2018; 
Villalonga et al. 2019). These studies typically utilise a setting in normal periods and 
focus on the agency problem between controlling families and other investors. However, 
the effect of family control on firm value during periods of political uncertainty is 
unclear.  
Prior literature has documented that firm value declines when political uncertainty 
emerged (Bailey & Chung 1995; Beaulieu et al. 2005; Pástor & Veronesi 2012; Baker 
& Bloom 2013). Other studies have also documented negative effects of political 
uncertainty on stock returns (Bailey & Chung 1995; Beaulieu et al. 2005; Pástor & 
Veronesi 2012) and on firms’ policies such as financing and investment decisions 
(Huang et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2016; Colak et al. 2017; Jens 2017; Amore & Minichilli 
2018). This is particularly so for firms which operate in economies that are politically 
less stable and are characterized by weak economic fundamentals and significant 
government interventions. In contrast, little is known about the role played by family 
control during periods of political uncertainty. In particular, to what extent does family 
control benefit investors? Or does family control serve the family’s interests at the 
expense of minority shareholders during times of political uncertainty?  
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We argue that uncertainty stemming from a political crisis tends to disturb a firms’ 
equilibrium, and any uncertainty in business environment can amplify the benefits or 
costs of family control in influencing corporate valuation. Accordingly, whether the 
effect of family control on firm value during political uncertainty will prevail as that in 
normal periods is pertinent for academic and policy-makers alike. Political uncertainty 
can magnify the benefits of family control given that controlling families have 
incentives to preserve the firm’s reputation, leading to reduced agency conflict between 
controlling families and minority shareholders (Anderson & Reeb 2003). During 
political uncertainty, family control could add value to their company as a result of 
granting greater access to finance and profits engendered by government policies 
bestowed upon family firms due to their network and political connections (Faccio 2010; 
Liu et al. 2013). On the other hand, families’ private benefits of control can be affected 
negatively by political uncertainty. To the extent that political uncertainty might 
threaten the survivorship of family firms, family firms are prone to preserve their 
private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. The survival-oriented actions 
of family firms are associated with tunneling (Johnson et al. 2000) including political 
pressure via taxes, regulations or bribery during times of political uncertainty (Frye & 
Shleifer 1997; Caprio et al. 2011; Xu et al. 2016). Given these two contrasting effects, it 
remains an empirical question on how political uncertainty affects the behavior of 
family firms. 
The empirical evidence of family firms’ behaviors during political uncertainty is 
scant, especially in emerging markets where high family ownership concentrations are 
common and controlling shareholders usually influence businesses’ policies and market 
value (La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2000). Furthermore, in emerging markets, 
the institutional environment is less developed, investor protection is weaker, and 
117 
 
corruption is more prevalent32 (La Porta et al. 2000a; Wiwattanakantang 2001; Leuz & 
Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang 2009). Consequently, 
political power and connections are critical to securing guarantees and business 
opportunities, which lead firms to expend extensive resources in establishing personal 
relationships with government officials and powerful politicians through friendship, 
board nominations and campaign contributions (Fisman 2001; Li et al. 2008; 
Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang 2009; Xu et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2018). Due to 
institutional weakness of emerging markets, the net effect of controlling families on 
firm value may not be apparent, as it is predicted that firms’ behaviors during periods of 
political uncertainty are likely to magnify both the benefits (to enhance firms’ 
survivorship) and costs (of minority shareholders’ expropriation) of family control.  
This paper fills this gap in the literature by examining the impact of family control 
on firm value during political uncertainty in Thailand. In Thailand, the government 
plays an active role in promoting economic development, yet Thai politics have been 
marked by intense political uncertainty between an unstable democracy and coups d’état, 
in which the military seizes control and replaces elected governments.33 We focus on 
the constitutional change arising from the 2014 coup d’état, which stemmed from a 
prolonged political crisis that led to a change in the political system with extensive 
social and economic ramifications. This political unrest started in November 2013, and 
has an adverse effect on Thailand socially and economically. In particular, between 
November 2013 and May 2014, about 28 people died and more than 700 were injured.34 
Thailand’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 2.1 percent in 2014 and by 1.3 
 
 
32 For example, according to Transparency International, in 2015, Thailand scored only 38 out of 100 
(where 100 is ideal) on corruption, and ranks 76 out of 167 countries worldwide. 
33 Between 1932 and 2015, Thailand’s political system is characterized by an unstable democracy which 
led to 20 constitutional changes and 20 coups d’état. 
34 Time, http://time.com/108719/thai-army-declares-military-coup/ (May 22, 2014).  
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percent in 2015.35 The SET Index (SET) falls from a peak of 1,597.86 on the 30th April 
2013 to a low of 1,288.02 on the 30th December 2015. The focus on Thailand stems 
from the fact that family firms have historically dominated the Thai economy. 
According to the report by Forbes Thailand, as of 2015 the Thai top 50 richest people 
who own big family businesses contributed more than 25% of Thailand’s GDP and 
made up for 33% of market capitalization in the stock market. Additionally, in our 
sample, 60.2% of firms listed on the Thai stock market are family firms. As such, our 
findings provide insights into the costs and benefits of family control on firm value in 
such times of political turmoil.  
Our study is motivated by existing literature which contends that the inefficient use 
of firms’ resources by controlling shareholders can increase the expected agency costs 
of minority shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Zhang & 
Cao 2016). Since firm value can be determined by minority shareholders who would 
expect more risk of tunneling by controlling families (La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta et 
al. 2000a), we contend that the agency costs are more likely to affect the value of a 
family controlled business during political uncertainty, since higher expected agency 
costs can give controlling families more incentives to extract resources from their own 
firms (Johnson et al. 2000). Our study thus complements these existing studies by 
considering the influence of controlling families on firm value when investors face 
different levels of expected agency costs during political uncertainty. 
We use a number of empirical approaches to test our conjecture and draw 
meaningful causal inferences. Notably, we exploit the constitutional change by the 2014 
coup d’état as an exogenous shock that triggered (but was also caused by) political 
 
 
35 Time, http://time.com/4448655/thailand-constitutional-referendum/ (August 11, 2016) 
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uncertainty in Thailand. It is possible that a systematic relationship between family 
control and other firm characteristics might occur during political uncertainty, thereby 
affecting the relationship between family control and firm value, and the association 
between family control and firms’ financial decisions in our study. On this issue, we 
apply a matched sample approach by using the propensity score matching (PSM) 
method, following Lins et al. (2013). We also use a difference-in-difference framework 
and control for firm fixed effects. These two approaches might be sufficiently robust to 
establish causality and ensure that firm value and decision-making are causally affected 
by family control during political uncertainty in Thailand.   
Based on a sample of 2,156 firm-year observations for 365 firms in Thailand from 
2010 to 2015, we find that family control has a significantly negative effect on firm 
value over the period when political uncertainty peaked. This effect is more pronounced 
in the presence of controlling families and when controlling families hold more shares 
in the firms but less than 75%. These results suggest that given Thailand’s weak 
institutional/regulatory environment in which corruption is prevalent and investor 
protection is weak, investors tend to discount the value of family control; during 
political uncertainty the costs of family control outweigh the benefits leading to a 
decline of firm value. Our main findings are robust to using alternative estimation 
methods, alternative sampling methods, alternative measurements of family control, and 
alternative control variables.  
Additionally, we hypothesize that the effect of family control on firm value during 
political uncertainty relies on the level of expected agency costs. We find that the 
underperformance of family firms is concentrated in those firms with high expected 
agency costs, which are associated with the inefficient use of internal resources. The 
negative effect of family control on firm value is more significant when firms have high 
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cash holdings, high operating profits and more free cash flows. Also, family firms with 
low expected agency costs do not underperform significantly. These results suggest that 
investors are concerned about the risk associated with tunneling and the use of firms’ 
resources to establish political connections, which tend to escalate during political 
uncertainty. For this reason, they discount the value of family control more heavily 
when they expect that family firms have higher agency costs as they use internal 
resources tentatively to establish new political connections instead of maximizing firm 
value.  
Next, we establish that the cause of underperformance of family firms stem from 
investment and financing decisions during political uncertainty. We find a larger decline 
in the investment of family firms during political uncertainty relative to non-family 
firms, indicating that family firms tend to delay their investment in such times. In 
addition, family firms tend to abstain from undertaking financial activities such as 
paying dividends and accessing debt financing during heightened political uncertainty 
compared to non-family firms. Taken together, these imply that the relative 
underperformance of family firms can be explained in part by the reduction in 
investment and financing activities during political uncertainty in an effort to preserve 
family funds and enhance the survivorship of family firms. Overall, all findings in our 
study reflect that in Thailand, the underperformance of family firms during political 
uncertainty mainly stems from the strong incentive of controlling families to survive in 
the long run at the expense of minority shareholders to establish political connections. 
Our study contributes to the literature on corporate performance during political 
uncertainty and the literature on corporate finance and family control. First, prior studies 
investigate the performance of family firms during normal periods (Anderson & Reeb 
2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; King & Santor 2008), while our study provides insights 
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into the role of family control by examining the net effect of family control on firm 
value during turbulent periods of heightened political uncertainty. We document the 
impact of prolonged political uncertainty arising from a change in the political system 
between an unstable democracy and coup d’état on the way family control affects firm 
value. Our study also views the political uncertainty as a natural experiment which 
addresses the endogeneity concerns and potential simultaneity bias between family 
control and firm value (Lins et al. 2013; Beuselinck et al. 2017). Furthermore, our study 
differs from Connelly et al. (2012) and Wiwattanakantang (2001), who explore the 
behavior of Thai firms on firm performance by considering Tobin’s q and ROA. 
Additionally, we make a contribution to the literature through manually collecting 
ownership information for each year over the sample period 2010-2015. 
Second, our study adds to the literature with regard to the determinants of firm 
value during political uncertainty in emerging markets. Most existing literature suggests 
that political uncertainty reduces firm value in both developed and developing markets 
(Bailey & Chung 1995; Beaulieu et al. 2005; Pástor & Veronesi 2012; Baker & Bloom 
2013). We complement these studies by showing that during political uncertainty the 
effect of family ownership on firm value differs from that of other blockholders in 
emerging markets. We provide empirical evidence to explain the underperformance of 
family firms relative to non-family firms during political uncertainty in emerging 
markets. Further, we show that the underperformance of family firms is associated with 
the level of expected agency costs incurred when controlling families use firms’ 
resources to establish political connection, and in so doing expropriate from minority 
shareholders.  
Finally, we provide additional insights into how family firms’ behaviors are 
affected by political uncertainty in terms of investment and financing decisions. 
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Previous studies document that during political uncertainty firms cut their investment 
(An et al. 2016; Jens 2017) and reduce their financing activities (Fan et al. 2008; Huang 
et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2016). We extend these studies by considering the incentives of 
controlling families to engage in certain investment and financing policies, and show 
that family firms reduce investment and financing activities than other firms during 
political uncertainty indicating that families are more conservative during uncertainty. 
Our results complement Lins et al. (2013) suggesting family control is probably 
associated with concerns about the survival of the family network. Our study also 
confirms that lower dividend payment and lower debt level reflect that family firms are 
more risk-averse, which extends the findings of González et al. (2013). These results 
relate to the literature focusing on the risk-taking incentives of family firms. Some 
studies have documented that family firms are risk-averse because they have invested 
all of their human capital and financial capital in the firms so they are more concerned 
about their market reputations and long-term survival (Anderson et al. 2003; Ellul et al. 
2007). Other studies contend that families have significant ownership and thus are likely 
to expropriate minority shareholders and undertake risky behaviors (Boubakri & 
Ghouma, 2010; Lin et al. 2011). In addition, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) has reconciled 
these two conflicting views and argued that family firms value their “socioeconomic 
wealth” such that they choose an optimal risk level to avoid losing this wealth based on 
the trade-off between improving performance and increasing risk.36 Jiang et al. (2015) 
also suggest that besides socioemotional reasons, family firm risk-taking is associated 
with differences in families’ personal values such as religion. The lessons learnt about 
how family control influences firm value and firms’ decisions during political 
 
 
36 Socioeconomic wealth is defined by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007)  as “nonfinancial aspects of the firm 
that meet the family's effective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the 
perpetuation of the family dynasty.” 
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uncertainty, are directly applicable to other emerging economies where family firms are 
dominant and their influence is subject to the stability of external environment.   
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly describes 
Thailand’s institutional framework. Section 4.3 reviews the current and relevant 
literature and establishes the hypotheses. Section 4.4 discusses the data, variables and 
methodologies. Section 4.5 presents the empirical results and section 4.6 concludes with 
a summary of the main themes covered here. 
4.2 Institutional background  
The ownership structure of Thai firms is concentrated, and families are the largest 
controlling shareholders in Thailand (Wiwattanakantang 2001). Since family firms have 
operated since the introduction of a constitutional monarchy in 1932, most families who 
are the founders (or descendants of founders) of business empires, own extensive 
businesses in Thailand such as agriculture, food and beverage, automotive, industrial 
materials, steel, construction materials, and commerce (Polsiri & Wiwattanakantang 
2006; Bertrand et al. 2008). Typically, Thai families have long established connections 
and long-term relationship with banks (Charumilind et al. 2006) and powerful 
politicians including traditional, bureaucratic and military elites (Polsiri & Jiraporn 
2012) to favor their firms. Taken together, family firms contribute significantly to 
economic growth in Thailand. According to the report by Forbes Thailand (2015), the 
country’s top 50 richest people who own family businesses contribute more than 25% of 
the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 33% of market capitalization in the 
stock market. By the end of 2015, 63.82% of non-financial listed firms on the Stock 




Despite the introduction of a constitutional monarchy in 1932, Thai politics have 
long been marked by intense political uncertainty and scandal. Frequently, coups d’état 
have been implemented by the country’s generals to seize control and replace elected 
governments. From 1932 to 2015, Thailand’s political system could be best described as 
an unstable democracy in which 20 constitutions and 20 coups (13 were successful) 
occurred. Since the 1980s, Thailand has had a semblance of a more stable democracy, 
during which time military interventions became less frequent. However, during the 
past decade, Thailand has experienced worsening political uncertainty leading to high 
tensions, intermittent violence, and regular street protests. In Thailand, the level of 
ethical corporate governance is also clearly underdeveloped, and the degree of 
corruption remains high. According to Transparency International, in 2015, Thailand 
scored only 38 out of 100 (where 100 is ideal) on corruption, making it 76th out of 167 
countries. Firms’ bosses employ their resources to establish personal relationships 
through friendships, board nominations and campaign contributions with government 
bureaucrats and politicians (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang 2009).  
Given the opportunities afforded by political uncertainty, controlling families are 
more likely to seek access to political power and patrons, and use their political 
connections to get favors for their firms. Under the weak institutional setting as 
discussed above, the impacts of family control could be more pronounced to firms when 
firms face political uncertainty. Thus, it is important to investigate benefits and costs of 
family control during political uncertainty in Thailand. 
4.3 Literature review and hypotheses development 
4.3.1 Literature review  
The interest conflicts between controlling families and other investors significantly 
influence firm value, especially when there is political uncertainty. Thus, based on 
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family ties, controlling families are more likely to have incentives to expropriate wealth 
from other investors (Bertrand et al. 2008). However, if controlling families keen to 
preserve their business for their next generations, it is possible that family control can 
have a long-term horizon and better alignments between controlling families and other 
investors, leading to a competitive advantage and creating firm value (Anderson et al. 
2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006). Prior studies have noted that from a resource 
perspective, family network and their political connections bring about bail out from 
their government (Faccio 2006), and provide greater access to debt financing from 
banks and other state institutions (Li et al. 2008; Liu  et al. 2011). For instance, 
politically connected firms significantly increase in firm value and stock price (Faccio 
2006). Thus, preserving families’ connection is incrementally beneficial to firm 
performance. 
However, during political uncertainty, the behavior of family firms may be different 
from normal periods. Previous literature suggests that political uncertainty can move 
firms out of equilibrium and amplify the benefits and costs of family control on firm 
value (Lins et al. 2013). Obviously, during political uncertainty the prior established 
political connections of controlling families are weakened or even broken. For instance, 
a sudden break in political connections (such as sudden deaths of politicians) can reduce 
firm value and it is more pronounced in family firms (Faccio & Parsley 2009). In 
addition, due to higher risks in government policies, stock price drop during political 
uncertainty (Pástor & Veronesi 2012, 2013). Political uncertainty also leads to a 
reduction in investment (An et al. 2016; Jens 2017), debt financing (Fan et al. 2008), 
and dividend payment (Huang et al. 2015). Consequently, to maintain political 
connections, controlling shareholders are more likely to extract firms’ resources from 
minority shareholders to establish personal relationship with new government officials 
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and politicians (Fan et al. 2007) via taxed, regulations or bribery (Frye & Shleifer 1997; 
Caprio et al. 2011). These imply that the interest conflicts between controlling families 
and minority shareholders will be increased which can lead to the underperformance in 
family firms. 
4.3.2 Hypotheses development  
 In Thailand, family firms are common and play an important role in economy 
(Wiwattanakantang 2001). They also establish for long time and expand their business 
groups (Bertrand et al. 2008). Furthermore, Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang 
(2009) indicate that political connections and political power play an important role 
influencing firm value, particularly under the prevalence of corruption and weak 
institutional environment in this country. Thus, to access resources, controlling families 
seek to create and maintain close connections with powerful politicians 
(Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). During political uncertainty, family firms do not want to 
lose their abilities to access resources. Prior studies note that Thai families are more 
likely to extract firms’ resources from minority shareholders to manipulating family 
members’ networks (Bertrand et al. 2008; Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013) and establish 
personal relationships with new government officials and politicians (Bunkanwanicha & 
Wiwattanakantang 2009). Taken together, firm value is more likely to lower for family 
firms (Claessens et al. 2002). We posit our first testable hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1. Family firms experience a larger decline in firm value during 
political uncertainty than non-family firms. 
 The effect of family control on firm value during political uncertainty in 
Thailand is more likely to rely on the level of expected agency costs since family 
control can erode firm value by tunneling resources out of family firms at the expense 
of minority shareholders. It has been well documented that firm value can be 
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determined by minority shareholders who would expect risk of tunneling in family 
firms when it becomes evident that firms’ resources are being used for corrupt purposes 
and where investor protection is weak and corporate governance is poor (La Porta et al. 
1999; La Porta et al. 2000a). Connelly et al. (2012) indicate that family control leads to 
underperformance stemming from the use of internal resources via the Thai family 
business group. This is also confirmed by the findings of Bertrand et al. (2008) who 
investigate Thai family businesses and their affiliations. It is possible that during 
political uncertainty, Thai family firms with higher expected agency costs are more 
likely to tunnel resources out of firms to establish political connections, rather than firm 
value maximization. Based on this claim, our next hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2. The negative relationship between family control and firm value 
during political uncertainty is more pronounced in firms with higher expected agency 
costs by minority shareholders. 
4.4 Data and sample  
4.4.1 Data  
For accurate information on ownership data in Thailand, we manually collect time-
series ownership data between 2010 and 2015 from various sources. Typically, we 
gather the data from the SET Market Analysis and Reporting Tool (SETSMART) 
database of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) which is a well-established national 
information collector. This database provides ownership data, with at least 0.5% of 
stakes owned by shareholders for companies listed on the SET. To confirm our 
information is correct, we also retrieve ownership data from companies’ websites, the 
commercial register in Thailand and newspaper articles. Since the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) which erupted in 2008 and some of our variables are based on one-year 
lagged values, we use a sample starting from 2010 to avoid any potential effects on 
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companies’ accounting and ownership data during this uncertainty period. Regarding 
various dependable sources of information, we can identify all shareholders who are 
recorded for each year in our study. The ownership shareholding data consist of both 
control rights and cash flow rights. Based on ownership categories reported by 
Wiwattanakantang (2001) who pioneered the analysis of equity ownership structure in 
Thai firms, we then identify family shareholders by tracking Thai last names which are 
relatively unique and protected by law (Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). 
We collect accounting data of companies from Bloomberg database and match it 
with the manually collected ownership data which are obtained from SETSMARTS 
database. We further restrict our sample to non-financial companies. We exclude firms 
with negative total assets, negative book equity, and negative debt. To estimate standard 
errors clustered by firms, we require each firm to have at least two continuous year 
observations. Our final sample for the panel data regressions comprises 2,156 
observations for 365 firms. Importantly, this sample selection process does not suffer 
from survivorship bias since we include firms that are delisted or go bankrupt in a 
specific year during our analysis. 
4.4.2 Family ownership and control  
In our analysis, the identification of a family firm is essential. Following La Porta et 
al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000) and Wiwattanakantang (2001), we use the control 
rights of the controlling shareholders to define the ultimate control. The threshold level 
is debatable since it can be influenced by factors such as the difference of ownership 
concentration and institutional environment. According to the SET, a shareholder can be 
considered as a controlling shareholder with more than 25% of control rights to exert a 
significant influence on firm behaviors and decisions. Consequently, we use 25% of the 
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control rights as the threshold in our analysis, and firms are defined as widely held firms 
if the largest shareholder’s control right is less than 25%. 
We follow Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Villalonga and Amit (2006) to identify 
family firms in our study. In particular, a firm is identified as a family firm if the 
founder/ultimate owner or a member of his/her family, by either blood or marriage, is 
the controlling shareholder with at least 25% of the control rights, either individually or 
as a group. This definition allows us to capture all the control rights held by members of 
the same family in Thailand.   
In this study, following Wiwattanakantang (2001) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
we create a variable FamilyDummy, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s 
controlling family owns at least 25% of control rights, and 0 otherwise. We also use 
another measure of family ownership which is FamilyStake. This is a continuous 
variable used to capture the level of family ownership, and it is measured by the 
percentage of control rights held by controlling families.  
Table 4.1 summarizes the information on ownership distribution of the sample 
across industries using the SET classification. The sample consists of 365 firms and 
2,156 firm-year observations. 60.25% of firms are family firms, and the remaining firms 
are non-family firms. It is interesting to note that there are more family firms than non-
family ones in our sample, reflecting the historical dominance of family ownership in 
Thailand. Specifically, the biggest family firms operate in the consumer products 
industry, and in agriculture & food industry; in fact these families control about 75% of 
both industries. Also, family firms own more than half of the service industry, which 
has the largest number of family firms. Conversely, the resources industry is run by the 
smallest percentage of family firms (38.47%), which is not surprising since this industry 
is monopolized by state-owned enterprises.  
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Table 4. 1 Industry Distribution of Family Ownership 
This table reports the distribution of firm-year observations across industries for family and non-family 
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221 160 61 72.40 27.60 
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454 284 170 62.56 37.44 
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203 96 107 47.29 52.71 
 Total 2,156 1,299 857 60.25 39.75 
 
4.4.3 Firm performance and other firm characteristics  
To measure firm performance, we use the market-to-book ratio, following 
Beuselinck et al. (2017). The market-to-book ratio is measured as market value of assets 
(market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by the book value of total 
131 
 
assets. This ratio is expressed in natural logarithm in the regression analysis because we 
want to mitigate the impact of outliers. The variable is represented by LnMB in this 
study. 
 To consider the effects of other factors on firm performance during the political 
uncertainty period, we include a set of control variables following existing studies 
(Beuselinck et al. 2017). LnSize represents firm size and is measured as the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s total assets. FixedAsset is calculated as the ratio of fixed assets to 
total assets. OCF is the ratio of operating cash flows to total assets. Lev is leverage and 
is defined as the ratio of long-term debt at time t to total debt at time t-1. We also 
include the indicators of two other controlling shareholders. The first one is GovDummy, 
equal to 1 for government controlled firms. Another is ForeignDummy equal to 1 for 
foreigner controlled firms. To reduce the effect of outliers we winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1% and 99% levels.  
 Table 4.2 summarizes the statistics for the main variables used in our empirical 
analysis. Panel A shows that the mean of the average natural logarithm of market-to-
book ratio is 0.267. Interestingly, FamilyDummy has a mean value of 0.602, indicating 
that 60.25% of firms in our sample are family-owned firms. The average percentage of 
control rights held by a controlling family is 29.05% with the largest ownership is 
87.63%. The natural logarithm of firm total assets is 8.51, on average, while the average 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets is 36.77%. The leverage has a mean value of 37.45%. 
The average operating cash flows to total assets ratio is approximately 6.91%. Panel B 
shows the distribution of firms in our sample. In our sample, 4.9% of observations are 





Table 4. 2 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of this table reports the summary statistics of all variables for the full sample from 2010 to 2015. 
The definition of all these variables are provided in Appendix B.  
Panel B of this table reports the distribution of the firms according to the types of the controlling 
shareholders. 
Variable Observation Mean Median Min Max SD 
Panel A: Firm performance, ownership and firm characteristics 
LnMB 2,156 0.267 0.165 -1.422 3.793 0.520 
FamilyDummy 2,156 0.602 1 0 1 0.489 
FamilyStake (%) 2,156 29.055 34.140 0.000 87.636 26.018 
LnSize 2,156 8.514 8.267 4.297 14.626 1.511 
Lev (%) 2,156 37.452 4.333 0 1,315.588 117.87 
FixedAsset (%) 2,156 36.772 35.075 0.598 94.344 22.783 
OCF (%) 2,156 6.915 6.758 -13.746 26.310 9.866 
Tobin’s Q (%) 2,156 1.506 1.180 0.487 6.535 0.986 
ROA (%) 2,156 5.149 5.114 -34.658 31.490 8.913 
Cash holding (%) 2,156 7.484 4.655 0.061 47.880 8.300 
EBITDA (%) 2,156 5.456 5.069 -28.868 33.110 8.778 
FCF (%) 2,156 1.997 2.341 -35.108 36.993 11.645 
CapEx (%) 2,156 4.959 3.180 0 33.66 5.721 
Dividend 2,156 0.730 1 0 1 0.444 
GovDummy  2,156 0.049 0 0 1 0.216 
ForeignDummy  2,156 0.123 0 0 1 0.329 
       
Panel B: Number and percentage of firm-year observations in our sample 
 Number of firm-year observations Percentage of total firm-year 
observations 
1. Family firms 1,299 60.25% 
2. Non-family firms 857 39.75% 
2.1 Government 106 4.92% 
2.2 Foreign investor 267 12.38% 
2.3 Widely held 484 22.45% 





Table 4.3 summarizes the mean differences between family and non-family firms 
for the full sample. All variables use the data between 2010 and 2015. On average, 
family firms are significantly smaller in size; however, they have higher market-to-book 
ratio and ROA, compared to non-family firms.  
Table 4. 3 Univariate Analysis 
This table reports the mean values for family firms and non-family firms, and the t-statistics of the 
difference for the full sample with the data from 2010 to 2015. LnMB is the natural logarithm of market-
to-book ratio of total assets. LnSize is the natural logarithm of total assets. Lev is the ratio of long-term 
debt at time t to total debt at time t-1. FixedAsset is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. OCF is the 
ratio of operating cash flows to total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of firm market value to firm book value. 
ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust 
standard error clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
 
Family ownership Full Sample 
 Yes No Difference (t-stat) 
LnMB 0.284 0.241 0.043*(1.866) 
LnSize 8.353 8.757 -0.404*** (-6.116) 
Lev (%) 34.552 41.847 -7.295% (-1.406) 
FixedAsset (%) 36.840 36.668 0.172 (0.171) 
OCF (%) 7.156 6.548 0.608 (1.400) 
Tobin’s Q (%) 1.544 1.448 0.096%** (2.200) 
ROA(%) 5.550 4.541 1.009**(2.575) 
 
4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 Baseline results  
To examine the influence of family ownership on firm performance around the 
political uncertainty, we follow Duchin et al. (2010) and Garcia-Appendini and 
Montoriol-Garriga (2013) to set up the following difference-in-differences (DID) 





This approach enables us to make use of the full sample and examine the role of 
family control before and during the political uncertainty period. In particular in 
equation (1), LnMB is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio for firm i in year t, 
which is used to measure firm performance. Family_Ownership is the proxy for family 
control, measured by both FamilyDummy and FamilyStake at the end of 2012 which is 
one year prior to the occurrence of political uncertainty. FamilyDummy is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm’s controlling family owns at least 25% of control rights, 
and 0 otherwise. FamilyStake is the percentage of control rights held by controlling 
families if they own over 25% of controlling shareholding. In the regression, we enter 
these two variables separately. This identification is to address the potential endogeneity 
issue in the DID design that family firms may change their control after the political 
uncertainty, in which case the family control is endogenously determined. It could also 
stem from reverse causality which may arise on the relationship between family control 
and firm performance and its policies (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Hence, to avoid 
potential endogeneity issues, we apply the identification strategy to measure family 
ownership at year end of 2012 prior to the political uncertainty, in the spirit of Duchin et 
al. (2010) and Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013). The relationship 
between firm ownership and firm performance also suffers the issue of omitted or 
unobservable variables, so we include the firm fixed effects to address this issue. The 
inclusion of firm fixed effects also incorporates the Family_Ownership in the regression.    
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PoliticalYearDummy represents political uncertainty period which is measured as a 
dummy variable that equals 1 for observations in years 2013 to 2015, capturing the full 
period of political uncertainty. Then the interaction term reflects the DID effect of 
family control on firm performance before and after the political uncertainty. To control 
for the time-varying performance, we also include year fixed effects. However, as we 
already include the PoliticalYearDummy, and to avoid the problem of dummy variable 
trap, we only include selected year dummies (i.e., 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). 
Based on previous evidence, firm characteristics are included as the set of control 
variables, which are LnSize, Lev, FixedAsset, OCF. To consider the other types of 
controlling shareholders, we also include two dummies to indicate both government 
controlled firms and foreigner controlled firms (GovDummy and ForeignDummy) and 
their interaction with the PoliticalYearDummy, which also allow us to compare the 
effect of family ownership with other controlling ownership. All of these variables are 
described in Section 4.4. Robust standard errors are calculated by clustering at the firm 
level. 
The results of estimating Equation (1) are reported in Table 4.4 using various 
family ownership proxies. In particular, the interaction terms between family ownership 
and political uncertainty are our main concerns. As can be seen from the results, the 
estimated coefficients of FamilyDummy*PoliticalYearDummy and 
FamilyStake*PoliticalYearDummy are -0.069 and -0.108, and statistically significant at 
the 5% levels in columns 1 and 2. Economically in column 1, the coefficient indicates 
that during the political uncertainty occurrence, the average logarithm of market-to-
book ratio decreases by 25.84% for family firms compared with non-family firms for 
the entire sample. In column 2, the coefficient indicates that a one-standard-deviation 
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increase in FamilyStake is associated with a 2.84 percentage point, or 10.64%, decrease 
in natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio during the political uncertainty.37  
We further investigate the distribution of family ownership by considering the 
ownership between 25% and 75% (FamilyStake25to75), and over 75% 
(FamilyStake75more) in Column 3. We find that the coefficient of the interaction term 
is negative and statistically significant for FamilyStake25to75*PoliticalYearDummy. 
These results indicate that family firms with relatively lower ownership perform more 
poorly during the political uncertainty. The consistency in these three specifications 
support our hypothesis 1 that firm performance during political uncertainty are lower in 
family firms than in non-family firms and suggest that in Thailand, listed firms perform 
worse during the political uncertainty period when controlling families hold more shares.  
All control variables exhibit the expected signs and significant levels that are 
consistent with prior literature on firm value (Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Lins et al. 2013; 
Beuselinck et al. 2017). In particular, operating cash flows is positively related to firm 











37 The standard deviation of FamilyStake in 2012 is 26.278% and its mean is 28.329%.  
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Table 4. 4 The Effects of Family Ownership on Firm Performance during the 
Political Uncertainty 
This table reports the firm fixed effects regression with DID design. Dependent variable is LnMB, which 
is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of total assets for firm i in year t. Family_Ownership is 
measured by two proxies which are FamilyDummy and FamilyStake. FamilyDummy is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for family firms and 0 otherwise, measured at the end of 2012. FamilyStake is the percentage of 
control rights held by family owners, measured at the end of 2012. FamilyStake25to75 is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a family holds 25%-75% of their firm’s control rights at the end of 2012 and 0 
otherwise. FamilyStake75more is a dummy variable that equals one if a family holds more than 75% of 
their firm’s control rights at the end of 2012 and 0 otherwise. PoliticalYearDummy represents political 
uncertainty period and is a dummy variable that equals one in the years 2013 to 2015. Due to the 
inclusion of this variable, we are only able to include selected year dummies for year 2011, 2012, 2013, 
and 2014. All other variables are defined as before. Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample from 2010 to 
2015. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Full sample  




FamilyStake*PoliticalYearDummy  -0.108** 
(-2.04) 
 
FamilyStake25to75*PoliticalYearDummy   -0.070** 
(-2.42) 




















































Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.050 0.051 
Observations 2,156 2,156 2,156 
 
4.5.2 Firm-level expected agency costs and family ownership 
In this section, we further explore whether a possible cause of the family firms’ 
underperformance involves the level of expected agency costs, to test our hypothesis 2. 
To examine the influence of expected agency costs, we first split our sample into low 
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and high expected agency cost subsamples. Following Dothan (2006), Lins et al. (2013), 
Moro Visconti (2013) and Badawi and Fontenay (2019), the subsample of low expected 
agency costs includes firms if they have below-median cash holdings (Cash), below-
median operating profits measured by earnings before interest-based taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization to total assets (EBITDA), or below-median free cash flow (FCF). The 
subsample partition is based on yearly data. 
We re-estimate equation (1) using FamilyDummy and report the results of the key 
variables in Table 4.5. We find that the estimated coefficient of the interaction term 
FamilyDummy*PoliticalYearDummy is negative and statistically significant for the high 
expected agency cost subsamples (columns 2, 4, and 6). In particular, the coefficients 
are -0.093, -0.100, and -0.116 (t-values are -2.01, -2.50 and -2.59, respectively). 
However, we do not find statistically significant coefficients on the interactions for the 
low expected agency cost subsample. Again, all our results confirm that during political 
uncertainty, family control experiences a larger decline in firm value with the outcome 
being more pronounced in firms with high expected agency costs via cash holdings 
balance, operating profits and free cash flows. The results remain qualitatively similar if 
we use FamilyStake in place of FamilyDummy in the regressions.   
Taken together, these results provide strong support for our hypothesis 2 that during 
the political uncertainty period the negative association between family ownership and 
firm value is more pronounced in firms with high expected agency costs. These results 
agree with the view espoused by Villalonga and Amit (2006), who find that the 
performance of family firms is associated with agency conflicts. This is evident when 
considering the period of political uncertainty, and when controlling shareholders 




Table 4. 5 Firm-level Differences in Expected Agency Costs 
This table reports the firm fixed effects regressions with DID design. Dependent variable is LnMB, which 
is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of total assets for firm i in year t. Cash is the ratio of cash 
to total assets. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization to 
total assets. FCF is the ratio of free cash flow to total assets. All other variables are included and defined 
as before. Columns 1, 3 and 5 use the subsample of firms with low Cash, EBITDA, and FCF. Columns 2, 
4 and 6 use the subsample of firms with high Cash, EBITDA, and FCF. Due to the inclusion of 
PoliticalYearDummy, we are only able to include selected year dummies for year 2011, 2012, 2013, and 
2014. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
LnMB Cash EBITDA  Free cash flow (FCF) 
 Low High  Low High  Low High 























































Control variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.077  0.088 0.062  0.074 0.109 
Observations 1,078 1,078  1,077 1,079  1,078 1,078 
 
4.5.3 Additional analyses   
4.5.3.1 Matching sample 
Regarding the correlation between family ownership and other firm characteristics 
in our observational data, we maintain family ownership exerts a nonparametric causal 
effect on firm performance by using propensity score matching. We split our sample 
into two subgroups. The treatment group includes firm-year observations with family 
ownership, while the control group consists of firm-year observations without family 
ownership. To construct the matching sample, we match the observations based on 
family ownership for each year and industry classified by the SET. Then we employ the 




Based on prior literature (Beuselinck et al. 2017), firm characteristics that are 
deemed to wield effects on family ownership are included in the logit regression. The 
definitions of all variables are as before. The predicted values from this logit model are 
the propensity score for a family firm. Each treatment firm is then matched with one 
control firm that has the nearest propensity scores, following Dehejia and Wahba (2002). 
This process leaves us with 857 of family firms and 857 control non-family firms.  
The differences in means for family firms and control firms of the matched sample 
are reported in Panel A of Table 4.6. It shows that the differences in all the firm 
characteristics are statistically insignificant between these two samples, which validate 
our matching process. In Panel B of Table 4.6, we examine the relationship between 
family ownership and firm performance by re-estimating the regressions in both Tables 
4 and 5 using the matched sample.  
The coefficients of all the interaction terms between family control proxies and 
PoliticalYearDummy are negative and the significance levels are consistent with the 
results reported in Table 4.4, indicating that during the period of political uncertainty 
the costs of family control are greater than the benefits. In Panel C of Table 4.6, we 
investigate the level of expected agency costs influencing the negative relationship 
between family control and firm value during the political uncertainty by re-estimating 
equation (1) using the matched sample. The coefficient of 
FamilyDummy*PoliticalYearDummy is negative and significant at 1% (in columns 4 
and 6) and 5% levels (in column 2), while the coefficient is insignificant in columns 1, 3, 
and 5. These results are also qualitatively similar to those based on the full sample 
analysis reported in Table 4.5, indicating that the negative and significant relationships 
between family ownership and firm performance are concentrated in those firms with 
high expected agency costs. 
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Table 4. 6 Results using the PSM sample 
This table reports the results of empirical analysis using the PSM sample. The matched sample is 
constructed on the one-to-one matching. In Panel A, we illustrate the t-statistics of the difference for the 
matched sample with the data from 2010 to 2015. In Panel B, we conduct regression analysis of the 
relationship between family ownership and firm performance. In Panel C, we conduct subsample analysis 
to examine the effects of expected agency costs on the relationship between family control and firm 
performance. Columns 1, 3 and 5 of Panel C use the subsample of firms with low agency conflicts. 
Columns 2, 4 and 6 of Panel C use the subsample of firms with high agency conflicts. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Family 
ownership 
One-to-one matched sample  
 Yes No Difference (t-stat) 
LnMB 0.294 0.241 0.053**(2.17) 
LnSize 8.713 8.757 -0.044(-0.59) 
Lev (%) 41.728 41.848 -0.120%(-0.02) 
FixedAsset (%) 36.230 36.669 -0.439%(-0.39) 
Observations 857 857  
    
Panel B: The Effects of Family Ownership on firm value during the Political Uncertainty 













  -0.064 
(-0.57) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.035 0.035 
Observations 1,714 1,714 1,714 
    
Panel C: Firm-level Differences in Expected Agency Costs 
 Cash EBITDA Free cash flow (FCF) 
 Low High Low High Low High 















Control variables Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.072 0.072 0.062 0.069 0.124 
Observations 841 873 828 886 889 825 
 
4.5.3.2 Family control and corporate decisions in investment and financing activities  
To give a more complete picture of how firms’ behavior is affected by controlling 
families during political uncertainty, we examine these families’ decisions concerning 
investment and financing, which can lead to underperformance of family firms. We 
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hypothesize that private benefits of family control become more costly to minority 
shareholders during the political uncertainty due to controlling families’ incentive for 
firms’ survivorship through using firm resources, particularly over investment (Julio & 
Yook 2012; An et al. 2016) and/or financing decisions (Francis et al. 2014; Huang et al. 
2015; Waisman et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2016). To test this, we consider the impact of 
family control on capital expenditure, leverage and dividends, by estimating the 
following firm fixed effects model for the full sample during the period 2010 to 2015: 
 
Decisionit is investment and financing decisions for firm i in year t. In our study, the 
investment decision is measured as capital expenditure to assets and represented by 
CapEx whereas the financing decision is measured by two proxies, i.e. Lev and 
Dividend. Lev is firm leverage that is the ratio of long-term debt at time t to total debt at 
time t-1. Dividend is a dummy variable equals to 1 if firm pays dividends and 0 
otherwise. Following the literature (Lemmon & Lins 2003; Lins et al. 2013; Beuselinck 
et al. 2017), firm characteristics are included as the set of control variables which are 
LnSize, Lev, FixedAsset, OCF, ROA and LnMB. All of the other variables are described 
before, except ROA which is the ratio of net income to total assets. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. 
Table 4.7 reports the results of estimating equation (3). Our primary interest is the 
estimated coefficient on the interaction between FamilyDummy and 
PoliticalYearDummy which measures the impact of family control on firm decisions 
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around the political uncertainty. The estimated coefficients are all negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% (in columns 2 and 3) and 1% levels (in column 1). 
Considering the investment policy via capital expenditure (CapEx) in column 1, the 
estimated coefficient of FamilyDummy*PoliticalYearDummy is negative (-0.012) and 
significant at the 1% level (t-value is -2.92), indicating that family firms reduce the 
capital expenditure by 1.2 percentage points, or 24.19%, more than that of non-family 
firms during the political uncertainty. This finding implies that families behave more 
conservatively during the political uncertainty, probably due to concerns about the 
survival of the family network and uncertainty about the future.  
For debt financing (Lev) in column 2 and dividend payment (Dividend) in column 3, 
the estimated coefficients are -0.213 and -0.052, respectively and significant at the 10% 
levels (t-values are -1.80 and -1.76, respectively). These results indicate that family 
firms reduce their external debt financing and dividend payment probability by 21.3 and 
5.2 percentage points, or 56.87% and 7.12%, more than those of non-family firms 
during the political uncertainty. Our finding suggests that the reduction in leverage 
amongst controlling families could be due to the increase in conflict of interest between 
controlling families and creditors arising from family firm tendency to enhance their 
political connection during periods of high political risk. In addition, family firm 
reduction in dividend payment exacerbates the conflict of interest between controlling 
families and minority shareholders during periods of high political risk. Taken together, 
all of the findings show that political uncertainty can trigger a marked reduction in 
financing activities in family firms, paying smaller dividends and having poorer access 
to finance that could relieve debt. 
In summary, our findings point out that family control matters during political 
uncertainty. It is plausible that the decisions made by controlling families to reduce their 
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investment and financing activities during political uncertainty may at least partially 
account for the underperformance of family firms. The private benefits of control 
become more costly to minority shareholders since the primary interests of controlling 
families to survive become the driving factor of utilising firms’ resources. 
Table 4. 7 Investment and Financing Decisions During Political Uncertainty 
This table reports the regression result of firm investment and financing decisions. Dependent variables 
are shown in the column titles for firm i in year t. CapEx is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. 
Lev is the ratio of long-term debt at time t to total debt at time t-1. Dividend is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if a firm pays dividend and 0 otherwise. All other observations are defined as before. Control variables 
in Column 2 excludes leverage and replaces operating cash flows to total assets ratio (OCF) with total 
cash to total assets ratio (Cash). Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. The t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 CapEx Lev Dividend 
 Full sample   













Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.133 0.031 0.087 
Observations 2,156 2,156 2,156 
 
4.5.3.3 Alternative proxies and sample   
We further test the robustness of the results by conducting a number of additional 
analyses, which are available from the authors upon request. According to Faccio and 
Lang (2002), we further consider the threshold of controlling families based on 10% of 
control rights, instead of 25% of control rights. Moreover, consistent with Villalonga 
and Amit (2006), we use alternative control variables by including firm age in our 
analysis. Following Anderson and Reeb (2003), we change the measure of firm size 
which is the natural logarithm of firms’ debt and equity (Size_growth). We have also 
conducted the regression analysis by using the ROA and Tobin’s Q as the proxy for 
firm performance.  Finally, since companies in the resource industry group may be 
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sensitive to government regulations and are not entirely free in making and 
implementing their own policies, we exclude firms in this industry group. Again, the 
results are largely consistent with our prior findings, and confirm the robustness of our 
main results. For brevity these results are not reported here but they are available from 
the authors upon request. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Thai politics have been marked by intense political volatility. Frequently, military 
coups d’état have seized control of government and replaced elected government 
leaders, thus initiating authoritarian rule. Family firms that dominate the Thai economy 
have long played an important role and sought to gain favor with government leaders 
and bureaucrats. As in many other economies around the world, they want to retain their 
influence in periods of political uncertainty and beyond, and this motivates us to 
investigate the implication of family control on firm valuation and financial decisions 
during such periods.  
 We find that during the political uncertainty, family firms underperform in 
comparison to non-family firms. The effect is more pronounced when controlling 
families hold higher ownership. We also find that poor performance is more pronounced 
in family firms with higher expected agency costs. Family firms also delay or change 
their investment and financing decisions/activities during the political uncertainty, 
which partially explains the underperformance of these firms. Our main findings are 
robust to using alternative estimation methods, alternative sampling, alternative 
measurements of family control, and control variables.  
Our findings can be generalized to other countries and markets where the institutional 
environment is weak, corruption remains high, and corporate governance is 
underdeveloped. Overall, our results support the view that, to survive during political 
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uncertainty, family control can lead to tunneling costs with little benefits for 
shareholders. This is possibly due to the controlling families’ desire to survive in the 
long-run and tentatively by establishing favorable political connections. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
      
   Researchers have attempted to mitigate agency problems occurring within 
businesses and determine the mechanism from the perspective of corporate governance. 
One of the important mechanisms is ownership structure and concentration which is an 
internal governance mechanism. It is essential for family firms which are prevalent in 
both developed and developing nations. The ownership and control of family firms can 
affect their performance and policies, especially in emerging markets where the 
institutional environment is unique and corporate governance is weaker than that in 
developed economies. Most existing studies have been done in developed markets and 
highlight the relationship between family ownership and firm performance. 
Additionally, the findings reported in prior studies on the role of family control in 
emerging markets are inconclusive.  
This thesis investigates the role played by family control and the institutional 
environment of emerging markets in explaining the relationship between controlling 
families and other investors and reflecting controlling families’ incentives influencing 
the implications for firms’ decisions in emerging markets like Thailand. While the 
thesis aims at this broad objective, the specific goals of the study are:  
1. To investigate the importance of family control and expand on earlier analyses 
by examining three different dimensions of family control, namely: family ownership 
structure, control-ownership wedge and family management. Also investigated here are 
the respective effects on dividend payment in Thailand’s listed firms, 
2. To identify an important channel through which family control wields influence 
on the cost of debt in Thailand where lending relationships and long-term affinities 
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between controlling families and creditors are important for firms’ ability to access 
external debt financing, 
3. To examine the effect of family control on firms’ market value during political 
uncertainty stemming from a prolonged political crisis during the constitutional change 
in 2014. 
This thesis summarizes the role of family control via family ownership, control-
ownership wedge and family management, and describes the unique institutional 
environment as being crucial in emerging markets like Thailand. Under the weak 
institutional environment and poor investor protection, controlling families pursue their 
private benefits and expropriate minority shareholders by distorting dividend policy in 
Thai listed firms. This is unlike what happens in developed countries such as the U.S 
and the U.K which have much stronger law enforcement environments regarding the 
property rights of family firms. However, this thesis reveals that family firms benefit 
from the strong and trustworthy relationships they established with creditors, which 
help to alleviate information asymmetry in Thailand’s weak law enforcement 
environment. Moreover, during political uncertainty, family control is associated with 
the firms’ survivorship at the expense of minority shareholders to establish political 
connection among the high level of corruption. The findings from this thesis are 
outlined in more detail below. 
5.1 Family control and dividend payment  
In Chapter 2, this thesis investigates the relationship between dividend policy and 
the three key dimensions of family control in Thailand, i.e. family ownership structure 
and family management. Prior studies note that dividend policy can be used to mitigate 
agency cost of excess cash flow between controlling families and minority shareholders. 
However, this thesis argues that, under an underdeveloped institutional environment, 
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controlling families use excess cash flow to pursue their private benefits by paying low 
dividends to minority shareholders, indicating the high level of agency cost in family 
firms. 
The empirical evidence in Chapter 2 shows that family control has a negative effect 
on dividend payment, and this finding confirms the above expectation that family 
control is associated with lower dividend payment. These results become more 
pronounced when family firms dominate the ownership and are involved in virtually all 
management matters. This is direct empirical evidence for the argument that lower 
dividend payment can be used as a channel for controlling families to expropriate 
minority shareholders. This chapter further supports this contention and finds that the 
extraction of private benefits for family control becomes more costly when firms do too 
well, indicating there are more severe agency problems in family firms relative to non-
family firms. 
Furthermore, the findings in Chapter 2 support the argument that controlling 
families’ incentive for expropriation depends on disproportional ownership or wedge. 
Controlling families’ incentive for expropriation is significantly diminished when firms 
have lower wedge, and is enhanced when firms have more excess cash flow. The 
findings also provide supportive evidence for the argument that institutional 
environment like political uncertainty is important and can affect the behavior of family 
firms. Controlling families’ incentive for expropriation is heightened due to political 
turmoil such as the constitutional change in Thailand. 
Overall, these results confirm the expectations and suggest that in emerging 
markets with underdeveloped legal systems and the lack of investor protection 
mechanisms for minority shareholders, controlling families are more likely to extract 
firms’ resources for their private benefits, and subsequently paying minority 
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shareholders lower dividends. Unlike strong institutional environments and dispersed 
ownership concentration in developed nations, the serious agency conflict between 
controlling families and minority shareholders in Thai listed family firms continue to 
undermine the country’s institutional environment. 
5.2 Family control and cost of debt  
Chapter 3 further examines the impact of family control on the cost of debt in Thai 
listed firms. Since the Thai equity market is underdeveloped, the country’s firms rely 
heavily on bank debt for their external financing which is a unique characteristic of 
Thailand’s financial system. This chapter assesses the impact of family control on 
firms’ ability to secure debt finances externally. Specifically, how do creditors respond 
to the behavior of family firms by requiring interest rate, as an indicator of the cost of 
debt? In the presence of information asymmetry in Thailand, strong and trustworthy 
relationships between controlling families and creditors play an important role in firms’ 
ability to access external debt finance sources. The chapter hypothesizes that controlling 
families have incentives to use their control and blend it with their lending relationships 
with creditors to enjoy less cost of debt financing. 
The findings in Chapter 3 confirm the above hypothesis and illustrate that 
compared to non-family firms, family firms in Thailand have lower cost of debt. The 
results can be explained by Thailand’s weak institutional environment and the lack of an 
arm’s length market-driven system. Since family firms have operated there for a long 
time and extended their business groups and interests, they exercise control via family 
ownership structure, control-ownership wedge and family management, and maintain 
their lending relationship with creditors to secure lower cost of external debt financing 
for long-run survivability.  
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The empirical evidence finds that the lower cost of debt enjoyed by family-
controlled firms is particularly pronounced in highly profitable firms. However, this 
impact of family control becomes weaker during the 2014 coup d’état possibly due to 
the act of establishing political connections. These findings confirm the argument that 
country-level institutional environment in terms of political instability can affect the 
behavior of family firms. Overall, the chapter suggests that in emerging markets with 
weak institutional environments and lacking an arm’s length market-driven system, 
family control significantly affects the cost of debt. Strong lending relationship between 
controlling families and creditors is beneficial in securing lower financing costs.  
5.3 The value of family control during political uncertainty  
Chapter 4 advances the work in Chapter 3 by investigating the behavior of family 
firms during periods of intense political uncertainty in Thailand. In particular, it looks 
the effects of the constitutional change experienced by 2014 coup d’état to provide 
greater insights into what family control can do in the Thai capital market. This political 
uncertainty avoids the endogeneity concern about the relationship between family 
control and firm value. This uncertainty tends to amplify the incentives of controlling 
families in influencing corporate market valuation.  
This chapter asserts that firms’ market value and especially that of family firms 
declines with political uncertainty. It is probable that family firms could use their 
internal resources to establish new political connections during such periods of political 
uncertainty. The findings here confirm this argument and reveal that Thai family firms 
perform poorly relative to non-family firms during a political upheaval, and the effect is 
more pronounced with increasing controlling family ownership. The decline in firm 
value is associated with high expected agency costs of family firms which expend 
internal resources to establish political connections. There is evidence that investors 
152 
 
heavily discount the value of these firms due to perceived tunnelling behavior, 
particularly in companies which are characterized by high cash holdings, operating 
profits, and free cash flow.   
Additional empirical evidence shows that family control can be influenced by 
uncertainty in terms of their financial and investment policies. This is most evident 
when firms operate in nations that are less stable politically and have weak economic 
fundamentals and firms’ decision-making are influenced by the public sector, i.e. the 
government. Chapter 4 finds that regarding survivorship during the periods of political 
uncertainty, family firms delay their investment, hold less cash, pay lower dividends 
and have poorer access to debt financing compared to non-family firms. These results 
suggest that families are more conservative during political uncertainty. The reduction 
in investment and financing activities may at least partially account for the 
underperformance of family firms. 
Overall, these results confirm the above hypothesis and furthermore, family control 
reduces investment and financing activities which are associated with greater 
underperformance of family firms. Taken together, due to the institutional weakness of 
Thailand, family firms tend to expend resources to maintain or establish new political 
connections so that they survive. 
5.4 Summary and implications   
This thesis demonstrates that from a governance perspective the essentials of family 
control and institutional environment affect corporate policies and market value in the 
Thai financial and capital markets. Controlling families have incentives to expropriate 
minority shareholders by paying lower dividends. The levels of expropriation also 
depend on firms’ wedge, indicating the serious agency conflict between controlling 
families and minority shareholders in family firms. 
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Furthermore, to offer greater insights into the role of family control in finance-
related policies and firms’ abilities to access external debt financing and growth in the 
long-term, the policy on cost of debt is analysed in this study. Due to the lack of an 
arm’s length market-driven system in emerging markets, controlling families establish 
strong and trusting lending relationships with creditors. Consequently, this relationship 
helps to mitigate information asymmetry and lower the cost of debt for family firms 
relative to non-family firms. The lower cost of external debt financing is more 
pronounced in highly profitable family firms, suggesting that controlling families are 
concerned about their long-term survival. 
Moreover, to further understand the influence of institutional environment on the 
behavior of family firms, political uncertainty is considered in this study. The empirical 
evidence shows that political uncertainty can significantly affect the relationship 
between family control and firm value. Family firms are more conservative during the 
uncertainty, probably due to the concerns about the survival of the family network 
because they reduce financial and investment activities, resulting in worsening the 
family firms’ value during a period of political uncertainty.  
There are some important implications for market participants in these kinds of 
developing economies. First, due to the agency conflict between controlling families 
and minority shareholders, family control is associated with expropriation and 
tunnelling via lower dividend payment. Due to the weak institutional environment and 
poor investor protection, expropriation and tunnelling are more severe in emerging 
markets which is consistent with Liu et al. (2015) and Ashwin et al. (2015) who 
examine the role of family firms in China and India, respectively. For this reason, 
regulators need to develop legal systems and regulations that can remove the agency 
problem. To higher levels of investor protection, a number of dimensions should be 
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developed such as the rights of shareholders, disclosure and transparency, the role of 
stakeholders and et cetera. The Thai corporate governance code should be stricter and 
changed from “comply or explain” basis to “Mandatory” approach resulting in stronger 
investor protection and corporate governance. Second, lending is in part based on 
personal ties and allocating loans to affiliated firms at preferential terms, rather than on 
the basis of expected future cash flows. Hence, the standard of corporate governance 
and financial system in Thailand should be reformed by regulators. For instance, 
transferring the ownership of some Thai financial institutions from families to other 
types of controlling shareholders such as foreigners or the government should be 
expansively applied leading to increase in an arm’s length market-driven system and 
mitigate information asymmetry. Additionally, banks should be required to reduce 
outstanding loans to connected companies. Granting new banking licenses for both 
domestic and foreign commercial banks should be disclosed on standard practices. 
Third, the value of family control needs to be recognized by both investors and policy-
makers in terms of firms’ ability to access external debt financing as well as in the times 
of political uncertainty, since family control plays an critical role to enhance firms’ 
future prospects. Fourth, lower disproportional ownership structure and financing 
conditions such as more profitability can reduce controlling families’ propensity for 
tunnelling. Investors and creditors need to realise the importance of this issue before 
making investment decisions. Fifth, political uncertainty leads to establishing 
connections between family firms and politicians during political uncertainty periods, 
but this needs to be guarded against given the prevalence of corruption in emerging 
countries like Thailand. 
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5.5 Limitations and suggestions for future research  
This section considers some limitations of this study and offers suggestions for 
future research concerning family control of businesses. First, this research focuses on 
family control such as ownership structure, control-ownership wedge and management. 
However, other types of family control can be considered in future studies, namely the 
different influences that exist between founders and heirs in family firms. This research 
highlights the influence of family control on dividend payment, the cost of debt as well 
as on firm value during political uncertainty in Thailand while other financing and 
investment decisions in family firms should be explored. Another limitation of this 
thesis is the sample selection. This thesis uses only companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) but the role of corporate governance in Thai’s unlisted 
companies, which are generally small to medium-sized, is unclear. Therefore, future 
research should employ both publicly traded and privately owned Thai firms in order to 
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Appendix A Chapter 3: Turnover of Politicians in Thailand by Province and Year 
(2009-2015) 
This table reports the turnover of politicians in Thailand by province and year over the sample period 
2009-2015. 
 
Number Province 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 Ayutthya 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2 Bangkok 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
3 Buriram 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
4 Chacherngsao 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
5 Chainart 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
6 Chiang Mai 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
7 Chiang Rai 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
8 Chonburi 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
9 Chumphon 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
10 Khon Kaen 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
11 Krabi 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
12 Lampang 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
13 Lamphun 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
14 Nakhon Ratchasima 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
15 Naknorn Sawan 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
16 Nakorn Phathum 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
17 Nonthaburi 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
18 Pathum Thani 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
19 Prachinburi 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
20 Rayong 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
21 Roi Et 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
22 Samut Prakarn 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
23 Samut Sakhon 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
24 Saraburi 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
25 Songkhla 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
26 Surat Thani 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
27 Udon Thani 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 





Appendix B Chapter 4: Variable Definitions  
Variable name Variable definition 
Panel A: firm performance and family ownership 
LnMB Natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio 
FamilyDummy Dummy variable equals 1 if a family holds more than 25% of 
their firm’s shares and 0 otherwise 
FamilyStake Percentage of control rights controlled by the family owners 
FamilyStake25to75 Dummy variable equals 1 if a family holds 25%-75% of their 
firm’s shares and 0 otherwise 
FamilyStake75more Dummy variable equals 1 if a family holds more than 75% of 
their firm’s shares and 0 otherwise 
  
Panel B: other variables  
PoliticalYearDummy Dummy variable equals 1 in the years 2013 to 2015 (during 
political uncertainty) and 0 otherwise 
GovDummy Dummy variable equals 1 if the government hold more than 
25% of their firm’s shares and 0 otherwise 
ForeignDummy Dummy variable equals 1 if foreign investors hold more than 
25% of their firm’s shares and 0 otherwise 
Firm size (LnSize) Natural logarithm of firm total assets 
Leverage (Lev) Long-term debt at time t/ total debt at time t-1 
Fixes asset (FixedAsset) Fixed assets/ total assets 
OCF Operating cash flow/ total assets 
Cash Total cash/ total assets 
EBITDA Earnings before interest-related taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization/ total assets 
Free cash flow (FCF) Free cash flow/ total assets 
Return of assets (ROA) Net income/total assets 
Tobin’s Q (Market value of equity + Book value of debt)/ total asset. 
Market value of equity equals price per share times total 
number of shares outstanding. Book value of debt equals total 
assets minus book value of equity 
CapEX Capital expenditure/ total assets 
Dividend Dummy variable equals 1 if a firm pays dividends and 0 
otherwise 
 
 
 
